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2"...in such a war, the natives over whose heads it is fought,
wholly devoid of responsibility for it are, will always be
the greatest sufferers, no matter how we may try to spare
them; and from the point of view of European
prestige...nothing is more calculated to weaken the respect 
of the natives for the Whitemen as a race than to make them 
the witness of our quarrels, unless it be to enlist their 
assistance in arms against our fellow whites,..."
Source -
Henry Duff - "Whitemen's wars in Black men's countries" in 
the National Review, No. 504, February, 1925, pl02.
3SIERRA LEONE AND WORLD WAR 1
Thesis Abstract
Though Sierra Leone was not a theatre of war in 1914, World 
War 1 had significant consequences for the dependency. 
Convinced that the crisis was not just a "Whiteman's 
palaver," Sierra Leone supported the Allies against the 
Central Powers.
Fearing reprisals from Germany, Governor Merewether warned 
against denuding the Protectorate of troops but the global 
emergency was, in the opinion of the Colonial Office, more 
important than the interests of the Colony. Thus between 1914 
and 1917, Sierra Leoneans were recruited for service in 
Togoland and the Cameroons and to help fight Britain's 
"porters' war" in East Africa. If recruitment reduced the 
crime rate in Freetown it also took away able-bodied men 
from agriculture. Returnees from the Cameroons worsened the 
problems of unemployment and sanitation.
The war exposed the vulnerability of Sierra Leone to the 
spread of disease. Congestion, increased international trade 
contacts and the lack of fumigation facilities for ships at 
Freetown's harbour, helped the spread of smallpox and 
influenza. Whilst smallpox threatened whole villages, and 
dislocated farming, influenza paralysed education and 
arrested progress in the oil palm industry.
Economically, the war hindered developments in the import and
4export sectors. By 1915 dwindling revenue returns pointed to 
the need for financial stringency. The problems of economic 
decline, high prices for imported goods and the manipulative 
tactics of foreign firms were felt mainly by indigenous 
producers and consumers. The chief variables governing 
economic activity were unfavourable climatic conditions, the 
high tariff rates on spirits, tax evasion in the Protectorate 
and the closure of the German market. Thus growth in revenue 
in 1918 did not indicate any widespread accumulation of 
wealth. Economic problems impinged significantly on the 
already depleted supplies of food in wartime. Rice smuggling 
over the frontier, the requisitioning of rice by the military 
authorities, the hoarding of rice by traders and the famine 
of 1919 aggravated food shortages and provided the triggers 
for rural and urban violence*;
5TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract 3
Preface and Acknowledgements 6
Map 10
PART 1
Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Chapter 11 The Military Experience 44
Chapter 111 The Sierra Leone Carrier
Corps 100
PART 11
Chapter IV Sanitation Disease and War 142
Chapter V The Smallpox Epidemic 170
Chapter VI The Influenza Epidemic 213
PART 111
Chapter VI1 The Economic Impact 1 257
Chapter VI11 The Economic Impact 11 300
Chapter XIX War, Rice and Food
Shortages 327
CONCLUSION 381
BIBLIOGRAPHY 388
6PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was conceived whilst I was conducting research for 
a Masters thesis at Fourah Bay College on the origins and 
impact of the Colonial army in Sierra Leone. The motivation 
was supplied by my late father Emmanuel Cole who enlisted as 
a depression Range Finder in the Heavy Battery, Royal 
Artillery Machine Gun Section in 1937. It was largely as a 
result of his efforts that the Sierra Leone recruit was 
offered boots by the British administration even though the 
question of boots had begun to exercise the minds of the 
authorities since 1902. By the outbreak of war in 1914
recruits in Sierra Leone had still not been given boots
though the question was considered again in 1916. Men like 
R.S.M. Morlai Yainkain, C.S.M. Kamanda, Sergeant Momo Sanko, 
Lance Coporal Sorie Kanu and Private Momodu Alpha (all of the 
Sierra Battalion) thus had to contend barefoot with the 
hazards of the terrain in the Cameroons and the problems of 
bush warfare in East Africa.
It is partly in memory of these (and many more) men who 
suffered and died that this work is written. If there is a 
tendency to forget their contributions to the fortunes "of 
king and country" between 1914 and 1918, this work celebrates 
the sacrifices they made by "reviving" many a neglected 
document.
All too often the history of Sierra Leone in the twentieth
century has been smudged by political and "tribal rifts"
which have torn the society apart and led the military to
7step into the shoes of civilians. Unfortunately some Sierra 
Leonean historians have added to these divisions by seeking 
"tribal" justification and answers to historical questions. 
Above all the failure to dig deep into the "crystal 
fountains" of archives has inevitably sharpened these 
divisions and done material damage to the historiography of 
Sierra Leone. Rather than leave much to the imagination, 
this work provides a comprehensive history of Sierra Leone 
between 1914 and 1919. It offers details and interpretations 
rather than generalisations and concentrates on the concrete 
rather than the abstract. If there is a tendency toward 
detail in some places, it is hoped that this will illuminate 
rather obscure some of the main themes of Sierra Leone's 
history in the early twentieth century. Such themes include 
attempts by colonial governments to balance revenue and 
expenditure, disease, medicine and health, food shortages, 
rural and urban radicalism, and deteriorating Anglo-Krio 
relations.
A work of this nature owes a great debt to many people. My 
debt is greatest to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for 
providing the bursary and financial assistance which enabled 
me to conduct research in Britain. Many thanks are due to 
Theresa (formerly Ms Harvey and then British Council 
Representative in Sierra Leone) Koroma for making this 
possible; for her encouragement and inspiration amidst 
intense opposition from the University Secretariat in Sierra 
Leone, and for enabling me to travel back home to conduct 
field work. I gladly acknowledge the unflinching support 
offered by Professor Akintola Wyse - for enhancing the 
motivation and stimulus for this work and for making bold
8sacrifices on my behalf even in the face of threats from 
University authorities at Fourah Bay College. The completion 
of this work is ample recompense for all the fruitful and 
stimulating discussions we had since he became Head of 
Department at Fourah Bay College.
I am more than grateful to Richard Rathbone (my supervisor 
at S.O.A.S.) for sustaining that stimulus; for teaching me so 
much about scholarship and fellowship; for his friendship, 
dedication and good humour; for helping to broaden my 
comparative perspective and for bolstering my confidence 
whenever it tended to wane.
My other obligations are legion. I am deeply indebted to 
Albert Moore of the Sierra Leone National Archives whose 
efficiency and fortitude helped to locate many a document 
that could easily elude even the most meticulous of
researchers. I am also grateful to the staff of the 
following archives and libraries: Fourah Bay College Library, 
Sierra Leone Collection, the Public Record Office, London, 
The British Library, Col indale, the staff at the former Royal 
Commonwealth Society Library, London, the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, the staff at
S.O.A.S. Library, University of London and the Imperial War 
Museum.
I owe much to the stimulus of Christopher Fyfe whose
encyclopaedic knowledge of Sierra Leone history helped in 
some instances to sharpen my focus and analysis; to Joy, 
Secretary, Department of History at S.O.A.S., and Pascal 
Codwyll (a very special friend) for introducing me to the
9many crucibles of computer technology. A final debt is owed 
to Jackie for typing the thesis and for accommodating a 
motley of idiosyncratic shifts and changes at unreasonably 
short notice.
While the work is certainly the better for the help I have 
been given, I alone am responsible for errors found therein.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Though Sierra Leone was not a theatre of war in 1914, World 
War 1 enhanced significantly the importance of the dependency 
as a depot in Britain's imperial network.1 Apart from its 
strategic position on the west coast of Africa, Sierra Leone 
was important not only for supplying troops, carriers and 
labourers to the various theatres of war but also for 
providing material resources to help maintain the troops.2 By 
the time of the outbreak significant improvements had been 
made in communications. Railway3 construction and bridge 
building4 were proceeding with relative ease facilitating 
greater exchange of goods and movements of people between the 
Colony and the Protectorate. More importantly, developments 
in harbour facilities5 improved international trade not only 
with other West African countries but with Europe as well. 
Germany, France, Holland and (to a lesser extent) the United 
States of America had thus succeeded in establishing some 
foothold in the import and export trade of the country.6
In the wake of railway construction came foreign firms 
seeking concessions in the oil palm industry.7 The Syrians 
who between the late 1880's and 1913 had made significant 
inroads into the wholesale and retail trade of the country 
were also by the outbreak of war, still streaming into the 
country from French Guinea following the railway to tap the 
new opportunities open to them.8
Paradoxically as will be shown in the thesis, the blessings 
of communication and trade were to prove a curse in disguise
12
during the war. If troops returning from the various 
theatres of war brought disease to the dependency, the 
strategic position of Freetown, developments in communication 
and international trade facilitated the spread of smallpox 
and influenza. Whilst recruitment for service overseas 
dislocated family life, it also removed many able bodied men 
away from agriculture. Ironically also increased commercial 
activity was to prove disastrous for indigenous producers and 
traders as foreign firms established trade rings to control 
the export trade and shipping during the war. Why therefore 
was Sierra Leone so important during World War 1?
SIERRA LEONE IN THE CONTEXT OF EMPIRE
Situated close to the main trade routes between Europe, West 
Africa and South Africa and very close to the routes from 
Europe across the South Atlantic Ocean, Sierra Leone was 
destined to play a major role militarily and economically in 
World War 1. With a magnificent harbour situated half-way to 
the Cape and with ample supplies of fresh water, the 
dependency had for long been constituted as a fortified 
coaling station.9
In considering the "natural capabilities and advantages of 
the place," the Sierra Leone Gazette had in 1827 expressed 
the hope that the Colony "might be made one of the brightest 
jewels in the British Crown."10 At least since 1787 when the 
"famous harbour" acted as a "sanctuary for so many liberated 
Africans"11 imperial strategists had come to regard Sierra 
Leone as the key to the defence of British territories in 
West Africa and as a strategic colony in the imperial chain
13
because of its importance as a coaling station. In the event 
of war therefore, British sea power was expected to prevent 
other European powers from supplying and reinforcing local 
African forces or using West Africa as a base for attack 
against India.12
With a total area of 27,300 square miles,13 it was chiefly 
the geographical position of Sierra Leone which made it so 
important to naval and military strategists during World War 
1. Long before the threat of war, it was active British 
policy to protect the important trade routes along the 
Atlantic Ocean. The need therefore to prevent these routes 
being used by enemy ships and the harassment of enemy sea­
borne commerce, constituted the primary duties of the navy. 
Regarded as "the gateway of West Africa"14 Sierra Leone came 
to acquire greater importance in the context of empire mainly 
because three of the most important trade routes in the 
British Empire passed within a comparatively short distance 
of the dependency. One route passed from Europe to South 
America and another (very important in the trade of the 
empire) from Europe to West African ports.15
The route from Europe to Australia and New Zealand via the 
Cape of Good Hope was probably the most controversial. The 
construction of the Suez Canal had diverted a large amount of 
commerce from this route but it should be observed that the 
distance from Melbourne to England via the Cape is only 850 
miles greater than by the Canal route. Thus, if the Canal 
route was blocked, this would mean using the Cape route 
extensively. In fact this route was heavily used during the 
war to convey troops and food though Britain still retained
14
Egypt, Malta and Gibraltar. Freetown came to serve as a
convenient base for ships used in protecting these routes; it 
was therefore vital to protect the dependency against enemy 
attacks for were the Colony to be captured by a hostile 
power, this was bound to endanger the safety of sea
communications with South America, the Cape and Australia. 
As the link between Gibraltar and Simon's Town, (also a naval 
dockyard) the Colony occupied a midway position between
Simon's Town and the British Isles. It was therefore well 
placed to serve as a rendezvous for convoys of ships on the 
Cape route or for those plying between the United Kingdom and 
West African ports.16 Freetown served this purpose during
the war and was also an important base for mercantile
shipping sailing for the U.K. "from South American ports, and
from Australian ports via Cape Horn or the Straits of
Magellan."17
Of greater importance was the role of Sierra Leone in
providing a base for the replenishment of stores, the
provision of fuel and for effecting repairs to cruisers
employed in the protection of merchant shipping.18 So vital 
was Freetown in the imperial network that between 1909 and 
1913 (except for 1910 when yellow fever threatened the
dependency) the port was the scene of much vibrant shipping 
activity.19 Many steamers chiefly from Britain traded with 
Sierra Leone before the war. A regular mail and passenger
service was maintained by the vessels of the African
Steamship Company and the British and African Steam
Navigation Company, both of which were run by Messrs Elder
Dempster and Company. The service boats operated by the
15
latter sailed from London, Liverpool and other ports at 
regular intervals calling at both Freetown, and Bonthe. In 
this way trade was maintained by these services between the 
Colony and Canada, the United States, Hamburg, Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Bordeaux, Havre and the African coast.20
In a trade in which various nations participated, the only 
competition came from Germany whose express mail and 
passenger boats of the Woermann Line began calling at the 
port in 1911. So vigorous was German competition that by the 
outbreak of war the German business firm, the Deutsche 
Kamerun Gesellschaft was firmly established at Freetown and 
Bonthe and was rapidly opening up branches in Blama and 
Kenema in the Protectorate.21 So important was Freetown to 
Germany that in 1918, the German Colonial Secretary declared 
that "one of the first results of Teutonic victory would have 
been the seizure and utilisation of the British West African 
colonies, especially Sierra Leone."22 It is against this 
background that we must understand the determined German 
efforts to cripple British shipping during the war.23
As a strategic entrepot of trade Freetown before the war was 
a distributing centre for British and other foreign goods. A 
bourgeoning network of communications ensured a successful 
import and export trade. Well provided with waterways useful 
for transportation24 steamers called at the sub-ports of Mano 
Salija, Sulima, Kikonke, Mahela and Gene for produce,23 
tapping the trade of the Moa valley, Mopalma, Pujehun and its 
adjoining towns of Deah, Yoni, Victoria and Timdale.26 Though 
there were few roads suitable for motor traffic outside 
Freetown on the eve of war27 feeder roads with hard surfaces
16
had begun to converge on the more important railway stations- 
Moyamba, Bo, Blama, Hangha, Segbwema, Baima and Pendembu by 
1913.28 With its main line running south-eastwards from
Freetown by Waterloo, Bauya, Bo, and Blama to Baima, railway 
construction was revolutionising trade in many parts of the 
Protectorate and by 1912, the branch line to Rowalla in 
Ronietta District had been opened to traffic29 attracting a 
greater volume of trade and foreign firms which came to play 
a controversial role in the export trade during the war. In 
1913 for example, Messrs Lever Bros were seeking permission 
to lay down tramways or mono-rails in Ronietta and to erect 
mechanical mills to express oil from the pericarp of the palm 
fruit.30
By the eve of war, the principal firms included Messrs 
Pickering and Berthoud, Paterson Zochonis and Company, G.B. 
Ollivant, the Societe Commerciale de I'Ouest Africain, the 
French Company, the firm of Monsieur A Genet and Company, P. 
Ratcliffe and Company and others.31 The results of 
developments in communications and commerce on the eve of 
war, were enormous. As traders followed the railway, small 
centres developed into large towns. Mano on the main line 
and Sembehun in Ronietta came to constitute important 
trading centres where the staple trade in palm produce was 
supplemented by a brisk business in rice during the harvest. 
Kangahun, the station before Mano on the main line also 
developed encouragingly during 1912.32 Originally designed 
to be the terminus of the branch line, "a mushroom town" had 
sprung up at Makump by 1913. Mabum itself just five miles 
short of Makump, was posing a threat to the latter's
17
importance.33 In Railway District, Sumbuya, situated on the 
borders of Northern Sherbro, was served by an excellent 
waterway by which goods and produce could be cheaply 
transported to Bonthe34 and from there to Freetown's 
strategic harbour on the west coast.
These internal developments added considerably to the overall 
importance of the dependency in the empire and because the 
harbour was so essential in the empire's trade, the land 
defences of Freetown had begun to attract the attention of 
the military authorities in 1910. Because communications 
formed an integral part of imperial defences, some roads were 
being cut in the vicinity of Signal Hill and Wilberforce Spur 
in 1910 to facilitate communications in the event of war and 
to make all ranks familiar with them in peace time.35 As has 
been rightly argued, if the port of Freetown was to be 
effectively utilised during war, the cooperation of land 
forces was absolutely essential. The need to defend Freetown 
was predicated on many factors. It was in close proximity to 
the principal lines of sea communications; further, it was in 
close proximity to possible areas of conflict36 especially so 
with the French in neighbouring Guinea and with the Germans 
fighting hard for control in Liberia.37 So that in the event 
of a naval war in the Atlantic Ocean, Sierra Leone could 
serve as a cruiser base, convoy assembly point and fuelling 
station. So important was Freetown as a "routing and convoy 
port" that in 1924, Governor Slater was to argue that the 
"naval duties which Sierra Leone was being asked to undertake 
were becoming so numerous" that it was necessary to have a 
naval officer permanently stationed there to "ensure the
18
proper execution of these duties."3®
To a large extent, such considerations governed the 
maintenance of imperial and colonial forces in Sierra Leone 
long before the outbreak of World War 1 (unlike Ghana, 
Nigeria and the Gambia which maintained only colonial forces) 
On the eve of war the personnel of the Imperial garrison 
comprised the Command and Headquarters Staff, Royal Garrison 
Artillery (42nd Heavy Battery) formed in 1889. Comprising 
chiefly of Mende, Temne and Limba recruits, the establishment 
consisted of 5 European officers, 4 European NCOs, 83 rank 
and file and 6 guns.39 The West India Regiment formed around 
1812 partly because of the high mortality rate among the 
European soldiers of the Royal African Corps, was also part 
of the Imperial garrison and originally consisted of recruits 
from Barbados. For more than a century this regiment 
maintained its headquarters in the Colony leaving Bunce 
Island for Tower Hill in 1812 and afterwards occupying Mount 
Aureol.40 By the outbreak of war, there were 4 companies 
still in the Colony.41
Formed chiefly in response to the outbreak of the Hut Tax 
rebellion of 1898, the West African Regiment which comprised 
chiefly Mende and Temne recruits was also intended to augment 
the troops of the Third Battalion, West India Regiment which 
had recently arrived from St. Helena.42 When orders were 
received for mobilisation, the regiment had 7 companies 
deployed in Freetown, 2 at Port Loko, 2 at Mabanta, and 1 at 
Wongkufu.43 Yet perhaps of greater importance for
appreciating the role of colonial forces in the British 
empire was the presence in the Colony of the Sierra Leone
19
Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force whose 
origins and history up to 1914 are traced in chapter 2. 
Apart from calling into question the character and prestige 
of British authorities in the remoter parts of the interior, 
the 1898 rebellion exposed the inadequacy of the Sierra Leone 
Frontier Police to ensure the obedience of the insurgents. 
It is against this background coupled with a combination of 
strategic considerations that the formation of the Sierra 
Leone Battalion should be understood. Constituted in 1901 
with headquarters in Freetown, recruits were drawn mainly 
from the Mende and Temne groups, the Susu, Limba, Loko, and 
Sherbro also furnishing large numbers.44
With memories of Mende men serving under his command in the 
Ashanti war of 1873-1874, Lord Wolseley had appointed an 
experienced staff officer to raise recruits in 1897 and his 
desire to develop a strong indigenous foundation for a Sierra 
Leone force was clearly dictated by the strategic importance 
attached to Freetown in Lord Carnavon's Royal Commission 
Report on the defences of empire in 1879. British maritime 
support it was envisaged would thus multiply the 
effectiveness of the W A F F  many times over.45 From 1905, 
the supervision of convict labour was undertaken by Court 
Messengers and with a reserve force begun in 1906, the 
training of the men benefited immensely.45 From the creation 
of the battalion and the subsequent absorption of a large 
number of the former Frontier Police, till the battalion 
replaced the West India Regiment which came under orders for 
disbandment in 1928, the energies of the W A F F  were engaged 
in quelling internal risings4-7 and up to 1908 when the
20
headquarters were moved from Freetown to the Protectorate, 
service with the battalion was very popular.48
The battalion was essentially a colonial military force and 
all expenses connected with it were borne by the Colony 
unlike the imperial garrison which was financed by imperial 
funds. This dichotomy was to pose formidable problems of 
control in wartime when the W A F F  came under War Office 
control.49 On the eve war however, the fortunes of the 
battalion were rendered particularly hazardous when some 
members of the administration began to view it as a 
liability. The increasing outbreaks of "human leopard 
murders" led the District Commissioner of Northern Sherbro 
(Major Fairtlough) to recommend its abolition and the 
establishment of an armed constabulary force modelled on the 
lines of the Royal Irish Constabulary.
Fairtlough's objections to the force were predicated on what 
he regarded as the high cost of maintaining the establishment 
(£30,000 and an additional £500 for the 2 new companies 
proposed) He saw the force as a purely military one 
contributing nothing to the administration and development of 
the Colony. Fairtlough argued that the 19 white officers in 
the force had only a cursory knowledge of the Protectorate 
and evinced little interest in its economic development. The 
Governor however countered that the moral effect of a 
military force "is greater among uncivilised people than that 
of any constabulary force".30 In the end the battalion was 
maintained and was destined to help liberate the Cameroons 
from the Germans.
21
During World War 1, the fortunes of Sierra Leone were 
presided over by two governors whose regimes were marked by 
great controversy with the Colonial office and the indigenous 
population over many a matter of policy. Taking over the 
dependency in 1911 Governor E. M Merewether's term of office 
was noted for the bitter acrimony which his policies 
generated in Krio circles. Though he was to declare that his 
task in the Colony was "an easy one"51 the evidence shows 
that by 1913, there was sufficient bad blood between him and 
the community. In September 1913, the local bar (all Krios) 
vehemently opposed attempts by the Legislative Council to 
amend the Supreme Court's Ordinance of 1904 and secure "under 
certain circumstances" the admission of depositions of absent 
witnesses. Fed up with the blundering tactics of the 
Governor who regarded the opposition as "useless", the 
Colonial Office argued that it was "not a bad thing 
occasionally to let the unofficials have their way."52 Though 
the Secretary of State (Harcourt) concluded that the "Sierra 
Leone government was increasingly anti-native", Merewether 
was still replacing retired African personnel53 with white 
officers in the legal establishment.54 Harcourt was later to 
argue that "the sooner this negrophobe governor is removed 
elsewhere the better".55
Merewether's governorship had clearly fallen on bad days - 
hemmed in as he was by an articulate public and unofficial 
members in the Legislative Council, and a Colonial Office 
that was prepared to sacrifice him in the interest of peace. 
On the eve of war, he was regarded as "a fearful allowance 
chaser" presiding over an administration that was 
"lethargic... one who accomplishes the minimum of results with
22
the maximum of f riction. . . if there is any zeal or energy in 
any public office he makes it his business to ground it".56 
Despite repeated appeals prior to the war Merewether refused 
Krio pleas to be enlisted in the proposed Volunteer force 
first mooted in 1911.5v On 15th January 1916, the governor 
who had been appointed to Antigua and the Leeward Islands, 
was captured on board the Elder Dempster liner, Appam, which 
after much litigation was sent to its owners in Virginia 
where it was released.55
At a time when the economy was in dire straits, H E R  
Wilkinson assumed the governorship of Sierra Leone in 1916 
after a distinguished and varied career as sheriff in 
Singapore, Acting Collector of Land revenue Pengang, Acting 
Inspector of schools, Straits Settlements, Inspector of 
schools. Federated Malay states, and Acting Resident, Negri 
Sembilan.59
It was largely this varied career that was to inform the 
copious despatches which Wilkinson was later to send to the 
Colonial Office during the course of the war concerning 
education, health and sanitation, and forestry. More
importantly however, Governor Wilkinson's administration was 
marked by an endeavour to provide adequate feeder roads to 
convey produce to the railway.60 Wilkinson's roads policy 
was intended to substitute wheeled traffic especially motor 
transport for transport by carriers. Furthermore the roads 
were expected to release many men from the work of transport 
to that of direct production. Administratively, they were to 
provide efficiency by enabling government officers to cover
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much more ground in the day and to pay surprise visits 
everywhere.61 Perhaps what made the governor's reign so 
contentious, was the controversy surrounding the outbreak of 
influenza in the colony in 1918, the Governor's alleged 
inaction and boycott of his medical staff,62 the disputes 
surrounding rice shortages and the riots against the Syrian 
communi ty in 1919.6 3
It is against this background of the strategic importance of 
Sierra Leone and two controversial administrations that the 
thesis examines the impact of recruitment on the dependency 
during the First World War, the impact of the spread of 
disease, the economic impact of war and rice shortages.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Over the last fifteen years, historians have come to evince 
considerable interest in the part played by Africa in World 
War 1 and this is clearly reflected in the growing literature 
on the subject. It is important to note however that apart 
from one or two country studies such as that by Osuntokun, 
the literature on Africa is skewed towards military 
recruitment in wartime and the role played by African 
soldiers and carriers in the African theatres of war 
(Togoland, the Cameroons and East Africa) Consequently the 
historian studying the impact of the war on African societies 
is still confronted by what Rathbone describes as many "areas 
of darkness".64
Very few works address the political and economic policies 
pursued by colonial governments in their attempts to balance 
revenue and expenditure or the impact of the war on public
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works and infrastructural developments. Themes relating to 
internal trade, the impact of wartime privation on indigenous 
producers, African merchants and the general population, the 
fortunes of religion in wartime and the impact of disease in 
various African territories are ignored. Many works are 
largely general surveys with a conspicuous dearth of material 
on Sierra Leone.65
Most of the "Regimental Histories" trace the development of 
separate regiments like the Kings African Rifles and the 
Northern Rhodesian Regiment66 so that in much of the 
foregoing literature the material on Sierra Leone is either 
very thin or non-existent. Such an omission justifies the 
need for a micro-study approach such as that by Osuntokun on 
Nigeria,67 in order to produce a synthesis of the African 
contribution to the war effort and to emphasise the overall 
impact of the war on Africa.
R.P.M. Davies and Haywood and Clarke attempt to do justice to 
the role played by West Africans in the war, yet these 
attempts are limited in scope chiefly concerned as they are 
with the military input of West Africans in the Cameroons, 
Togoland and East Africa.66 Writing from an essentially 
military background, Haywood and Clarke drew extensively on 
the war diaries relating to the period, but very little is 
known of the problems faced by demobilised soldiers and 
carriers and their relatives as they try to adjust to civil 
life after the end of hostilities.
In major works on Sierra Leone by both Sierra Leone and non- 
Sierra Leonean writers the impact of the war on Sierra Leone
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is either allocated a passing reference or is not mentioned 
at all.69 Thomas Cox's study of civil-military relations in 
Sierra Leone is also of little help. As the first 
comprehensive study of Sierra Leone's soldiers, Cox examines 
the activities of military men in politics and the imposition 
of "subjective control70 over what was hitherto regarded by 
the British as a non-political army. Whilst it should be 
stressed that the impact of the war did not constitute the 
major concern of these writers it should also be stated that 
despite the interest generated in this period of African 
history, very little research has been undertaken on Sierra 
Leone.
Methodology
The dearth of published materials on Sierra Leone during the 
First World War means that the research was based chiefly on 
primary (archival) sources. In spite of the wide, uneven and 
disparate nature of the evidence, the Sierra Leone National 
Archive holds valuable primary data and the Colonial Office 
despatches (though largely incomplete) as well as documents 
from the War Department illuminate the socio-economic, 
medical (health) and political impacts which inter alia 
precipitated the first post-war national crisis and turned an 
already disgruntled civilian population against what was 
regarded as an alien group - the Syrians.
The research draws on files relating to the Harbour, Local 
Matters, Customs, Foreign Affairs, the Railway, the Colonies, 
Agriculture, the West African Frontier Force, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Commissioner of Police, the Food Committee and
26
the Medical Department, the Board of Trade, files from the 
office of the Secretary of State, the Sierra Leone Gazette, 
files relating to the Sanitary Department as well as Court 
Record books covering the period 1914-1920. For an 
examination of the impact of the war on the Protectorate, the 
reports and Minute Papers of the various District 
Commissioners proved invaluable; these relate to the Railway, 
Northern Sherbro, Sherbro, Karene, Koinadugu, Headquarter and 
Ronietta Districts.
The approach adopted is mainly thematic and interpretive and 
the aim is to examine broadly the impact of the war on the 
Colony and Protectorate from where the bulk of the soldiers 
and carriers were recruited. The limitations of the evidence 
in s<. Leone necessitated (most of the relevant files stop at 
1920) extensive research in London and documents at the 
Public Record Office were particularly helpful first for 
filling the yawning gaps in the Sierra material and secondly 
for corroborating rare material found in the Sierra Leone 
Archive.
Newspaper reports especially those from the Sierra Leone 
Weekly News the Colonial and Provincial Reporter, West Africa 
Magazine, the Sierra Leone Times and the Reformer, (only one 
disintegrating copy of this newspaper s^ in the Sierra
Leone Archive) were also examined in order to show the 
general feelings of a populace whose unconditional loyalty to 
the war effort was hardly reciprocated by the bullying 
tactics of officialdom. Other government publications 
examined include Blue Books, Sierra Leone Annual Reports, 
Legislative Council Debates and Parliamentary Papers.
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A basic limitation of the study is the lack of oral evidence 
so important for corroborating or refuting official 
viewpoints. This could be partly explained by the fact that 
no memoirs have been left behind by any of the recruits 
(soldiers and carriers) who took part in the African 
campaigns or in Mesopotamia. Many recruits like Kelfala 
Kamara, Abu Jailoh, Musa Kamara, Johnny Panguma, Ansumana 
Mandingo, Brima Kamara, Joe Mende, Fine Boy, Vamboi, Blackie, 
Tommy and Momoh Bangura were mainly uneducated Protectorate 
Africans who were uprooted from their groups by recruiting 
commissioners and loyal chiefs to fight the wars of the 
Whiteman. The passage of time may also have taken its toll 
on whatever stories they may have handed down to their 
children. These limitations compound the task of the 
historian wishing to reconstruct the problems facing 
demobilised soldiers and their relatives. We also know very 
little of their socio-economic backgrounds both before and 
after their experiences in the theatres of war. Further, 
very few reminiscences abound of the influenza pandemic which 
affected nearly every sphere of life in Freetown and the 
Protectorate. In the absence of what could be described as 
concrete oral evidence, resort was had to newspaper reports 
which reflected local responses and reactions to the war. But 
with a press mainly dominated by the educated Krio, the 
voice of the Protectorate African or the much despised Syrian 
was little heard.
Once war became inevitable in Europe the fortunes of Sierra 
Leone became inextricably tied up with that of the Allies. 
Certain themes are clearly discernible from a study of the
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relevant documents and the thesis is accordingly divided into 
three parts. The military contribution of Sierra Leone to 
the war effort is crucial for an appreciation of the overall 
impact. Part 1 therefore examines the military build up in 
Sierra Leone as war clouds gathered in Europe and the initial 
destabilising effects on farming. In some cases the War 
Department found it necessary to appropriate lands (to make 
clearings for defence purposes as at Wilberforce and Kissy) 
and "articles of food."'71 Both chapters in Part 1 examine 
the call to mobilisation and attempts by Africans to escape 
compulsion. Slaves were to use the occasion to make good 
their escape and enlist in the West African Frontier Forced2 
much to the chagrin of chiefs. Ronnietta and Karene 
districts in particular supplied infantry and carriers for 
the Expeditionary Force in the Cameroons (by 1915 Ronnietta 
had supplied 700 carriers)73 and because nearly all the 
W.A.F.F. was sent away, the garrison was manned by a 
volunteer force set up for the purpose in 1915.74 The 
general impact on agriculture, labour and public works and 
the problems posed by demobilised soldiers in the Colony and 
Protectorate are also examined. The influx of returnees to 
the Colony was to cause serious problems of unemployment and 
many from the Cameroons worsened the problems of sanitation.
Although (as the Rev. Coker of St. Patrick's Church argued) 
"Africa finds herself" in the war "without her consent being 
first obtained"75 many carriers were sent from Sierra Leone 
to German East Africa. Recruiting for the Corps caused 
serious problems for the administration but by September 
1917, the undivided loyalty of chiefs such as Musa of Mano
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and Boima in Bo7e helped to secure 4,953 carriers to help 
Britain fight what had clearly become a "porter's war" in 
East Africa.’7*7 By December 1916 the War Office had concluded 
that West Africans were particularly suitable for work with 
the Inland Water Transport and the Royal Engineers in 
Mesopotamia. Many labourers from Sierra Leone supplied crews 
for large paddle and stern wheel steamers, motor launches and 
salvage barges. Whilst military recruitment and service 
overseas helped to reduce the crime rate in Freetown78 it 
also exercised a baneful influence on agriculture as many 
able bodied men were taken away from farming.79
Part 2 examines the impact of disease - the small pox 
epidemic of 1915-1916 and the influenza pandemic of 1918 - on 
the dependency. It provides some background to the
insanitary conditions which made Sierra Leone so vulnerable 
to the spread of disease. Governor Wilkinson found the town 
characterised by filth and squalour; Sawpit steps - a very 
important landing place in the business quarter was "littered 
with filth" while sanitary officers wasted time "on petty 
bickering even where there is a smallpox epidemic to 
combat."80 Problems of congestion81 in insanitary conditions 
and continued trade contacts with foreign countries like 
Guinea also aided the spread of disease.82
Conditions in the Protectorate were far from satisfactory. 
Bonthe for example was characterised by "bad drainage, bad 
water, dusty streets" and "mosquitoes are abundant."83 The 
vulnerability of the port of Freetown to steamers infected 
with diseases, the fact that vaccination was not compulsory
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in Sierra Leone before 1916, the lack of medical officers 
during the war years and the failure of African therapy all 
did little to mitigate the spread of disease in 1916 and 
1918.84 Carriers from the Cameroons worsened the situation 
by introducing chickenpox in an already smallpox infected 
country.85 These factors helped the smallpox epidemic to 
spread from French Guinea through Karene to Freetown. If 
smallpox threatened whole villages like Makolo to the east of 
Karene, dislocated farming and bred famine conditions in 
Susu-Limba country, the influenza epidemic of 1918 (apart 
from the alarming death toll and its negative effects on 
public works, education and agriculture) dislocated business 
and hindered progress in the oil palm industry.85
Part 3 discusses the performance of the economy and the 
financial position of the country throughout the war years. 
It undertakes a detailed examination of the import and export 
trade, the general fortunes of revenue, the initial shocks at 
the outset of war and government's attempts to absorb these 
shocks at least up to December 1914. The dependency was very 
fortunate in having accumulated a substantial surplus in 
1913. "The Colony" could therefore "contemplate with 
calmness a further call in 1915 on its ...balances."87 If 
Governor Merewether was enthusiastic over revenue prospects 
for 1915, conditions by the beginning of the new year, 
pointed to a difficult future. Although by February the 
export trade in palm kernels was showing signs of resuming 
its earlier vitality, and though receipts from the railway 
had picked up from a little over £7,000 in September 1914 to 
over £13,500 in December of the same year and some
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improvements made in the import trade, this hardly justified 
hopes that the estimates of £490,647 for 1915 "will be 
realised."ss The revenue derived from trade returns, and 
other sources such as shipping, court fines and the House 
Tax, was not improving and by June 1915 the diminution in 
cash available for general purposes pointed to the need for 
financial stringency and increased duties on all exports 
except ale, beer, porter, cigars, cigarettes and 
unmanufactured tobacco.89 Apart from the elimination of 
German trade, other factors combined to dislocate the import 
and export trade and the lack of shipping facilities 
compounded the situation all the more.
By September 1914 the trade in palm kernels was at a 
standstill. With prices at Liverpool standing at £15 to £16 
a ton, a few purchases were being made in the Colony at 
£11.10s. so that the trader was left with a very small margin 
of profit after paying the increased charges for freight and 
insurance. Producers therefore held back their produce in 
anticipation of better prices.90 The partial failure of the 
first rice crop in 1914 and the consequent diversion of the 
attention of producers to a second crop, the drift of labour 
towards road construction, the drastic fall in prices and the 
lack of machinery to extract the oil from the pericarp of the 
palm fruit, exercised "a baneful influence" on the expansion 
of the export trade in palm oil by 1915.91 Messrs Lever 
Brothers, established at Yonibana, were therefore forced by 
circumstances to give up their factory and to erect the plant 
in the Gold Coast.92 Conditions had not materially improved 
by 1918 and the irregularity of shipping activity, the
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influenza epidemic, the early rains coupled with the very 
high cost of imported goods continued to worsen the 
situation.93 Indeed the loss of German trade was to have 
serious consequences for revenue throughout the war.
The war years constituted a blessing in disguise for European 
firms (firms such as the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique 
Occidentale and Paterson Zochonis and Co)94 in Sierra Leone. 
By 1916, the operations of a "Combine" of foreign firms had 
come to the notice of the Governor. Members of the Combine 
were making very large gains from "the commission paid on 
profits" by parent firms in London and local agents were 
"notoriously prosperous at present." The effects of the 
exploitative practices of the Combine were felt by producers 
who were compelled to accept very low prices for produce and 
at the same time pay very high prices for imported goods such 
as machets.95 Within the context of a general economic 
decline, the government was compelled to abandon public works 
during the war -works such as the railway extension to Baga, 
the building of the new bay at Cline Town, the improvement of 
roads and drains in Freetown etc. - in order to effect 
savings in many directions.96
Perhaps, the most useful way of appreciating the economic 
impact of the war on Sierra Leone is by comparing the nature 
of economic activity in the pre-war years and the war period. 
The chief variables which conditioned economic activity were 
unfavourable climatic conditions, the prohibition of certain 
imports like sugar from the United Kingdom,97 the high 
tariff rates on spirits, the transfer of labour into the 
ranks of the Carrier Corps, the rather subtle methods of tax
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evasion in the Protectorate, the strenuous efforts by the 
administration to secure revenue by raising taxes and by 
rehabilitating the Customs Preventive Service at Gene, Mano 
Salija and Sulima.
Through the use of statistical evidence based on trade 
returns it is shown that growth in revenue in 1918 did not 
indicate any widespread accumulation of wealth. By 1919 
there was an artificial scarcity of basic commodities caused 
by hoarding and indiscriminate profiteering by local firms,98 
(like the S.C.O.A. which was charging very high prices for 
flour) Syrians" (such as Ali Rashid in Moyamba who was 
convicted for inflating the price of rice) and chiefs who 
extorted rice and produce from their subjects.100 These 
factors produced a volatile situation and contributed to 
rural and urban radicalism in 1919.
Alongside the general economic malaise was the problem of
rice and food. The last chapter traces the history of rice
from the pre-war years through the war period. This approach 
is important for an appreciation of the factors which led to 
the anti-Syrian riots in 1919. The evidence shows that the 
history of rice hitherto was characterised by dearth and the 
famine of 1910 was the precursor of the shortages between 
1914 and 1919. The dependence on rice as the staple diet and
the failure to find alternatives in the pre-war period made
it so difficult for the population to adjust to conditions of 
scarcity during the war.101 This chapter looks at the 
practice of selling rice over the frontier to French Guinea 
and official policy towards rice and food on the eve of war 
and during the war years.
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Official policy included arrangements for procuring supplies 
of preserved meat, biscuits, groceries and dried vegetables 
from England. In the event of war rice brought down the 
Searcies river for export was to be commandeered and 
merchants were requested to maintain stocks of rice and flour 
to meet the needs of the government in any emergency.102 The 
war period itself was characterised by compulsory purchases 
of rice and a lack of protection for the producer against the 
poor prices offered by merchants. By July 1915 for example 
the total cost of rice to General Dobell in the Cameroons was 
£1,572.103
Many factors affected the production and availability of rice 
during the war years. These included poor rainfall and 
climatic variations, problems of transportation as in
Northern Sherbro where the Sumbuya rivers were not navigable 
throughout the year, labour shortages and the influenza
epidemic. By 1917 the shortage of machets for cultivation 
worsened the fortunes of the rice crop104 and the lesser 
imports of rice from August 1914 coupled with the re­
imposition of duties on foodstuffs in November 1915 affecting 
bread, butter, and salt merely exacerbated the food
situation.105 Rice collection during the war became a
yardstick for measuring chiefly loyalty to officialdom. If 
its plentiful supply at the outset of war brought the 
government and people together, the later shortages were to 
sever that connection in 1919.
The food problem was not mitigated by the scramble for sugar 
and the lack of meat and fish,106 and the population resented
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the prices fixed by the Food Committee.10'7 By July 1919 many 
chiefs, traders, Europeans and Syrians were guilty of 
hoarding rice and other foodstuffs, widespread extortion and 
attempts to cheat consumers by the use of illegal 
measures.108 These problems were compounded by the famine of 
1919 and the serious administrative lapses in the 
distribution of rice provided the triggers for urban and 
rural violence in post-war Sierra Leone.
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CHAPTER 2: THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE
In March 1920, Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy was to declare 
in the House of Commons that "plenty of histories of the war 
have been written already by private people and why the 
government should go into this business I cannot for the life 
of me understand."1 But the evidence then and now, would 
show that "the public have heard very little of" the 
"appalling hardships"2 endured by African soldiers in World 
War I. This chapter therefore eschews familiar approaches 
which merely focus on the fighting exploits of African 
combatants in the various theatres of war. Rather, it is 
argued that the African soldier's involvement in the war was 
far more complex than the expulsion of the Germans from 
Mbureku3 in the Cameroons or the crossing of the Rufiji 
valley in East Africa.4
The deployment of Sierra Leoneans as combatants, carriers and 
labourers in Togoland, the Cameroons, German East Africa and 
Mesopotamia, constituted an "experience" which has been given 
casual treatment by historians. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in recent studies by Abraham and Turay,5 Peter Clarke6 
and Farwell.7 Because "there is much that is unknown..." 
about the experience of Africans in World War I, this chapter 
examines the fortunes of Sierra Leone's soldiers in a war 
that was destined to render "our condition more and more 
distressing to think on.1,8
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THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I
When in 1897, Chamberlain decided to amalgamate the disparate 
military and police forces in former British West Africa into 
one corporate body, the West African Frontier Force, little 
did he realise that the composite battalions would be used in 
any crisis involving the great powers. The Sierra Leone 
Battalion W.A.F.F. was constituted in 19019 and thereafter 
took over the functions of the former Frontier Police.10 Its 
role then involved support for the civil administration "for 
which purpose a number of troops are locked up in obligatory 
garrisons," the provision of a striking force to quell 
internal risings and the rendering of assistance to other 
British colonies in West Africa.11 The need to preserve 
Britain's interests in the interior influenced colonial 
thinking greatly so that in 1903, the battalion was engaged 
in containing numerous Kissi raids from Liberia; the 
objective was also to forestall any French expansion in order 
to "restore the confidence of the people."12
Born of the need for contingency,13 the W.A.F.F. was designed 
to help shore-up Britain's huge imperial structure14 in 
Africa. The colonies themselves were to act as a great 
reserve of manpower that could be mobilised in case of war 
and the primary job of the W.A.F.F. was "imperial policing" 
and fighting "small wars" on the far flung frontiers of 
empire.15 In Sierra Leone in particular, the battalion was 
set up16 in view of the rapidly declining prestige and 
reputation of the West Indian Regiment and the Frontier 
Police. At a time when the Anglo-French dispute over the 
Niger was at its height, Freetown, then a naval depot and
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coaling station with batteries constructed for its defence,17 
had to be protected against an assumed French threat. French 
penetration south eastwards from Futa Jallon, was threatening 
to give rise to frontier disputes, hence the need for a force 
to patrol the frontier road from Kambia on the Searcies in 
the north to the Mano river in the south east.18
Apart from strategic considerations, the internecine trade 
wars that characterised the hinterland in the late 19th 
century19 and the threat posed to British trading 
establishments, were to make the need for the battalion all 
the more urgent even before the declaration of the 
Protectorate in 1896.20 The battalion was therefore to act 
as a "guarantee of security to the inhabitants" and "a 
safeguard against lawlessness, oppression and the traffic in 
slaves."21
In a context in which military roles came to overlap with 
police functions22 (such as the provision of gaol guards, 
escorts, and orderlies to District Commissioners) the men 
incorporated into the battalion from the Frontier Police had 
little combat experience apart from the Ashanti campaign of 
1900.23 Governed by local ordinances which specified the 
applicability of the Army Act, and provided for general 
service, their employment in expeditionary forces outside 
Africa was never regarded as a likely contingency before 
World War I.24 They were distributed, maintained and trained 
for African risings and disturbances and the question of 
defence against European-directed invasion or an offensive 
against European-owned territories had never been seriously
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contemplated.
The efficiency of the battalion was determined by its success 
in quelling internal risings and by its performance in bush 
warfare. The force lacked any machinery for expansion and 
much reliance could not be placed on reservists. Unlike East 
Africa which was more exposed to internal troubles and 
external aggression, and to where troops from India could be 
despatched to contain problems "beyond the capacity of the 
King’s African Rifles," there was no source other than the 
United Kingdom (except Nigeria, the Gold Coast or Gibralter) 
or an imperial garrison from which the battalion could have 
been reinforced.25
The military history of the period immediately preceding the 
outbreak of war was closely connected with the suppression of 
internal disorders. In 1912 for example, a company of the 
W.A.F.F. from Tesani, was deployed to quell disturbances in 
Sandoh chiefdom, Kono sub-district. So grave was the crisis 
that another company of the West African Regiment had to be 
held in readiness.26 By January 1912, the battalion was 453 
strong with a reserve force of 87, and using M.L. and M.E. 
rifles. The full complement however required for the reserve 
force was 250.27 By December 1912, the actual strength of 
the battalion was 498 with a reserve force of 83 at Daru.2s
Internal developments in 1913 necessitated significant 
increases in the battalion, from four to six companies,29 B 
Company being stationed at Gbangbama to contain the 
activities of the Human Leopard Society30 in Imperri. The
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increase was designed to meet the protracted emergency in 
Kono31 and to maintain peace on Sierra Leone's frontier with 
Liberia.32 In 1913 therefore the establishment comprised six 
companies (685 O.R.'s) and ten machine gun carriers. The 
average length of service was reduced from 4 years five 
months, to three years two months; but the high percentage of 
Mende recruits (36%) was already beginning to arouse serious 
concern in official circles. One company was therefore 
stationed near the terminus of the branch railway from Bauya 
to Makump in order to secure more Temne recruits.
As half of the men came from the "bush field," they 
demonstrated an intimate knowledge of bush fighting but lack 
of open space precluded them from attaining a high standard 
in extended order formation. Though the general stamp of 
recruits was "very level," there was too much preoccupation 
with fatigue work.33 By January 1914 the Temne complement 
had increased from 147 in 1913 to 160, but Mende dominance 
(259) in the ranks was still evident.34
As war clouds gathered over Europe, a review of colonial and 
imperial forces began in Sierra Leone. Between February and 
March 1914, five companies of the West African Regiment were 
moved from Karene to the Peninsula to take part in 
manoeuvres.35 The cutting of many roads at Signal Hill and 
Wilberforce in 1910, had signalled the commencement of 
improvements in communications to defend Freetown's harbour 
in war time36 and by April 1914, plans were in hand to 
improve the rifle range at Kortright to facilitate more 
extensive practice in field firing.3-7 Two months before the
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declaration of war, the strength of the force was 675 O.R.s 
and 10 machine-gun carriers, the drop being due to the 
problems entailed in securing sufficient Temne recruits, 52 
discharges and 28 desertions. The reserve force was still 
far below strength (85); only 55 men came forward for 
training.
Musketry practices were far from satisfactory because of the 
lack of magazine rifles and the continued use of the Martini- 
Met ford carbine. Even among the O.R.s, there were "too many 
third class... s h o t s 3S The preceding observations are 
crucial for an understanding of the controversy which came to 
surround the performance of Sierra Leone's soldiers in the 
Cameroons.
As war became inevitable, Merewether commenced mobilisation 
on 30th July (in accordance with the precautionary stage of 
the Defence Scheme39). All companies of the W.A.F.F. at 
outstations were removed to Daru; two companies were sent to 
Songo Town,40 and the policy of examining ships was enforced 
on 1st August 1914.41 Due to the strained relations with 
Germany, Merewether was required to guard against the 
possibility of attack in "advance of any formal declaration 
of war."42 By 4th August, mobilisation was practically 
complete and only two companies of the West African Regiment 
were yet to move from the Protectorate.43 At the outbreak of 
war, the garrison in Sierra Leone comprised six companies of 
the W.A.F.F., 12 companies of the West African Regiment, four 
companies of the West Indian Regiment and a company of the 
Royal Garrison Artillery.
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The declaration of war with Germany soon led to the speedy 
internment of all German subjects - reservists, naval 
engineers and marines.44 Even the German Consul Herr 0. 
Lebzin was ordered to leave the Colony at the earliest 
opportunity.45 German shipping activity in Sierra Leone was 
also brought to a halt by the seizure of all vessels and 
craft belonging to the Woermann Linie Shipping Company to 
prevent them "being used...for a hostile purpose."46 Only 
missionaries were allowed freedom on condition that they did 
not engage in any "act hostile to the government" and because 
most of them (Alsatians and Poles) were found to be "rabidly 
anti-German..."47
As far back as 1909, the Committee of Imperial Defence had 
argued in favour of expelling "aliens of enemy nationality" 
from important naval bases in war time or adopting some 
system of "registration or observation" over them 
elsewhere.48 Though technically enemy subjects of the Ottoman 
Turks, the difficulties anticipated in interning all males of 
military age, led General Daniel1 to recommend the latter 
course in relation to the Syrians. Syrians could only leave 
Freetown or the Protectorate with the consent of the 
Commissioner of Police, the "better" and "wealthiest" class 
being held responsible "for the good behaviour of their 
countrymen." Their letters were to be censored and defaulters 
immediately arrested.49 In accordance with a memorandum from 
the Overseas Defence Committee, Merewether established the 
censorship of all postal matter on 8th August and appointed 
Messrs R.F. Honter and Davies as Assistant Censors.50 With 
the above precautionary measures thus taken, th^
51
administration turned its attention to Dobell's repeated 
requests for troops in the Cameroons.
RECRUITMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
The demands of the Cameroon Expeditionary Force were to 
stretch the patience of the Governor to the full. Harcourt's 
request for four companies of the W.A.F.F., four companies of 
the West African Regiment and two 2.95 millimetre quick 
firing51 guns meant important modifications of the approved 
Defence Scheme. Apprehensive over the uneasiness generated 
in the wake of mobilisation and a possible "sea attack 
combined with landing operations," and haunted by fears of a 
"native rising" approximating the scale of 1898, both 
Merewether and the G.O.C. Daniel1 were to warn against 
denuding the garrison.52 If Merewether1s fears were 
predicated on the reluctance of the Colonial Office to use 
imperial troops in the absence of colonial troops in the 
event of any "factional outbreaks,1,53 there was every 
possibility that the Germans might use Liberia (the 
headquarters of the German West African Cable, connecting 
Pernambuco and Tenerife) as a base of attack against Sierra 
Leone. Germany's economic leverage in Liberia and their 
attempts at "inculcating their nationality... into the 
inhabitants of the Republic"54 meant that the situation 
warranted careful attention.
By 17th August however, all apprehensions had been allayed 
and the demand for human and material resources on Sierra 
Leone became more urgent. Merewether was required to 
despatch to Lome "when the naval situation permits," two
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companies of the W.A.F.F., two machine guns, 500 small rounds 
of ammunition (5,000 rounds for each machine gun) 300 
carriers with headmen, medical staff with stores, hammocks 
and tents for officers and a total of six weeks supplies for 
Europeans (four for Africans) in addition to rations for the 
voyage.55 On the 18th, Merewether was further requested to 
prepare 1,200 carriers and headmen, one month's supply of 
food for Europeans and Africans, and the necessary sea 
transport to the Cameroons.56
August 1914 was a trying month for the administration for 
apart from supplying troops, Sierra Leone was a supply base 
for arms and ammunition to the forces in Togo. On 23rd 
August when C and E companies left for Togo land,57 the O.C. 
Troops, Lome, was requesting double common shrapnel shells 
with fuses for 2.95" guns. On the58 same day, the War Office 
approved the transfer of 1,500,000 rounds of Mark VI small 
arms ammunition from the imperial troops in Sierra Leone to 
Togo.59 By 25th August, Daniell had already supplied 500 
rounds of quick-firing gun ammunition to Lagos and 300 rounds 
to Lome.60 At the start of the campaigns in the Cameroons, 
Dobell had 4,300 West African troops at his disposal61 but by 
September, his further requests for one officer, 20 N.C.O.'s 
and men from the Royal Garrison Artillery, four companies of 
infantry with signallers, 1,000 carriers with headmen and 
medical staff and 1,000 rounds of gun ammunition,62 were to 
arouse apprehensions once more about the dangers of reducing 
the garrison to a minimum.63
In October 100 carriers were despatched from Kenema to
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Freetown64 and Dobell requested one more doctor, a nurse and 
three dressers.65 The only potential threat to Sierra Leone 
then was the extensive use of mining in home waters by the 
Germans66 which led to fears that the same would be done in 
bases used by British and Allied naval forces; the spread of 
false reports by a Mr Brunner, an agent of the Societe 
Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, of German successes and 
imminent defeat of the Allies,67 (obviously, "...la 
societe...parait etre sous 1'influence Allemande68) and the, 
albeit unsubstantiated rumours that a German ship 
"Karlsruhe," anchored near Cape Verde, "was obtaining wood 
and fuel from the natives."69
By 25th December 1914 the number of colonial and imperial 
troops from Sierra Leone serving in the Cameroons, was 1,206 
including officers; thereafter 407 more were despatched to 
the Cameroons,70 but when Dobell pressed for more troops in 
January 1915, Merewether replied that the only force 
available for suppressing disorders in the Protectorate, were 
"undisciplined and untrained Court Messengers."71 Mr Baynes 
regarded this as "the usual cry of wolf which one always 
expects and gets" from the governor,72 but this did not deter 
Dobell from pressing for the enlistment of every suitable 
recruit for the W.A.F.F.73 in order to make good the wastage 
in the unit.74 It was difficult however to achieve this in 
West Africa since, as it was argued, "the majority of 
the...races are not suitable materials to make soldiers of," 
and because only 10% of the estimated population of West 
Africa (19,400,000) were considered "eligible males." In 
Sierra Leone, a regular recruiting campaign was begun; 
special bonuses were offered and recruiting bands sent round
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the likely districts. The result "just" enabled the Colonial 
Office "to fill the gaps in our forces...and keep a small 
margin over. 1,75
The recruitment drive in 1915 was fraught with serious 
problems. British West African colonies and Protectorates 
were thinly populated and it was hard to find groups whose 
favourite occupation was fighting. Even celebrated resistors 
to the initial European thrust (like the Temnes, Mendes and 
Asante) were beginning to exhibit a "special dislike for
military discipline;" and while in peace time it was very
difficult "to keep...local forces up to normal
establishment," any recruitment drive had to consider the 
likely problem of reducing the garrison "below a certain 
number."’76 By February however, Ronietta had provided a total 
of 700 carriers for the Expeditionary Force. So "keen" were 
the men to enlist, that when the District Commissioner 
informed others that "no more labourers were required many 
walked from Moyamba to Freetown - a distance of about 80
miles in the hope of being engaged."77 During the same 
period, "many hundred carriers" were supplied by the Railway 
district.78
Throughout 1915 the chiefs in Ronietta continued to provide 
Mende and Temne volunteers as carriers and "the cheerful and 
manly characteristics of the Mende people call for 
admiration,"79 but the efforts of recruiting commissioners in 
Koinadugu met with "practically no response" as the people 
there lacked "the adventurous disposition of the Mendes."80 
It is very difficult to determine the extent of compulsion in
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Sierra Leone but by March 1915, Major Jenkins was suggesting 
that all District Commissioners were to help "catch 
recruits, "S1 this at a time when conscription had been 
extended to the "Four Communes" in Senegal.82
In order to overcome the problems associated with recruitment 
in 1915, the O.C. Details, W.A.F.F., Daru, enlisted 10 men 
"...to let the natives see that recruiting has not stopped 
altogether."83 With fears of Mende dominance still in the 
ranks, it was decided to locate a skeleton depot at Daru, 
"which the natives have become accustomed" to associating "in 
their minds with the W.A.F.F;"84 but Temnes were showing "a 
disinclination to enlist out of their own country."85
Of the 65 men wounded in the Sierra Leone Battalion up to 
June 1915, 52 were likely to be subsequently fit for service. 
Dobell therefore urged the enlistment of 100 more men to 
replace casualties and those likely to be discharged as 
"time-expired" men at the end of hostilities,86 this at a 
time when Britain was determined to commit more men to the 
front by offering pardon to all deserters from the regular 
forces.87 Dobell's requests intensified in July88 and by 
August, recruitment was being pursued with greater vigour; 27 
out of 134 recruits had passed their musketry training88 and 
more reservists were reporting for training. Daniel1 
therefore urged that an additional officer be sent to Daru to 
help the two already there.80
Clearly the almost feverish call for reinforcements between 
August 1914 and July 1915 was a function of heightened
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engagements at Pitti, Kompina, Harman's Farm, Bare, Mbureku, 
Mbenga, Jabassi, Kwakwa Creek, Mojanga, Kribi, Nkongsamba and 
Dual a in the Cameroons.91 Between 3rd September and 14th 
October 1915, 102 recruits were despatched as reinforcements
to the Cameroons92 and in December, 90 more proceeded to 
Duala, "a good many recruits now offering themselves."93 
Thereafter the fortunes of the battalion were tied up with 
the capture of the last German stronghold at Yaounde on 1st 
January 1916 until the Germans were forced to retreat in a 
south easterly direction towards Spanish Guinea. Assembled 
at Duala on 2nd February, the entire battalion arrived in 
Freetown on 26th and 29th April 1916 after twenty months in 
the Cameroons.94
Since their arrival in Freetown the future of the battalion 
was to be dominated by great controversy regarding its 
performance and though the Colonial Office was reluctant to 
employ them in any future combat capacity, their fate was to 
be determined by events in East Africa. By June 1916, the 
Allies were determined to wind up the campaign in German East 
Africa and since prolonged bush-fighting was anticipated in 
the southern part of the country, they were anxious to secure 
West African troops given the impossibility of any more 
recruiting from Portuguese East Africa.95 Sierra Leone and 
the Gambia however could offer no help and recourse was 
therefore had to Nigeria95 (for raising four battalions of 
500 men each with a four gun battery) and the Gold Coast 
which sent 900 men to East Africa in July.97
Between October and November 1916, the position of the Allies
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in East Africa had become desperate and the Sub-Committee on 
Imperial Defence recommended a "resolute offensive with an 
adequate force." Indian troops were proving very unreliable; 
many had resorted to self-mutilation and others succumbed 
easily to the hazards of "malaria and debility." In revenge 
for having been denied permission by Britain to invade German 
East Africa from Rhodesia, the Belgians refused to assume the 
offensive north of Lake Tanganyika.98 With an anticipated 
monthly wastage of 15%, reinforcements were needed for the 
Nigerian contingent, and with Lugard pleading that his 
garrison had been reduced to below "safety point," attention 
once more turned to Sierra Leone."
The Colonial Office was desperate to avoid all criticisms 
"that we are obstructive because we suggest that there are 
difficulties."100 Above all, Britain needed to determine the 
strength of troops to be maintained in its own possession in 
the Cameroons, pending a more definite division of the 
country with the French. Brigadier-General Maurice's 
suggestion to recruit a force from ex-German soldiers in the 
Cameroons had been abandoned by 16th November.101 Because of 
their comparative wealth, it was proving very difficult to 
enlist the Asante during the cocoa season.102 Mr Fiddian 
therefore recommended the use of two companies of the Sierra 
Leone Battalion either as garrison forces in Nigeria thereby 
releasing trained troops for service in East Africa, as 
combatants in East Africa itself, or as relief for the Gambia 
company which could then be sent to East Africa.103 The 
spectre of "native risings" in Nigeria was to underscore the 
need for Sierra Leone troops for garrison duties especially
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at a time when, (as the Army Council argued) Nigerian troops 
needed rest and recuperation.104
By November 1916, the War Office was bent on raising 
additional African units for service in theatres where 
"climatic conditions are favourable." Attention had turned 
albeit unsuccessfully, to the "fighting races of South 
Africa" and the idea of raising additional troops in East 
Africa itself had been entertained, but levies were also to 
be raised from countries not hitherto mentioned and that 
included Sierra Leone as well.105 The need to maintain the 
contingents already supplied by the garrisons of West Africa 
(3,900) was finally to lead to the Haywood mission to West 
Africa in December 1916.
As Director of Recruiting, Haywood was to raise recruits in 
West Africa for service overseas as well as efficient forces 
for operations in tropical or sub-tropical climates, or for 
garrison work thereby setting more suitable troops free for 
service in the field.106 Although it was official policy to 
restrict West African troops to African theatres of war due 
to their alleged inability for example, to withstand non- 
tropical climates and the difficulties entailed in 
maintaining them in distant theatres,107 Haywood was now to 
consider the possibility of raising units or drafts suitable 
in terms of efficiency, length of time required for training, 
the possibility of providing officers and N.C.O.'s, for 
service in either Europe, the Near East, Mesopotamia, East 
Africa, Somaliland, and for suppressing internal risings in 
West Africa.108
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The major problem with the Haywood mission centred around the 
difficulty of securing suitable officers and N.C.O.'s with 
West African experience. The War Office tried to release 
some from the Expeditionary Force in France, but the demand 
was mainly for company commanders and subalterns. Those 
officers who had held these posts in West Africa three years 
previously were, by the beginning of 1917 commanding 
battalions and could not be ordered back.109
In spite of the urgency of the situation, the Colonial Office 
was soon caught up in a thorny debate involving the 
suitability of the Sierra Leone Battalion even for garrison 
work. In August 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel Hastings had 
advised against enlisting men for service outside their 
colonies as was done by the French.110 The proposal that the 
battalion could be used as garrison troops in Northern 
Nigeria was to generate a flood of negative reports about 
Sierra Leone's soldiers.
Despised by Nigerian troops because they were paid higher 
rates, it was alleged that they were "likely to cause trouble 
by crime against person or property ..." Lieutenant-Colonel 
Cunliffe and Acting-Governor Boyle therefore suggested that 
they be deployed for garrison work in Southern Nigeria or the 
Cameroons111 but it would seem that the battalion and men of 
the West African Regiment had been found wanting. This major 
Beattie attributed to "lack of courage not lack of ordinary 
discipline. . . 11112
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Mr Ellis found such reports a "mystery" particularly so when 
the Gambia Company, "one of the best units, " was recruited 
from the same groups in Sierra Leone,113 but Lugard was most 
scathing in his denunciation of the battalion. Though no 
evidence abounds to support even the mildest of his claims 
Lugard charged them with "murder and rape" in the Cameroons, 
and alleged that even Dobell had problems with them. Deeply 
apprehensive of the Temnes and Mendes, Lugard argued that 
"outside their own country where they are restrained by 
tribal jujus," they "constantly commit crimes and atrocities 
on natives." The battalion was therefore to be held as a 
reserve force for local disturbances in Nigeria or the Gold 
coast.114
Colonel Hastings was however more objective in his appraisal 
of Sierra Leone's soldiers. Doubtful of the Mendes and 
Temnes, he could not "call his geese swans" because they had 
"no stomach for fighting and although...they would be alright 
against their own people armed with Dane guns" he doubted 
whether they would be of any use against a foe with modern 
weapons."115 Major Thurston, C.O. Gambia Company also found 
that his "Mende men" "...got very tired of active service 
before the end of the Cameroon operations,"116 but Hastings 
was still confident that the battalion was suitable for 
garrison duties in Nigeria and the Cameroons. He vouched 
that the Mendes and Temnes were "a quiet and docile people" 
and that he had never before heard that they were "atrocity 
committing." Together with Colonel Haywood, he refuted 
allegations that General Dobell had had trouble with them 
except for their lack of courage.117 Mr Fiddian himself
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doubted allegations about "their Hunnish propensities."
By December 1916, there was a desire to prosecute the 
campaign in East Africa with greater vigour and the question 
of deploying the battalion soon became wedded to the 
complications involved in administering occupied Togoland and 
the need for maintaining a military administration there. 
Governor Clifford (Gold Coast) urged that the Gold Coast 
company in Togo be released for further service in East 
Africa and be replaced by a police force.118 The Colonial 
Office was clearly in a dilemma; were they to withdraw the 
Gold Coast Company from Togo, it was bound to endanger their 
legal position there. Mr. Risley had warned against 
"anything implying civil control or annexation" as this would 
provide a pretext for Germany to annex Belgium, Poland and 
part of France. Further it would lead the Togolese to 
believe that "the whiteman was beaten" and had to take the 
soldiers away to fight in East Africa.119
The major question which arose was whether it was necessary 
to keep regular troops in Togo to maintain a military 
administration. It was therefore agreed that the police 
force - "a force of all sorts...of about 40 or 50" should do 
as garrison for international law purposes.120 What was 
important, it was argued, was the maintenance of order in 
Togoland for the French "can scarcely tell whether we keep or 
do not keep any soldiers" there. Were they to discover it, 
it was hoped the War Office would lend the Colonial Office a 
company of the West African Regiment in Sierra Leone.121 
Major Rew even suggested that the Gold Coast company could be
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replaced by a good company of Temne recruits from the Sierra 
Leone Battalion, and he found the Gold Coast Regiment just as
guilty of "rape, murder and looting in Togoland."122 Contrary
to Lugard's charges, Dobell could recall no breaches of 
discipline among the troops whilst in the Cameroons.123
In January 1917 when the Sierra Leone Battalion numbered 726 
O.R.'s,124 the march of the Senusi column on Tawa and Madowa 
and the threat posed to the northern frontier of Nigeria led 
Lugard to request all available troops and field guns from 
Sierra Leone.125 These were to be drawn from the battalion 
and the West African Regiment which he had hitherto 
condemned. The available evidence shows that Sierra Leone 
was not peculiar in furnishing allegedly poor infantry 
material. Haywood in May 1917, argued that the desire to 
raise a "million Black Army" in West Africa was founded on 
clearly fictitious ideas about the recruiting possibilities 
in British West Africa.126 By 1933, the War Office was 
coming to grips with this fact having learnt their lesson 
from the Germans who "differentiated carefully," recruiting 
soldiers only from certain groups and securing porters and 
unskilled labour from others.12’7
In Sierra Leone, recruitment was not carried out for Colonial
forces only and a consideration, albeit very briefly, of the 
place of imperial troops12® in the whole process is crucial 
for an understanding of the overall impact of recruitment. 
The West African Regiment strongly relied on District 
Commissioners and Moslem priests for assistance during 
recruiting tours such as those in the Moyamba-Mano
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district129 and Kabala130 in January and February 1915 
respectively. Considerably under strength in September 1915, 
D.C.'s came under tremendous pressure to secure 50 recruits 
from Moslem and Temne groups only,131 but responses from 
Karene and Ronietta Districts were unsatisfactory, most
recruits being rejected because of heart troubles.132 By 
December however, 100 men had been assembled at Daru.133 
After their collaborative effort with the Sierra Leone 
battalion in Nigeria, one company, whilst acting as garrison 
troops in the Gambia in March 1917, assisted the French in 
capturing the murderers of the chef de port at Selety.134
Established in 1889, the Royal Garrison Artillery with 82
O.R. 's and six 2.95" q.f. mountain guns were to be very 
instrumental in operations at Jabbassi, the Northern Railways 
and Kribbi in the Cameroons.135 Yet perhaps their most 
valuable contribution to the war effort was the construction 
of field works, the improvements effected at gun positions 
and defences at Bare136 and the heroic defence against the 
Germans at Dschang.137 Much of the effort of the 36th 
Company, Royal Engineers revolved around construction work 
and the building of replacements for field guns. By 8th
October 1914, they were constructing roads down the west 
branch of the Pitti river and on the 21st, repaired broken 
rails for the advance on Edea.
Their services were particularly valuable in using the 
railway for attacks and retreat. After constructing coffins 
for French soldiers on 25th October, the company erected
defences for the naval gun to defend their camp at Logbatchek
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from any enemy advance.138 Between November 1915 and February 
1916 when the company reached Kribbi, they facilitated the 
advance of the 4.5 inch Howitzer, constructed small bridges, 
rafts and drifts and repaired and strengthened existing
bridges. The company was to find these latter tasks
particularly tedious at Dschangmangas and Loldorf with Major 
Cole's column.133
Responses to recruiting parties particularly in the northern 
districts of Sierra Leone were not always positive. As 
recruitment interfered with farming in Kabala, many family 
heads advised their sons not to enlist.140 The experience of 
recruiting commissioners would show that chiefs were always 
willing to provide men from October upwards when they were 
not engaged on their farms.141 At a time when the allies 
suffered their first defeat at Jabassi,143 the difficulties 
entailed in providing guards for prisoners of war were to be 
inextricably tied up with the supply of manpower143 to the 
Cameroons. Recruits were simply not forthcoming. Despite 
their manifestations of a combatant spirit under their war 
chief Kafura, 144 the Kissi by 1915 were proving very
difficult to train.145
By January 1915, the stresses and dislocation caused by
recruitment were beginning to manifest themselves even among 
the Mende, 200 of whom crossed the Liberian boundary into 
Monrovia to escape being called up for service.146 The 
problems encountered in fulfilling Dobell's requests were 
further complicated by the wrangling between the Colonial 
Office and the War Office for control of the Sierra Leone
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Battalion in war time. At the root of the conflict was the
fear that the G.O.C. would merely promote the interests of
the West African Regiment.147
In April 1915, Merewether had to appeal to the good services 
of the Mende headman, George Cummings to meet Dobell’s 
request for 500 carriers. Cummings was to exploit the
situation to advantage to enrich himself for as Heslip 
(Commissioner of Police) suspected, he was "at the bottom of 
the chiefs not being able to procure the men" initially.143 
If the recruitment drive begun in August was severely checked 
by the dearth of officers, by November 1915 the supply of men 
for carrier service from Freetown and the surrounding
districts had been exhausted.149 Karene had to be excluded 
because of a smallpox outbreak and the same was true of Mafwe 
in Railway District and Mano in Ronietta.150
The recruiting ground was further limited by the rather poor 
results of musketry training among the reserve force. Many 
men failed to come up on time and many hitherto discharged on 
grounds of misconduct and as "medically unfit" tried to re- 
enlist hoping they would not be recognised because the 
battalion was away.151 On the whole, the incentive to enlist 
was not predicated on any warlike abilities. As Mr Ellis 
rightly conceded, the "W.A.F.F. rank and file are mercenary 
troops; the pay is what mainly brings them into the 
force..."152
By the end of the Cameroon campaign, a great deal of 
controversy had come to surround the performance of the
66
Sierra Leone soldier but the much vaunted arguments about his 
inefficiency show a failure to appreciate the realities of 
the problems which colonial and imperial forces had to 
contend with. The Royal Garrison Artillery for instance, 
suffered due to the failure to constitute an establishment of 
gun carriers153 and because the 2.95" guns had never been 
repaired before the war, they failed to come into action at 
Bagam and the river Nun.154 Though they were "loyal and 
willing," the hasty provision of 312 "untrained carriers" for 
the battery was seen as the equivalent of giving "the Officer 
Commanding a Battery of R.H.A. a mixture of cab horses and 
Dartmoor ponies on his way to the Western Front..."155 
Perhaps the most significant drawback was the lack of boots 
among the Regiment.1SS By 10th July 1915, many were attending 
hospital due to bad feet. The continuous rain and damp
aggravated sickness among the men with an average of 80 
reporting sick daily due to colds, rheumatism and sometimes 
smallpox.157
Clearly, allegations of incompetence against the men were 
never as widespread as Lugard wanted Colonial officials to 
believe. On the contrary, breaches of discipline were 
confined to a few soldiers only, such as privates 2791 Fine 
Boy, E Coy, W.A.R., and 3151 Soriba Temne, B Coy who were 
tried by a Field General Court Martial for leaving his post 
before being relieved and for sleeping whilst in active 
service at Nkongsamba, respectively.158 If the men of the 
Sierra Leone Battalion suffered from a "loss of confidence," 
it was partly a function of the failure to place additional 
officers at the disposal of Colonel Newstead.159 Above all,
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during the attack on Yaounde in June 1915, the vagaries of 
the weather, a combination of sickness among the column and 
Belgian inaction from the Congo, forced a withdrawal to Ngwe 
on the Kele river and resulted in the death of Private Lamina 
Conteh II of C Company.
Throughout, the battalion operated in country covered by 
dense tropical forest which favoured the defensive tactics of 
the Germans. Whilst restricting their movement, it limited 
the strength of advancing columns, rendered the enemy 
invisible and exposed them to sudden bursts of fire. This 
blind warfare meant constant watchfulness and self control 
which imposed a severe strain on nerves already weakened by 
the trying climate.160 Yet Dobell was very impressed by a 
group of men "to whom no day appears to be too long;" by men 
"endowed with a constitution which inures them to hardship" 
and by carriers who were very "patient and willing in the 
most difficult conditions..."161 Wilkinson's view that Sierra 
Leone was of little value in the supply of troops due to the 
"unwarlike character... of its tribes," does not therefore 
adequately explain the true picture of the country's 
contribution to the war effort.162
THE IMPACT OF RECRUITMENT
The tensions and apprehensions generated in the wake of 
mobilisation, had serious consequences for the public, the 
administration, the troops themselves and the Colonial 
Office. By September 1914, the appropriation of lands by the 
War Department for war purposes had caused much damage to 
property and compensation had to be offered to claimants at
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Kissy and Wilberforce.1(53 In the Protectorate, the
withdrawal of troops and the closure of some trading 
establishments bred fears of a possible punitive expedition 
by the government against the Mendes or Temnes164 and this 
reinforced rumours of imminent civil commotion in the Railway 
District.165
Generally, the despatch of troops and the need to keep many 
trains under steam day and night, crippled railway traffic 
considerably and reduced receipts for August 1914.166 If 
1915 was a bad year for dodging the draft in Guinea,167 the 
results of recruitment missions organised in Sierra Leone in 
the same period were equally counter productive, forcing a 
wave of emigration from the Protectorate. Merewether was 
therefore advised to "prevent ...the exodus of natives, which 
the arrival of recruiting commissioners might 
provoke... amongst the tribes...near the boundary..."ies
Due to the massive build up of troops, military demands for 
rice in Duala were to exert severe pressures on the 
authorities in Freetown and aggravated the problem of 
shortage.169 In February 1915, 220,081 lbs of rice were
shipped to the Cameroons;170 Ronietta provided 3,471 tons, 
the Railway District 318,171 but so acute was the problem of 
shortage that the authorities found it difficult to feed 
recruits awaiting transportation to Duala.172 Troop
movements after their return from the Cameroons - from 
Freetown via Mabanta to Wongkufu - were to impinge 
significantly on the already depleted supplies in a year of 
partial famine (1916)173 In the Railway District, "levies of
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rice were made" to meet the demands of returnees. Because 
the process of mobilisation entailed heavy expenditure, the 
government was forced to draw on its reserve, releasing cash 
that was held by the Bank of British West Africa "as and 
when it was found essential to meet military
requirements.
Against the background of a very gloomy financial outlook for 
1916,1-76 the total expenditure on the Expeditionary Force up 
to July 1915 was £9786/3/5;1-7-7 by February 1916, returnees 
were making heavy demands on the already limited reserve of 
silver coins the bulk of which had been sent to the Gold 
Coast and England, and as the G.O.C. apprehended trouble in 
paying carriers and troops in notes, he requested £50,000
from the Currency Board "as soon as possible."1-78
A significant by-product of recruitment was the spread of 
disease. In Freetown, mobilisation meant stationing many 
troops in the war stations (instead of at Tower Hill) which
harboured the chief sources of malarial fever.1-79 Apart from
introducing chicken pox from the Cameroons, Indian troops 
infected Sierra Leone carriers with Benign Tertian malarial 
fever. Dysentery itself received a fresh stimulus among 
thousands of carriers and Dr Young, then in charge of the 
Base hospital at Duala attributed this to the association 
with Indian troops. 1S° In the Expeditionary Force, 6 men of 
the Sierra Leone Battalion181 and 17 in the West African 
Regiment182 succumbed to disease for although in 1915 the War 
Office made the inoculation of British soldiers compulsory, 
nothing was done with regard to African troops in the
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Cameroons.183
At a time when chiefly loyalty to the war effort was being 
acknowledged by government, war time recruitment soon came to 
be tied up with the institution of slavery. In August 1915, 
three slaves of Paramount Chief Mafinda of the Banni 
Chiefdom, Kono country, absconded and enlisted in the
battalion. In the absence of any slavery ordinances in 
Sierra Leone to help determine Manfinda's claims for 
restitution, this practice was to cause much embarrassment 
for the authorities and threatened the very cordial relations 
with the chiefs.1®4
Perhaps the most threatening outcome of the process of 
mobilisation was the tendency by troops to use the occasion 
to indulge in excesses and the plunder of farms.1®3 In April
1916, 1000 carriers and 615 O.R.'s of the Sierra Leone
battalion left Duala for Freetown.1®6 Returnees were to
constitute a social problem intensifying the crime rate and 
the number of summary convictions for larceny in the Police 
Magistrate's Court.1®*7 Unlike the Nandi veterans who 
returned home,1SS many returnees now spurned the return to 
agriculture causing overcrowding in the capital and this led 
to desperate pleas for the application of the Vagrancy 
Act.189 In Royema, Karene District, mobilisation was used as 
a pretext by soldiers for revenge against chiefs, who 
together with many of their subjects lost their wives to the 
returnees.190
The return of soldiers of the West African Regiment to
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Moyamba was to cause great acrimony between them and the 
chiefs. Buoyed up by their new found status, their "arrogant 
spirit" and demands for lodgings posed a formidable challenge 
to traditional authority.191 War time recruitment had 
clearly altered outlooks and perceptions and returnees 
clearly had "great expectations." Though it is not clear to 
what extent the behaviour of the tirailleurs in neighbouring 
French Guinea might have influenced them, it is probable that 
the claims of the former to being "equal" to white men,192 
shaped the demands of returnees in Sierra Leone.
However, these agitations by Sierra Leone's soldiers could 
hardly be construed as the beginnings of nationalist politics 
(as Rosberg, Nottingham and Ogot argued in the case of 
Kenya193) for their activities were clearly not directed at 
the nerve centre of colonial rule and political consciousness 
found meaning only at the local level. In fact Wyse194 and 
Kilson195 found no evidence to suggest this and the 
activities of the Sierra Leone branch of the National 
Congress of British West Africa never reflected the input of 
the war veterans.
Many lessons were to be learnt from the experience in the 
Cameroons. Whilst it provided young officers greater 
knowledge of their men,196 it also alerted the Colonial 
Office to the need for attaching N.C.O.'s to the Sierra Leone 
Battalion.197 If the battalion did not perform well in the 
Cameroons, the reasons were largely due to the organisational 
defects which characterised the command structure in war 
time. Set up for internal defence only, the battalion lacked
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any administrative services suitable for despatch with an 
expeditionary force.
Command was never centralised in the hands of one soldier; 
there was no strategic plan of operations befitting a 
campaign of this scale and the short sighted policy of 
economy had been too rigidly enforced throughout the W.A.F.F. 
The garrison itself was an imperial one, commanded by an 
imperial officer misnamed G.O.C. West Africa who had no 
staff, intelligence service or organisation for dealing with 
the landward defences of the Protectorate. The anomaly was 
accentuated in war time when the battalion, a colonial force, 
came under his orders, but was still administered by the 
Colonial Office. This meant that in war time, the G.O.C. 
would have neither trained nor administered them and the 
forces (both colonial and imperial) had never been subject to 
unity of command and training especially so when the position 
of the Inspector-General had lapsed. These drawbacks clearly 
called for a strong imperial policy to deal with the problem 
of imperial defence. It was therefore argued that ultimate 
responsibility for defence should fall on the War Office for 
it was deemed "illogical that the War Office should be 
responsible for dealing with a situation in war for which 
they cannot prepare in peace."198
Brigadier-General Kirke's preference for War Office control 
was however to unleash a flood of protests from the Colonial 
Office. Many officials felt it would be disastrous for the 
Sierra Leone Battalion to be administered by the War Office. 
The Expeditionary Force had come under War Office control
73
only because of the latter's refusal to lend officers and
N.C.O.'s to the Colonial Office, which could not then secure
motor cars and howitzers for the advance on Edea. They
contended that the experience of continued friction in the 
colonies between the G.O.C. and the colonial governments were 
enough to demonstrate how impossible it would be for a force 
like the battalion, which was stationed throughout the 
Protectorate and which had to provide escorts and guards, to 
be under a G.O.C. who was not under the orders of the 
colonial governor.
Mr Grindle considered the proposal "an outrageous piece of 
militarism"190 for even the decision to amalgamate colonial 
military forces in West Africa in 1899200 had precluded any 
control of the W.A.F.F. by the War Office. Since the
W.A.F.F. still performed police duties and because it was 
still supported from colonial funds, officials found it 
impossible to diminish either gubernatorial control of, or 
the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the 
battalion. In 1907, War Office control had been effectively 
checked by the refusal of the Colonial Defence Committee to 
amalgamate the W.A.F.F. and the West African Regiment as the 
maintenance of internal order rested with the governor.
Deeply suspicious of War Office officers who had no knowledge 
of local conditions, Lieutenant-Colonel Beattie urged the 
importance of preserving the esprit de corps in the W.A.F.F. 
and the spirit of camaraderie which already existed between 
the W.A.F.F. and local governments.201 Brigadier-General 
Wallace Wright found the proposal "unsound" and "premature."
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Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins argued that the role of the 
W.A.F.F. was a purely West African and colonial one and were 
the War Office to take control of the W.A.F.F. which had no 
departmental services of its own, they would need to create 
new services (a medical and sanitary department, transport 
and supply services and a military works department) which 
would entail significant expenditure.202
In many ways, the experience of World War I exposed the 
organisational drawbacks of the Sierra Leone Battalion which 
had undergone very little change by 1920. Haywood therefore 
recommended the double company system to bring it into line 
with other units. There was also a need to make the reserve 
force more attractive and efficient. Although the battalion 
was well drilled, practices such as exchanging compliments on 
the march and the habit of banging the butt of the rifle on 
the ground unnecessarily, detracted from instructions in the 
training manuals. No visual signalling was practised and 
there were no instructions in bombing with Mill bombs and 
rifle grenades. Of the six machine guns on battalion charge, 
four were by 1920, 20 years old, one 23 years and the other 
31 years old.203
Significant reforms were also to be effected in recruiting. 
Though reputedly intelligent and endowed with a sturdy 
physique, the Cameroon experience led the authorities to 
conclude that both Mendes and Temnes were devoid of the 
courage and determination necessary to make good soldiers. 
By 1923 therefore, the War Office was inclining its 
recruitment towards the Susu, Yalunka, Koranko, Kono and
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Kissi as "the best recruits come from the northern and north 
eastern border..."204 Clearly, the notion of the "martial 
races" was being given greater prominence after the war, but 
the administration was also beginning to doubt the 
effectiveness of the battalion in providing "that degree of 
internal security, the assurance of which should be a first 
charge on the revenue".205
Echoing this apparent loss of faith in the force, Wilkinson 
was to recommend "the creation" of a constabulary force "of 
equal numerical strength" to serve the purpose, for although 
he believed that it was "possible... to turn poor infantry 
into passable infantry" the Governor doubted whether "the 
best use of the material gifts of the Protectorate African" 
would be realised "if we tried to make of him what nature 
never intended him to be..."2oe Inspector-General Haywood 
however did not share this pessimism. With first hand 
experience of the "Protectorate African" in the Cameroons, he 
realised that the men were "unused to such large demands for 
military service..." and "as British territory was never 
seriously threatened in West Africa, the enthusiasm of the 
natives was never fully aroused" before World War I.207
THE FATE OF RETURNEES
The return of the Sierra Leone Battalion to peace time 
soldiering at Daru, Bandajuma and Kailahun was not a pleasant 
experience. Because no preparations were made for their 
return, the men faced serious problems finding accommodation. 
The necessary repairs had not been done to the barracks which 
were falling in. At Bandajuma, the officers' mess had no
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kitchen and latrines. Karene had to be abandoned because of 
the smallpox epidemic raging there.208 Generally, the lot of 
soldiers was far better than that of carriers for the former 
were entitled to gratuities on discharge for disablement. 
Wilkinson therefore advocated an annual charitable allowance 
of £6 for both soldiers and carriers who had lost either one 
or both lower limbs or who had been blinded in active service 
in the Cameroons, East Africa and Mesopotamia, for it was 
"undesirable that a bad impression be created by too great a 
delay in recognising some obligation to these 
unfortunates..."3°9
As imperial troops, the men of the West African Regiment 
unlike the W.A.F.F. were not recommended for the 
Distinguished Conduct Medal or the Imperial Decoration, 
"presumably to avoid jealousy." For all their efforts, men 
like corporals Musa Kata, Morlai Maniga and private Akibu 
Turay, were only "mentioned in Dobell's despatches, 1,210 and 
though the men of the W.A.F.F. had been employed for the 
"preservation of the King's glory," Wilkinson doubted whether 
the award of the King's Certificate would be appreciated by 
"native African troops" on discharge.211
If military service in the Cameroons disturbed the 
equilibrium of family life, the subtle battle for control 
between West Africa Command and the Colonial Office did 
little to assuage the problems faced by Sierra Leone's 
soldiers. In October 1915 Major Daniell's proposals for 
separation allowances for the West African Regiment, the 
Royal Engineers and the Royal Garrison Artillery, excluded
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the men of the Sierra Leone Battalion on the excuse that 
their pay was "drawn from colonial funds. 112x2 In the ensuing 
tussle, neither imperial nor colonial troops received the 
allowances.
Officials had to contend with the problem of tracing the 
families of deceased soldiers and carriers. Many had been 
induced to change by Krio settlers and missionaries213 and 
this made it difficult to trace them or to hand over monies 
due to them, to their relatives.214 The fate of the latter 
was equally depressing. In attempting to claim monies owed 
to carriers, many wives like Hannah Thomas had to contend 
with massive extortions, bribes demanded by pay clerks, 
unbearably long delays, problems of identification and false 
accounting.215 These problems persisted until 1937 with the 
claims of Yattah, sister of Mamboh Sandafu of Gawoon Tongaya, 
Pujehun District, but the government however felt that she 
was merely "shooting an arrow into the air in the hope that 
it may transfix a doubloon or two."216
By January 1917 free surgical appliances had been offered to 
the wounded but it was difficult to find employment for all 
cases of "permanent partial disablement."21'7 Many returnees 
like Jonathan Frazer were driven to desperation by 
unemployment. A painter by trade he could find no employment 
"all over the town."21® The problem itself was chiefly a 
function of government's failure to devise a comprehensive 
scheme for demobilised soldiers. Many preferred government 
work but the men of the W.A.F.F. were not originally included 
in Colonel Faunce's registration scheme to find work for men
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men of the West African Regiment. On 7 th May 1918, the
Executive Council decided that preference be given to ex­
soldiers for vacancies in government posts of £2 a month and 
below219 but it was difficult to execute the scheme as there 
were very few openings by 1919 in the Police, Railway, 
Prisons, Public Works and Agricultural Departments.
Vacancies, as those in the Railway Department for a messenger 
in 1920, became very competitive and depended on the
"standard of intelligence" demonstrated by ex-soldiers like 
Bockari Kamara.220
Only in 1921 was the first Government Notice gazetted for 
veterans221 to fill suitable vacancies in government 
employment but men like Momo Koroma who had served the 
colours for 12 years, soon discovered that they had to 
compete with applicants with "a prior claim."222 Many wished 
to join the Police force, but very few openings occurred and 
as scores of discharged soldiers loitered about Freetown,223 
the G.O.C. W.A.R., made a desperate appeal to employers of 
labour in 1924.224 By 1925, there were no vacancies in the 
Court Messenger Force and there were serious apprehensions 
about employing ex-soldiers on the basis of the character 
shown on their regimental and company conduct sheets. Major 
de Miremont was even determined "to explode the existing 
theory that government work is awaiting any and every 
discharged soldier."225
In some cases, soldiers with previous claims to chieftaincy 
found themselves in an ambiguous position when they returned 
to civil life. 2499 Sergeant Kamanda since 3rd September
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1914, was desperate to know what his position would be under 
his cousin Vebbe who had been crowned Paramount Chief whilst 
he was away in the Cameroons. Because he was called up for 
service, Kamanda could not succeed his father who died in his 
absence. Government therefore decided that he should "sit 
down" under Vebbe and "obey him in all matters" until the 
chiefship fell vacant.226
However modest the efforts of the Sierra Leone soldier may 
have been in the Cameroons, his contributions were never to 
be forgotten. In May 1927, it was decided to commemorate the 
memory of 232 soldiers of the Sierra Leone Battalion, the 
West African Regiment, the Royal Engineers, the Medical 
Corps, the Inland Water Transport and 795 deceased men of the 
Sierra Leone Carrier Corps.227 The memorial was to be 
erected at George Street "the Whitehall of Freetown." 
Recommendations were therefore made for a portland stone 
together with the panels fully engraved to be sent out to 
Freetown.223 The work was completed in February and unveiled 
in March 1931.229
KRIO RESPONSES TO BRITISH POLICY OF RECRUITMENT
It was in many ways officialdom's failure to adequately 
reciprocate the loyalty of its subjects, that was to 
determine Krio reactions to British policy of recruitment. 
The Krios were to deeply resent officialdom's refusal to 
enlist them230 in war time especially so when the evidence 
shows that they had always cherished the military profession. 
By 1910, men like Thomas Johnson, Thomas Cole and William 
Coker had completed an average of 12 years service with the
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battalion.231 Krio ambitions to enlist had received a severe 
check in 1911 when they were excluded from the Volunteer 
Corps, and this explains the initial opposition by unofficial 
members in the Legislative Council, to vote the sum of £5,000 
towards the National Relief Fund in October 1914.232
Shorunkeh Sawyerr was to call for a permanently trained 
volunteer force to defend the Colony against external attacks 
but Merewether had his doubts about costs though he felt such 
a force would erode racial feelings between Europeans and 
Krios.233 It is not unlikely that the many press campaigns 
mounted by the Krio against the discriminatory practices of 
white military officers did much to reinforce government's 
suspicion of the loyalty of the Krio recruit. By 1912 
rumours were rife of W.A.F.F. officers compelling educated 
Africans in the Railway District to take off their hats and 
stand until they had passed.234
The opening days of the war were difficult ones for Krio 
society. Since 1892 they had been forced to contend with 
"the revolution in public service"235 marked by officialdom's 
insatiable thirst for "albocracy."236 Their preoccupation 
with things military could in part be said to have originated 
from fears (albeit unjustified) of a possible withdrawal of 
the British from Sierra Leone. Were that to happen, it was 
widely believed that "the Temne and Mendes shall pour upon 
us" for having "ousted them from the key positions of their 
fatherland." The only way to ward off this threat was (it 
was argued) through "military preparedness."23”7
Notwithstanding "Rambler's" plea for setting up a regiment
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called the "Kings Own Creole Boys,"238 the government had 
abandoned all attempts to disguise its contempt for what it 
regarded as the "educated native" who was always "fond of 
talking about the colour bar."239 By January 1915, although 
Britain, unlike the French was still reluctant to employ 
Africans on the Western Front, two Krios were to prove the 
exceptions.
When in January, F.S. Dove's offer to serve at the front was 
accepted by the authorities in London, the news generated 
much euphoria back home and though it was not readily known 
in what capacity Dove was serving, it was seen as one big 
opportunity for "a good Creole boy" who had hitherto been 
"chafing under the restraint of a lack of opportunity" to 
"have a go at the Germans.11240 Initially a law student in 
England before enlisting with the Tank Corps,241 private
91658, Dove was during the war, a first driver with E. 
Battalion and on 23rd November 1917 was involved in
manoeuvres at the battle of Cambrai. With four members of 
his crew killed, Dove "remained with his tank assisting the
wounded" and for his examplary and inspiring actions, was
awarded the Military Medal.242 For the Krio, Dove was the 
"pride of our nation..."243 and as the Eastern Standard and 
Akwapem Chronicle argued, "the educated West African" was 
"still holding his own...in every sphere of life..."244
In May 1915, Patrick Freeman, another Krio, was wounded at 
the Western Front and was hospitalised at Liverpool. Then 
19, he was a "sea boy" running voyages between West Africa 
and Europe. He had joined the French Navy but took his 
discharge at the outbreak of war and enlisted in the British
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army. In Freeman's going to the front, it was argued that 
"the blood of ancient and loyal Sierra Leone...has been 
represented on the great European battlefield."245 The Krios 
hoped that both examples would persuade the government to 
grant them "the privilege of training for the defence of our 
country..." They contended that most of those offered the 
opportunity "do not appreciate it...We Creoles...do not wait 
for the offer, we make it ourselves..."246 By 1917/18 the 
Krio plea had fallen on deaf ears and the community was 
"daily evincing a restless anxiety concerning not only the 
present but the future..."24,7
By 1919, the mood of unease and despondency which had 
insinuated itself into Krio circles forced many to begin 
searching for answers to a problem that was as old as the 
battalion itself. They found they had been discriminated 
against because of their so-called "forwardness" and 
"forcefulness"248 and the consequent Krio diatribe against 
the "Mende, Temne and Susu many of whom know very little of 
the English Language... but who are judged competent to guard 
the interests of...British subjects,"249 should be seen as an 
index of the frustrations of a society whose professions of 
loyalty were hardly reciprocated by officialdom.
Thereafter, editorials in the Weekly News and the Aurora were 
to engage the government in lengthy and acrimonious debates 
over the suitability of the Protectorate recruit in the 
battalion or the W.A.R.,250 and the complicity of the latter 
in the Anti-Syrian riots of 1919, merely helped to vindicate 
the Krio case.251 The bitterness continued up till 1920 and
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afterwards, fuelled in many ways by "repeated insults and 
assaults" by European officers "against respectable Sierra 
Leoneans..."252 Yet in all this (as the Krios themselves 
argued) it appeared as if something was missing in a society 
hitherto characterised by "men of strong constitution", 
"energy and recuperative powers." They themselves lamented 
the rather "stunted" and "puny species" of their group, which 
contrasted with the "healthy" and "sturdy" men from the 
Protectorate; "It is these people who are the future hopes of 
the Colony. ,,2S3
84
REFERENCES
1. See the Hansard, 4/3/20, p.788; and P.R.O. CAB 21/468.
2. Captain W.D. Downes- With the Nigerians in German East 
Africa (Methuen, London 1919) pp288-289.
3. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - War Diary, Cameroons Composite 
Battalion- Gold Coast and Sierra Leone Battalion Field Force 
September 1914 to March 1916; Colonel G.M. Orr - "Von 
Lettow's escape into Portuguese East Africa 1917" in Army 
Quarterly vol. 13 no. 1 October 1926, pp. 50-59. (Royal 
Commonwealth Society Library, London)
4. General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck - East African Campaigns 
(New York 1957) p.164.
5. E.D.A. Turay and A. Abraham - The Sierra Leone Army. A 
Century of History (Macmillan Publishers London and 
Basingstoke 1987).
6. Peter B. Clarke - West Africans at War, 1914-18. 1939-45 
(Ethnographica, London, 1986).
7. Byron Farwell - The Great War in Africa (Viking Penguin 
Books Limited 1987).
8. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. L.M. 664/16 - "The Cameroons War 1914- 
16; Complaint - Labourer Tommy II (deceased) his pay." 
Gaigbah and Boye to A.C. Hollis, 7/7/16.
9. When the W.A.F.F. was formed, the "W.A.F.F. (Sierra 
Leone Battalion) Ordinance 1901" repealed the Frontier Police 
Ordinance of 1890 and provided for the constitution and 
organisation of a military force to be called the W.A.F.F., 
enlistment, discharge and service, discipline, penalties, 
enforcement of civil contracts, wills and distribution of
property. See Sierra Leone Annual Report 1901 p.14,
Ordinance 22; P.R.O. C.O. 879/58 - "Report of the
Interdepartmental Committee on the Amalgamation of the 
Military Forces in West Africa;" Nicholas H.R. Etheridge - 
"The Sierra Leone Frontier Police: A study in the Functions 
and Employment of a Colonial Force" (unpublished M. Litt.
thesis, University of Aberdeen, January 1967; S.C. Ukpabi- 
"The West African Frontier Force" (unpublished M.A. thesis 
University of Birmingham, October 1964); D. Killingray - 
"The idea of a British Imperial African Army" in Journal Of 
African History, XIX, 1, 1979; D. Killingray-"The Colonial
Army in the Gold Coast: Official policy and local response" 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1982) F. 
Cole -"The Sierra Leone Army: A case Study of the Impact of 
the Colonial Heritage 1901-67" (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of Sierra Leone, 1987).
10. For the formation of the Frontier Police, see Sierra 
Leone Annual Report (S.L.A.R.) 1890. p.6
11. P.R.O. C.O. 445/52/8401 - Inspector-General A.H.W.
Haywood -Proposals for "Reorganisation of the W.A.F.F.
85
9/2/20; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. N119/20 - C.S.O. Conf. Armed Forces
of West Africa, General 1929-1942, Vol. Ill - Milner to
Wilkinson, 4/12/20.
12. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. 32/03, 11/7/03.
13. F, Cole - "The Sierra Leone Army," op. cit.
14. L.H. Gann and P. Duignan - The Rulers of British Africa 
1870-1914 (Hoover International Pub. 1978) p.73.
15. ibid p.73; Calwell has described "small wars" as
"campaigns undertaken for prestige, pacification and 
conquest" See C.E. Calwell - Small Wars: Their Principles
and Practice. (London 1909) pp.90-91.
16. For further details on the W.A.F.F. see S.C. Ukpabi - 
"Origins of the West Africa Frontier Force," Journal of the 
Historical Society of Nigeria Vol.3. No.3, December 1966.
17. S.L.A.R. 1889, p.8.
18. ibid pp.19-20.
19. S.L.A.R. 1890 p.20. After the deportation of
chief Makaiah in January 1889, treaties of friendship were 
signed wftf» * chiefs in the interior and annual stipends paid 
to them in return for keeping open the inland routes.
20. See C.O. 271/7 fol.325 in Sierra Leone Royal Gazette, 
August 1896 cited by C. Fyfe - Sierra Leone Inheritance 
(London, Oxford University Press 1964) pp.261-262; C.W. 
Newbury - British Policy towards West Africa (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1965) p.418.
21. S.L.A.R. 1901 p.32.
22. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Governors' Despatches - Inspector-
General ' s Report, Copy No.k/45, 5/4/02; "Regulations For the 
Employment of the W.A.F.F. in Sierra Leone," 9/4/01 under the 
authority of Ordinance No.22, Section 13; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. 
W.A.F.F. 1903-1910 Inspector-General 1s Report 1906, Conf. 
No.4, 1905-06.
23. See for example - A. Boahen -"Yaa Asantewa,"
Encyclopaedia Africana. Dictionary of African Biography.
Vol.l, Ethiopia - Ghana.
24. P.R.O. C.O. 445/48/27111 - Brig-Gen. Kirke, "Paper on 
the Defence of British Possessions in East and West Africa" 
W.A.F.F./K.A.R. 5/5/19.
25. ibid.
26. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. 148/12 M.P.C. 157/12.
27. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. M.P.C. 182/11 - Annual Return of
Military and Naval Resources of Sierra Leone 24/1/12.
28. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. (A) C8/13 M.P.C. 4/13 -Annual
86
Return of Military and Naval Resources of Sierra Leone 
14/1/13.
29. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Encl. to despatch S.L. Conf. (C) 
20/5/13, Inspector-General!s Report 1913.
30. For the activities of the society and cases preferred 
against Ganna of Imperri and others, see S.L.N.A. C.S.O. 
Encl. to despatches, S.L. Conf. (A) 15/4/13; 6/3/13; S.L.N.A. 
- File on Special Commission court 1913; K. Beatty - Human 
Leopards (London 1915); M. Kalous - Cannibals and Tonqo 
Flayers of Sierra Leone _(Auckland New Zealand 1974) A. 
Abraham - "Cannibalism and African Historiography"- Presence 
Africaine Nos.105/6, 1978; K. Little -Mende of Sierra Leone
(London 1951); T.J. Alldridge - The Sherbro and its 
Hinterland (London 1901); Oji Anya - "The Sherbro in the 
Nineteenth Century" (unpublished M.A. thesis. University of 
Sierra Leone, 1973).
31. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. M.P. C/256/1912 - "Report on 
Disturbances in the Sandoh Chiefdom," Governor to Secretary 
of State, 24/12/12.
32. P.R.O. C.O. 445/33/3147 - Merewether to Harcourt 
13/1/13.
33. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Encl. to despatch, S.L. Conf (C) 
20/5/13. Inspector-Generals Report, 1913; P.R.O. C.O. 
445/33/18691.
34. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. C.5/14 M.P. Conf. 239/13. 
Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources of the Colony 
of Sierra Leone 12/1/14.
35. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department (W.D.) 2/14 - D.A.A. and 
Q.M.G. West Africa to Colonial Secretary, 17/1/14; C.S.O. 
W.D. 9/14, D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial Secretary, 7/2/14; 
W.D. 10/14 -D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial Secretary, 7/2/14.
36. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 29/10 - D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to
Colonial Secretary No. 0/327/5, 16/11/10.
37. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 28/14 - D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to
Colonial Secretary 27/4/14.
38. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. W.A.F.F. Conf. M.P. C 67/14, 51/14, 
31/5/14; P.R.O. C.O. 445/34/21542.
39. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. SECRET (S) 4/14 - "Sierra Leone Defence 
Scheme" revised to December 1913.
40. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - War Diary, Cameroons, Composite 
Battalions Gold Coast and Sierra Leone Battalion (Field 
Force), September 1914 to March 1916.
41. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.14/14 - Harcourt to Merewether,
29/7/14; Merewether to Harcourt, 30/7/14; Merewether to 
Harcourt 1/8/14.
42. ibid - Harcourt to Merewether3/8/14.
87
43. ibid, Merewether to Harcourt 4/8/14.
44. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 65/14 - Major-General Daniell to
Merewether, 6/8/14; Major Faunce, Acting G.S.O. to Colonial 
Secretary, 7/8/14; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Conf. G.H. 121/14, 
29/9/14.
45. ibid - Colonial Secretary to D.A.A. and Q.M.G., 8/8/14.
46. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 68/14.
47. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 72/14.
48. P.R.O. CAB 21/468 - "War Organisation of the British 
Empire" 12/11/09; Appendix III of "Proposed Institution of a 
Standing Technical Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 11/11/09.
49. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. WD. 109/14, J.F. Daniell to Merewether,
6/11/14; Harcourt to Merewether 7/11/14; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. 
S.57/14.
50. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.16/14 - Major B. Faunce, Acting G.S.O. 
to Colonial Secretary 14/8/14; Merewether to Postmaster 
General, in ibid.
51. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.12/14 - Telegram, Harcourt to 
Merewether, 12/8/14.
52. ibid - G.O.C. Daniell to Merewether 13/8/14; Merewether 
to Harcourt, 13/8/14. Such fears had been expressed in March 
1914. See S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential (C) 21/14.
53. ibid - Merewether to Colonial Secretary 16/3/14.
54. P.R.O. C.O. 267/562/32815 - A.H. Bennet to Sir Edward 
Grey, 24/8/14. Bennet, appointed Commissioner by President 
Howard to make peace with the Liberian rebel chief 
Yeopolapay, had agreed to provide information on Liberia for 
the British government. Merewether himself had been ordered 
to collect information regarding German activities that may 
cross the border from Liberia.
55. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.12/14 - Telegram, Harcourt to
Merewether, 17/8/14.
56. ibid, Telegram, Harcourt to Merewether, 18/8/14.
57. P.R.O. CAB 45/113 - C.V. Owens, "Sierra Leone Troops in
the Great war, 1914-1918;" Summary of Operations for War
Office, Military Handbook, December 1931.
58. S.L.N.A. - C.S.O. S.20/14 - Telegram, Governor
Robertson, Accra to Merewether, 23/8/14; G.O.C. Daniell to 
Merewether, 23/8/14.
59. ibid, Telegram, Harcourt to Merewether, 23/8/14.
60. ibid, Merewether to Secretary of State, 25/8/14.
88
61. P.R.O. C.O. 445/48/19. See also London Gazette. 
31/5/16, Fourth supplement to Gazette 30/5/16.
62. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.30/14 - Telegram I.G.W.A.F.F. to
Merewether, 16/9/14.
63. ibid, G.O.C. Daniell to Merewether, 17/9/14; Merewether 
to Harcourt, 17/9/14.
64. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 95/14.
65. P.R.O. C.O. 267/561/47001, Merewether to Harcourt,
12/11/14.
66. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.45 - Alex Flint, for Secretary,
Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Sierra Leone, copy of
letter M.03496 (Immediate and Secret) 13/11/14.
67. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. M.P.C. 223/14 (G.H.5.15.)
7/1/15.
68. P.R.O. C.O. 267/564/3188, Merewether to Harcourt,
7/1/15.
69. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. (G.H.18.15.) 10/2/15.
70. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.5/15.
71. P.R.O. C.O. 267/564/1458, Merewether to Secretary of
State 10/1/15;
72. ibid, Baynes to Ellis, 11/1/15; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.2/15.
G.O.C. Daniell to War Office 9/1/15.
73. P.R.O. C.O. 554/28/48183 - Major Jenkins, Memo to Mr.
Strachey, 19/10/15.
74. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/11878 - Merewether to Secretary of
State 11/3/15.
75. P.R.O. C.O. 554/28/48183 - Major Jenkins, memorandum to
Mr. Strachey, 19/10/15.
76. P.R.O. CAB 24/ "GT" series/202 - Memorandum on the
Assistance of the Colonies and Protectorates in the War 
16/3/17.
77. P.R.O. C.O. 
District 1914.
267/564/12035 Annual Report Ronietta
78. P.R.O. C.O. 
District 1915.
267/570/12949 Annual Report Railway
79. P.R.O. C.O. 267/271/24882 Annual Report Ronietta
District 1915.
80. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D.104/15, D.C. Koinadugu to Colonial 
Secretary, 6/12/15.
81. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/11878 - Jenkins to Ellis, 12/3/15.
89
82. C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner - "France, Africa 
and the First World War" in Journal of African History, 
XIX,1, 1978 p.17.
83. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 11/16 - Major R. Litchford a/D.A.A. 
and Q.M.G. West Africa to Colonial Secretary, 7/2/16.
84. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secretary of State (S.S.) Frontier Force 
(F.F.) 7/15.
85. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/8615 - Major Jenkins to Mr Fiddian, 
22/2/15.
86. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Miscellaneous 107/14 - Dobell to 
Merewether 1/6/15.
87. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 55/14 - "After Orders," by Major- 
General J.F. Daniell, Commanding the Troops, West Africa; By 
Command of the Army Council, War Office Telegram, 7/8/14.
88. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Frontier Force (F.F.) 27/15 - Lt. G.
Clements, O.C. Details, W.A.F.F., Sierra Leone Battalion, to 
Colonial Secretary, 10/7/15.
89. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/38294 - Acting-Governor Hollis to 
Bonar Law, 5/8/15.
90. ibid. J.F. Daniell to Hollis 14/7/15, Encl. to despatch.
91. See S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Miscellaneous 107/14 - "List 
of casualties in the Native Ranks of the S.L. Battalion, 
W.A.F.F. and West African Regiment serving with the 
Expeditionary Force up to and including 28/3/15." C.M. 
Dobell, Commanding the Allied Forces, to Merewether, 30/3/15.
92. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Miscellaneous Received 1915 - J.F. 
Daniell to Merewether, 3/9/15; Local Miscellaneous 846/Misc. 
28/15 in C.S.O. Colonial Secretary 119/15.
93. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 123/15 - Daniell to Merewether, 
4/12/15; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Miscellaneous Received, 
Daniell to Merewether, 9/12/15.
94. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - War Diary, Cameroons, Composite 
Battalion Gold Coast and Sierra Leone Battalion (Field Force) 
September 1914 to March 1916.
95. P.R.O. C.O. 445/31/28366 - Mr Read to G. Fiddes, 
20/6/16.
96. ibid - "Memorandum on Conference at the Colonial Office, 
26/6/16.
97. ibid - "Interdepartmental Conference as to the 
recruitment of West African troops for service in East 
Africa," 18/7/16.
98. P.R.O. CAB 24 "G" series/1/38; CAB 24 "G" series/2/85.
99. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/49886 - "Memorandum on Conference at
90
the Colonial Office 24/10/16, (W.A.F.F. Nigeria, 18/10/16).
100. ibid, Mr Fiddian to Messrs Strachey and Read 17/10/16.
101. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/7127 - Director of Military
Operations, War Office, to Bonar Law, 13/2/16. 0154/4137
(M.O.I.) SECRET. W.A.F.F., Cameroons.
102. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/52973 - Telegram, Governor Clifford
to Walter Long 3/11/16. W.A.F.F./Gold Coast/East Africa.
103. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/48999 - Mr Fiddian to Messrs Ellis,
Strachey and Read 27/10/16. W.A.F.F./Nigeria/East Africa.
104. ibid - B.B. Cubitt to Under Secretary of State 13/10/16. 
0165/4825 (M.0.2.B) SECRET.
105. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/55218 - R.H. Brade to Under Secretary 
of State 10/11/16. 20/General No 435. (S.S.D.D.2), W.A.F.F.
106. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/56748 - Bonar Law to Governors, West 
Africa, 28/11/16. W.A.F.F., Nigeria/Gold Coast.
107. P.R.O. C.O. 445/45/10673 - Secretary of State, Foreign
Affairs to the French Ambassador 28/2/18.
108. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/59718 - "Instructions to Major
(Temporary Lt. Col.) A.H.W. Haywood,” D.S.O., Royal 
Artillery. War Office, December 1916. Haywood had just 
reverted to the army and had previously commanded a battalion 
of the Nigeria Regiment. He had served the W.A.F.F. for ten 
years in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Cameroons.
109. P.R.O. CAB 24/ "GT" Series/8 - "Memorandum on the
Assistance of the Colonies and Protectorates in the War, " 
16/3/17.
110. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/40807 - Lt-Col. Hastings - "Report on 
the Sierra Leone Battalion, Cameroon Operations," 8/8/16.
111. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/53625 - Boyle, Deputy-Governor,
Nigeria to Secretary of State, 7/11/16.
112. ibid - Major Beattie to Mr. Read, 8/11/16.
113. ibid - Mr Ellis to Mr Fiddian 9/11/16.
114. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/60721 - Lugard to Bonar Law, Telegram 
22/11/16. W.A.F.F. Nigeria.
115. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/56556. W.A.F.F./Nigeria/Sierra
Leone.
116. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/32704 - Thurston to Beattie 22/7/16. 
W.A.F.F. Gambia.
117. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/56556 - Major Beattie to Mr Fiddian, 
30/11/16. W.A.F.F./Nigeria/Sierra Leone.
118. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/60721.
91
119. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/59225.
120. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/56556 - Major Beattie to Messrs 
Fiddian, Ellis and Read, 7/12/16.
121. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/3520 16/17 - Lugard to Walter Long, 
27/12/16. W.A.F.F. Nigeria, Conf(C).
122. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/59225 - Major Beattie to Messrs Read 
and Ellis, 19/12/16.
123. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/3075 - General Dobell to Major 
Beattie, 4/1/17.
124. S.L.N.A. - "Annual Return of Military and Naval 
Resources of the Colony of Sierra Leone," 31/12/16.
125. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/1048 - Rear Admiral, Ninth Cruiser 
Squadron to Admiralty, 4/1/17. W.A.F.F./Sierra 
Leone/Nigeria. For a detailed account of the Senusi threat, 
see A. Osuntokun- Nigeria in the First World War (Longman 
Ltd., 1979) ppl50 -162. Arrangements were made for the 
despatch of 1,000 troops and carriers on 4th January 1917 and 
a further 1,600 within the next ten days.
126. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/27100 - Haywood - "Report on
Recruiting in West Africa." SECRET, 2/5/17; For French 
policy and the levee en masse, see C.J. Balesi - "From 
Adversary to Comrade in Arms: West Africans and the French 
Military" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Illinois, 1976. 
Facsimile University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. U.S.A. London 1979)
127. P.R.O. C.A.B 45/27. Memorandum by the Historical 
Section, War Office, 1933. Brigadier R.H. Haining, D.D.M.O. 
and I., to Brigadier-General Sir J E Edmonds, 15/6/33.
SECRET 0165/2168 (M.O. I).
128. See for example, P.R.O. CAB 45/113/ - C.V. Owens - 
"Sierra Leone Troops in the Great War;" Summary of Operations 
for War Office Military Handbook, December 1931.
129. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 5/15 - Major M. Bird, D.A.A. and 
Q.M.G. West Africa to Colonial Secretary 11/1/15; Colonial 
Secretary to D.C. Railway District 13/1/15; D.C. Railway to 
Colonial Secretary 18/1/15.
130. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 9/15 - Major Bird to Colonial 
Secretary 26/2/15.
131. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 104/15 - Major R Litchford a/D.A.A.
and Q.B.G. to Colonial Secretary 1/10/15; Litchford to
Colonial Secretary 14/10/15.
132. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.A.A. and Q.M.G. 22/11/15; 
D.C. Moyamba to Colonial Secretary 28/11/15.
133. ibid, General Manager, Sierra Leone Government Railway 
to Colonial Secretary 23/12/15; P.R.O. C.O. 267/271/24882 - 
Annual Report Ronietta District 1915.
92
134. For details about the role of the Regiment, see P.R.O. 
C.O. 267/582/43238 - Encl. C.; P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/12025 -
B.B. Cubitt to Under-Secretary of State, 5/3/17. 074/5102. 
W.A.F.F. Gambia/East Africa.
135. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Encl. A - "Narrative of the 
part taken in the war by the Sierra Leone Co. R.G.A.," 
9/2/19.
136. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5387 - War Diary, Sierra Leone Battery, 
Royal Garrison Artillery - Major Chevalier, Diary 1/8/15.
137. ibid - Chevalier - Diary 31/10/15; 7/12/15.
138. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - Lt. W.S. Jackson. "Report on 
Sierra Leone Detachment, R.E."
139. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Enel B - "Statement of War 
Services of the Native Half Company, 36th Coy, Royal 
Engineers." 9/4/19.
140. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 21/14 - D.A.A. - and Q.M.G. to 
Colonial Secretary 6/4/14; D.C. Stanley to Colonial Secretary 
20/4/14.
141. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Railway Construction (R.C.) 58/14 - J.W. 
Graham, Acting Chief Resident Engineer, Makeni-Baga Extension 
to Colonial Secretary, 7/10/14, Colonial Secretary (C.S.) 
173/14.
142. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Matter (L.M.) Miscellaneous 
107/14. S.L. No. 509, Harcourt to Merewether 28/10/14 - 
Copies of notification sent to the press regarding the 
military operations which had taken place in Nigeria and the 
Cameroons.
143. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. SECRET 11/14.
144. R.P.M. Davies - The History of the Sierra Leone 
Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (Freetown, 
Government Printer 1932) p.70.
145. P.R.O. C.O. 554/28/48183 - Major Jenkins, Memo to Mr 
Strachey 19/10/15.
146. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. C. 28/15 - Merewether to
Consul General Monrovia 1/3/15; P.R.O. CAB 37/133/7.
147. P.R.O. 445/35/9418 - Mr Fiddes to Major Jenkins 12/3/15.
148. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 47/15 - Major Litchford 1/WIR,
a/D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial Secretary 18/5/15; Heslip to 
Colonial Secretary, 20/5/15.
149. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 119/15 - Litchford to Colonial
Secretary 15/11/15.
150. ibid, Litchford to Colonial Secretary 4/1/16.
151. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/59301 - "Report on Reservists, Sierra
93
Leone Battalion, W.A.F.F. 1915. 16/11/15.
152. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/14577 - Mr Ellis to Mr strachey 
30/3/16.
153. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - F.E. de Chevalier - 
"Narrative of the part taken in the war by the S.L. Coy. 
R.G.A.
154. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5387 - Chevalier, War Diary, Fumban 
7/12/15.
155. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/4238 - op.cit.
156. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential (C) 51/20 - Major Heslip to 
Under Secretary of State, 14/6/20; C.30/1920; C.561/20; 
C.261/20; C.223/19.
157. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - War Diary, W.A.R. July 1915.
158. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 60/15 - Lt.Col. Evan Knox, 
Commanding Detachment, W.A.R. to Governor 15/2/15; P.R.O. 
W.O. 95/5388 War Diary W.A.R. September 1914 to February 
1916.
159. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/26682 - C.M. Dobell to Mr Ellis, 
31/5/16; W.A.F.F. Sierra Leone.
160. P.R.O. W.O. 95/5388 - War Diary. For further problems 
encountered by the troops see Lt. Col. A.H.W. Haywood - 
"Brief Note on strategy and tactics of the campaigns in the 
Cameroons" in the Journal of the Roval United Service 
Institution, vol. LXV, no.458, May 1920. pp.299-301. (Royal 
Commonwealth Society Library, London)
161. P.R.O. CAB 45/113 - C.V. Owens - "Sierra Leone Troops in
the Great War 1914," Summary of Operations for War Office
Military Handbook, December 1931.
162. P.R.O. C.O. 267/574/17206 - Wilkinson to Walter Long, 
14/3/17.
163. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 83/14 - Colonial Secretary to
G.S.O. Tower Hill, 29/9/14; "Report of the Compensation 
Board," Freetown, December 1914.
164. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonial Secretary (C.S.) 293/14 
Colonial Secretary to all D.C.'s, 11/8/14.
165. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Sherbro 28/14 - D.C. Railway
District, Blama, to Colonial Secretary, 23/9/14.
166. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonial Secretary 313/14 - Colonial 
Secretary to General Staff Officer, 28/8/14.
167. Anne Summers and R.W. Johnson - "Conscription and Social 
Change in Guinea" - J.A.H. XIX, 1, 1978. P.27
168. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Sierra Leone Consular, M.P.Foreign 
Govt., 33/15 - Glozel, Governor-General, Dakar to Merewether,
94
19/10/15.
169. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonial Secretary 324/14 - Colonial 
Secretary to D.A.A. and Q.M.G., 14/8/14.
170. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonial Secretary 333/14 - Comptroller 
of Customs to Colonial Secretary, 12/2/15; C.S.O. Colonial 
Secretary 389/14 - N.J. Campbell-Hollis, Secretary, the
Gambia to Colonial Secretary Freetown, 15/10/14.
171. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Railway District 65/17 - D.C. 
Bowden to Colonial Secretary 4/10/17.
172. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. F.F. 27/15 - Lt. G. Clements, O.C. 
Details, S.L. Bn. W.A.F.F. to Colonial Secretary 10/7/15.
173. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 42/16 - Captain Greaves, W.A.R., to 
Colonial Secretary 15/4/16.
174. P.R.O. C.O. 267/574/23770 - Annual Report, Department of 
Agriculture 1916 Appendix I.
175. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 8/14 - G.O.C. Daniell to 
Merewether, 31/7/14.
176. P.R.O. C.O. 267/566/32138 - Merewether to Bonar Law, 
29/6/15.
177. P.R.O. C.O. 267/566/40004 - Statement of Expenditure, 
1st September to 31st July 1915.
178. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. G.H. 13/16, 14/16, 15/16;
P.R.O. C.O. 267/570/6315 - Acting-Governor Hollis to
Secretary of State 9/2/16.
179. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 89/15 - J.F. Daniell to Merewether 
31/7/15.
180. P.R.O. C.O. 267/575/42910 - Annual Report Medical 
Department 1916.
181. P.R.O. C.O. 445/50/4476 - List of casualties, W.A.F.F., 
6/1/20.
182. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Enclosure C.
183. P.R.O. C A B  37/124/3, 2/2/15.
184. P.R.O. C.O. 267/572/42894 - Wilkinson to Bonar Law,
23/8/16; Mr Calder to Mr Read, 5/10/16; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. 
Conf. G.H. 78/16, M.P. C.212/16. For the Colonial Office's 
approach to the question of slavery in war time, see S.L.N.A.
C.S.O. Confidential 164/20; C.S.O. L.M. 1/18; C.S.O.
Confidential 8/17, 216/17, 212/16; D.C. Railway 59/16; D.C.
Karene 15/19. The only references to slavery up to 1916, 
were sections 36 to 40 of the Protectorate Ordinance, No. 33, 
1901 and Section 5 of the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction 
Ordinance, No. 6, 1903. The most authoritative study on
domestic slavery in Sierra Leone in the period under review 
is John Grace's Domestic Slavery in West Africa with
95
particular reference to Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1896- 
1927 (Frederick Muller, 1975)
185. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Sherbro 28/14, D.C. Port Loko Sub­
district to Colonial Secretary, 29/9/14; S.L.W.N. 6/3/20.
186. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 35/16 - Telegram, Duala to 
Headquarters, Sierra Leone, 19/4/16.
187. P.R.O. C.O. 267/575/50804 - Blue Book Report 1916.
188. L.J. Greenstein - "The Nandi Experience in The First 
World War" in M.E. Page (ed) - Africa and The First World War 
(Macmillan Press) p. 91.
189. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. L.M. 385/16 - Mr J. Coker to Colonial 
Secretary April 1916. On this point see also Sierra Leone 
Report of the Census for the year 1921 (London, 1922) cited 
in M. Crowder and J.F.A. Ajayi - The History of West Africa 
Vol.11 (New York, 1978) p.52.
190. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Koinadugu 108/16 - D.C. Karene to 
Colonial Secretary, 14/9/16. On this point see also C.S.O. 
M.P. 2332/07, 4083/08; C.S.O. M.P. 119/11.
191. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Ronietta 53/16 - D.C. Fairtlough to 
Colonial Secretary, 22/7/16.
192. ibid - Major C.H.B. Weston a/D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to
Colonial Secretary 31/7/16; C.S.O. W.D. 51/16; C.S.O. D.C. 
Karene 75/16, 95/16; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. 81/18, G.H.
26/19 - Report by Major Ogilvie on a visit to M. Lambin,
Commandant, Kissi District, French Guinea; Catherine C. 
Vridovitch - "French Black Africa" in A.D. Roberts (ed)- The
Cambridge History of Africa Vol 7, 1905-1940 (Cambridge
University Press 1986) pp.353, 359.
193. C.G. Rosberg and John Nottingham - The Myth of Mau Mau: 
Nationalism in Kenya (Nairobi 1966); B.A. Ogot (ed) - Zamani: 
A survey of East Africa History (Nairobi 1973).
194. A.J.G. Wyse - "The Sierra Leone Branch of the National 
Congress of British West Africa, 1918 - 1946," International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol 18, No. 4 (1985) 
pp676-698; A.J.G. Wyse - H.C. Bankole-Bright and Politics in 
Colonial Sierra Leone 1919 -1958 (Cambridge University Press 
1990) pp32-58.
195. M. Kilson - Political Change in a West African State: A 
Study of the Modernisation Process in Sierra Leone (Harvard 
University Press 1966).
196. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/24886 - Lt-Col. W.C. Hastings, O.C. 
S.L.Bn. W.A.F.F. to G.S.O., Military Headquarters, Freetown. 
30/4/16.
197. P.R.O. C.O. 445/36/35340 - Mr Ellis to Mr Fiddian,
29/7/19; P.R.O. C.O. 445/50/384111 - Major Beattie to Colonel 
Haywood, 8/8/20.
96
198. P.R.O. C.O. 445/48/27111 - Brigadier-General Kirke,
Deputy Director of Military Operations, War Office - paper on 
the "Defence of British Possessions in East and West Africa."
199. ibid.
200. T. Pakenham - The Scramble For Africa (G. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1991) p.518.
201. P.R.O. C.O. 445/48/27111 - Lt-Col. Beattie - "Memo on 
the W.A.F.F." 4/4/19. Excerpts from the Report of the Inter­
departmental Committee Africa (West) No. 588, June 1899, p.4.
202. P.R.O. C.O. 445/48/38127 - Wright to Beattie 27/5/19; 
Jenkins to Beattie, 30/5/19.
203. P.R.O. C.O. 445/50/38413 - Inspector-General's Report, 
Sierra Leone Battalion, W.A.F.F., 12/7/20.
204. P.R.O. C.O. 537/954/33394 - Inspector-General, Colonel 
Haywood "Report on the Combatant Manpower of the Native Races 
of British West Africa, 4/7/23. For an appreciation of the 
fighting spirit of the Temne and Mende, see K. Wylie - The 
Political Kingdoms of the Temne, Temne Government in Sierra 
Leone 1825-1920 (Africana Publishing Company, 1977); D.J. 
Siddle - "War Towns in Sierra Leone: A Study in Social 
Change" in Africa, 37, January 1968, pp.47-55; Paul M. Mbaeyi 
“ British Military and Naval Forces in West African History 
1807-1874 (NOK Publishers International Ltd 1978); La Ray 
Denzer and M. Crowder - "Bai Bureh and the Sierra Leone Hut 
Tax War of 1898" in R.I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui (eds) -Black 
Protest (O.U.P. London and New York 1970); J.D. Hargreaves - 
"The Establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the 
Insurrection of 1898" in Cambridge Historical Journal,XII, 
(1956). A. Abraham -Topics in Sierra Leone History (Freetown 
1976); A. Abraham - "Bai Bureh the British and the Hut tax 
War" -International Journal of African Historical Studies 
(1974); Military Report on the Colony and Protectorate of 
Sierra Leone, Vol. I, 1933 (War Office London, 1933).
205. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential On Armed Forces of West 
Africa, General, Vol III 1920-42 - C.S.O. N.119/20, Winston 
Churchill to Wilkinson, 16/4/21.
206. ibid Wilkinson to Churchill, 9/6/21.
207. P.R.O. C.O. 537/954/33394 - Haywood Report op.cit.
208. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 37/16 - Major F. Anderson, 
Commanding Detachment Daru to Headquarters, Freetown, 
25/3/16.
209. P.R.O. C.O. 267/578/44591 - Wilkinson to Walter Long 
23/8/18.
210. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Enclosure C.
211. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Sierra Leone Telegraphic 1918, Governor 
to Secretary of State, 28/12/18.
97
212. P.R.O. C.O. 445/35/49640 - Daniell to Acting-Governor 
Hollis 11/10/15.
213. P.R.O. C.O. 267/271/24882 - Annual Report Ronietta 
District 1916.
214. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 57/15. Detective Sergeant Browne 
to Commissioner of Police 19/6/15.
215. See footnote 8.
216. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Open Policy Files on the Navy and Royal 
West African Frontier Force 1937, N/8/37 - Yattah to Colonial 
Secretary 3/2/37; Acting Colonial Secretary to Yattah 
15/10/37.
217. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/6158 - Wilkinson to Walter Long 
17/1/17.
218. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. L.M. 486/16. J. Frazer to Wilkinson 
18/5/16.
219. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 51/18 - Colonel Faunce, Commandant, 
W.A.R. to Military Headquarters. 24/4/18; Colonial Secretary 
to All Heads of Department, 30/5/18; Colonial Secretary to 
All D.C.'s 7/6/18.
220. ibid - Chief Accountant Railway Department to Colonial 
Secretary 25/11/20; Colonial Secretary to Goddard, 2/12/20.
221. Gazette No 1930, 15/1/21.
222. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 51/18 - Comptroller of Customs to 
Colonial Secretary, 5/2/21.
223. ibid - Captain, a/D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial
Secretary 27/10/21.
224. ibid - Lt/Col. W.A.R. to leading mercantile firms in
Freetown, 30/12/24.
225. ibid - O.C. S.L. Bn, W.A.F.F. to Colonial Secretary
27/4/25.
226. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 88/16 - Major H.B. Weston a/D.A.A. 
and Q.M.G. W.A.R. to Colonial Secretary 16/10/16; Acting 
Colonial Secretary to Weston 30/10/16.
227. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Open Policy Files on the Navy and Royal 
West African Frontier Force, N/25/30 - Principal Secretary, 
Imperial War Graves Commission, to Colonial Secretary,
20/1/38. 8/27/13/S.I.
228. ibid - Principal Assistant Secretary I.W.G. Commission 
to Colonial Secretary 4/1/29.
229. ibid - Director of Public Works to Colonial Secretary 
2/2/31; Acting-Colonial Secretary to Commissioner of Police 
5/3/31; Gazette Notice No 153, 7/3/31.
98
230. The history of the rejection of the Krios from the 
military in Colonial Sierra Leone is as old as the Sierra 
Leone Battalion. For details see S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Inspector 
General's Report, 5/4/02; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.A.F.F. File 1903- 
1910 - Inspector General's Report 1906, Conf No.4. In 1908, 
there were only 17 Krios in a battalion of 432 O.R.s. See 
S.L.N.A. C.S.O. - Inspector-General1s Report 18/4/08.
231. See S.L.N.A. C.S.O. F.F. 12/10; F.F. 14/14; F.F. 23/10.
232. P.R.O. C.O. 267/560/38101 - Mr Ellis to Mr. Fiddes 
5/10/14; P.R.O. C.O. 267/560/38971 - Merewether to Secretary 
of State 9/10/14; P.R.O. C.O. 267/560/40912 - Merewether to 
Secretary of State 21/10/14.
233. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf 96. M.P.L.M. 344/11, 
14/10/11; S.L.W.N. 11/2/11.
234. S.L.W.N. 20/7/12.
235. Adelaide M. Cromwell - An African Victorian Feminist: 
The Life and Times of Adelaide Caselv Hayford 1868-1960 
(Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1986) p.31; Christopher Fyfe - A 
History of Sierra Leone (Oxford University Press 1962) p.615.
236. The term, referring to discrimination, was first used in 
the Weekly News of 13th January 1912. See also T. Mba 
Manneh- "The Dimensions of Racism in Sierra Leone" 
(unpublished B.A. Hons Dissertation, Fourah Bay College 
1989) .
237. S.L.W.N. 14/7/01; 10/12/01; Patrick S. Caulker - "The
Autochthonous Peoples, British Colonial Policies and the 
Creoles in Sierra Leone: The Genesis of the Modern Sierra
Leone Dilemma of National Integration." (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Temple University 16/1/76, University Micro Films 
International Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A. London 1979) 
pp.152-154.
238. S.L.W.N. 7/11/14; S.L.W.N. 9/1/15.
239. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf C 37/13 M.P. C 48/13 - 
Merewether to Colonial Secretary 21/4/13.
240. S.L.W.N. 30/1/15.
241. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Middlesex - Service Documents of 
private 91658. F.S. Dove, M.M.
242. Imperial War Museum, London - R.F.G. Maurice - The Tank 
Corps Book of Honour (Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, London 1919) 
p.276; G. Murray Wilson - Fighting Tanks (Seeley Service, 
London 1929) and J.F.C. Fuller - Tanks in the Great War 
(London: John Murray 1920).
243. S.L.W.N. 30/1/15.
244. S.L.W.N. 23/2/18.
245. S.L.W.N. 1/5/15. For examples of other Sierra Leoneans
99
who fought on the Western Front, see D. Kill ingray - "All 
the King's men? Blacks in the British Army in the First World 
War, 1914-1918"
in R. Lotz and I. Pegg (eds.) - Under the imperial Carpet: 
Essays in Black History 1780-1950 (Rabbit Press, England 
1986) p.176.
246. S.L.W.N. 30/1/15; 27/3/15; 15/5/15.
247. S.L.W.N. 3/2/17; 15/1/18.
248. S.L.W.N. 4/10/19.
249. ibid.
250. S.L.W.N. 6/3/20.
251. S.L.W.N. 4/10/19.
252. S.L.W.N. 20/11/20
253. H.O. Newland - West Africa: A Handbook of Practical
Information for the Official. Planter. Miner. Financier and 
Trader (Daniel O'Connor, London 1922) pp.282-283.
100
Chapter 3: THE SIERRA LEONE CARRIER CORPS
Sierra Leone's contribution to the war effort in East Africa 
was mainly connected with Britain's determination to fight a 
"porter's war" against the Germans.1 Lucas,2 Clifford3 and 
Downes4 have attempted to document the history of
carrier service in East Africa but as Hodges rightly argues, 
the literature is still plagued by a dearth of statistical 
information.5 This chapter attempts to fill in some of the 
gaps by examining the process of recruitment in the various 
districts, the problems faced by recruiting officers and the 
overall impact of recruitment. More importantly it examines 
a much neglected factor in the labour history of Sierra Leone 
-the Inland Water Transport contingent.
Whilst the Krio youth sought to proclaim his "love" for "the 
soldier's life," the "smart uniform and the swaggering gait 
of the sojer man," the desperate position of the allies in 
East Africa and the need for carriers to service the Nigerian 
contingent despatched there, provided the pretext for the 
Sierra Leone government to once more ignore the Krio plea for 
"a chance of promotion to induce him to join the colours."6 
Desperation and penury had led many Krios like Daniel Pratt 
to make a passionate plea to Merewether for employment."7
Convinced that he ought "to do my best for my king and 
country," Pratt also pleaded to be given "a chance in the 
army or the navy. "s A "fitter by trade, " he wished to be
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enlisted in the army’s transport department or as ”a 
carpenter in the war field." He was also willing to serve as 
a "carrier headman,"9 but officialdom was loath to treat with 
an applicant who "seems to have a very good opinion of 
himself."10 This rejection of the Krio youth, even for 
carrier service ensured that the burden of carrier work fell 
on groups from the Protectorate, chiefly the Mendes.
RECRUITING FOR THE CORPS
If the combatant capacity of Sierra Leone's soldiers left 
much to be desired, Sierra Leoneans were regarded as the best 
carriers in British West Africa. In late December 1916,
General Smuts was requesting 4,000 carriers to service the 
Nigerian Overseas Contingent in East Africa. The dependence 
on Sierra Leone was predicated on the War Office's desire to 
tap every able bodied "Hausa" for combatant roles. The 
demand was further justified by apparent drawbacks elsewhere. 
Although they made good carriers locally, Ibos it was argued 
exhibited a strong aversion to serve overseas;11 regular 
Indian troops and units from the Indian states, South African 
troops - both of British and Dutch extraction - and the 
contingent from the British West Indies, all succumbed to 
disease12 and the hazards of the "equally specialised but 
widely different conditions of the African bush."13
Furthermore, the administration in East Africa had to contend 
with widespread resistance from groups like the Masai, the 
Kipsigis, the Luo and the Giriama to the demand for labour. 
Settler demands for labour on European farms also combined to 
limit recruitment for carrier service in East Africa
102
itself.14 Major Beattie therefore argued that "Sierra Leone 
could best serve the purpose..."15
The origins of the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps can be traced 
back to January 1917 when recruiting began through chiefs and 
District Commissioners. Assistant District Commissioners who 
had firstly been seconded for military service also carried 
out recruiting and "because they were known personally to the 
chiefs," coupled with the attractive rates of pay held out to 
potential recruits, "they succeeded in getting a good class 
of carrier,"16 this in spite of the memories of hardship 
endured by their kith and kin in the Cameroons. 3,500 
carriers were assembled in their respective districts and 
were formed into companies of 500 each. They were drilled and 
"disciplined within a short time and the result proved of 
great advantage when they ultimately reached the scene of 
their activities."1'7
In response to the desperate conditions in East Africa, 
Wilkinson consented to raise 4,000 carriers in one month.18 
They were to be organised into eight companies under 20 
headmen and were to receive a shilling a day and headmen, 
l/6d.19 The Army Council suggested that part of their wages 
be held back as deferred pay or that some portion be allowed 
to their families,20 but the initial enthusiasm generated 
among recruits was soon dampened by the sudden vacillations 
in colonial circles. By 19th January, the Army Council 
ordered that the quota to be provided by Sierra Leone was to 
be limited to 3,000 in view of the 1,000 already raised in 
Nigeria.21
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In the main, government had recourse to the Mende Chief 
"King" George Cummings for the provision of carriers. George 
Cummings was willing to both raise the first contingent of
2,000 at the rate of £300, and to feed and house them before 
embarkation.22 By 2nd February however, he had only managed 
to raise 700 and District Commissioners therefore came under 
increasing pressure to provide the rest. 1,300 were required 
by 14th February and the rest by 1st March,23 but though 
recruits were offered a further inducement of rations or 3d 
allowance and although chiefs were promised a bonus in 
proportion to the numbers they provided,24 the administration 
encountered serious difficulties in fulfilling the requests 
of General Smuts.
By 17th February this problem was further compounded by 
complications on the international scene. General Hoskins 
was requesting an additional 5,000 carriers and the failure 
by the War Office to secure enough recruits elsewhere, 
imposed additional pressures on Sierra Leone. By then 
recruiting in the East African Protectorate, Uganda, 
Nyasaland and German East Africa had been exhausted. The 
Portuguese government had instructed its Governor General in 
Portuguese East Africa to discuss the question of recruitment 
with the British military authorities, but the Belgian 
military authorities in German East Africa "pointedly 
declined" to allow General Smuts to recruit carriers in 
Tabora District.
Because Britain had prevented the French from recruiting 
labour in British Somaliland, the French Government turned
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down the War Office's request for carriers from Madagascar. 
Above all, "reasons of policy render it undesirable to put 
ourselves under obligation" to the Belgians and the French.25 
The Colonial Office's suggestion that as many carriers as 
possible should be raised in East Africa itself and that the 
deficit be secured from West Africa, meant turning to Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria for "this... indefinite number at the 
earliest possible date."26 Mr Butler found the request 
"perfectly useless" and advised that coolie transport be 
secured from India instead.27
The increasing dependence on Sierra Leone was to lead to an 
inter-departmental conference on 28th February 1917 to 
consider the difficulties encountered by the War Office in 
raising recruits in East Africa, the Belgian Congo and the 
numbers to be recruited from West Africa; whether objections 
by the Admiralty to Wilkinson's readiness to raise a further
5,000 had been overcome, reports on carrier recruitment in 
Sierra Leone by Colonel Haywood, questions relating to the 
provision of transport for the carriers and the costs for the 
Corps including civil officials and local unofficials 
attached to it.28 Though Rhodesia tried to ease the burden 
on Sierra Leone by attempting to raise 6,000 carriers for 
General Northy, there were still difficulties to contend 
with. Mr. Read and Lord Drogheda felt "it was not safe to 
count on the Portuguese;" at a time when General Hoskins was 
pressing for 9,000 carriers, the French were busy recruiting 
all available men from Madagascar.
Further problems like providing shipping facilities for the
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Corps and the likelihood of desertion among the men whilst 
they waited also occupied the attention of delegates to the 
conference. Once more, the usual question of the dearth of 
officers was raised and, in view of these problems, the
conference resolved to stop recruiting carriers in Nigeria
and Sierra Leone temporarily pending the provision of
shipping facilities. Whilst recruitment for combatants was
to continue, pressure was to be put on the Portuguese
government to expedite the recruitment of carriers in 
Portuguese East Africa. The possibility of recruiting in the 
Belgian Congo and Madagascar was however to be shelved but 
General Hoskins was to provide information on the degree of 
medical assistance required for the carriers raised.29
Between February and March 1917, Northern Sherbro contributed 
400 carriers for East Africa. Assembled at Pujehun for 28 
days, they elected their own headmen but apart from two daily 
roll calls, and the issuing of rations, no attempt was made 
to drill them. The only discipline they knew was that 
acquired "through their own Poro laws," but it was
significant that this was the first time the chiefs in the 
district were asked to find carriers for service outside the 
Colony.30 An equally remarkable degree of loyalty was 
demonstrated by the chiefs of Karene. "One chief...when 
asked for carriers, detailed there and then his own son as 
headman for his own contingent."31
Although many were rejected in the Port Loko sub-district,
127 carriers actually left for East Africa in 1917.32 The
Railway District was no less important in the supply of 
carriers and many like Badea, Gina Gatu, Amara and Bockarie,
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came from Gboe, Humonyha, Foray and Mano chiefdoms 
respectively. The Fatoma, Posewa and Bundewa chiefdoms also 
supplied men for the Corps.33 From Kenema alone in the same 
district, over 1,000 men volunteered for service.34 Chief 
Musa of Mano in Ronietta District and chief Boima of Bo in 
the Railway District were to render invaluable service to the 
government. Carriers were assembled at Mano and Bo where they 
awaited despatch to East Africa.35
Quartered at these bases for periods extending over two or 
three months, the task of providing accommodation for "such 
large numbers of men until barracks could be constructed," 
proved a severe strain on the resources of the chiefs and 
their people, but "they made no complaint" and 
"are...deserving of special recognition..." In September, 
Wilkinson therefore recommended both Musa and Boima for a 
medal.36 The best mobilisation centres were Makeni (for A 
Company) and Daru (for B Company) Songo having been initially 
rejected because of its proximity to Freetown.3"7 Though 
Songo was later to become a collecting camp, the rationale 
then was that barracks situated in the neighbourhood of towns 
exposed the troops to "undesirable local influences" which 
militated against efficiency.33
In April 1917, the War Office suggested that in future 
carriers were to be raised in West Africa at the rate of
4,000 a month provided this did not prejudice the recruitment 
of combatants.39 Wilkinson was therefore requested to 
determine the maximum monthly quota which Sierra Leone could 
provide.40 The emphasis on Sierra Leone drew its inspiration 
from Colonel Haywood's report on recruiting in West Africa.
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Indeed, Haywood and Lugard had concluded that the Mende of
Sierra Leone, then numbering 400,000 "make excellent
carriers."41 These sentiments were clearly not without 
foundation and were deeply rooted in the history of Mende 
carrier work. Mende prowess as carriers was already well
known as early as the Ashanti war of 1900 when the late Madam
Yoko supplied 2,000 Mende carriers for the expedition against 
the rebels. In fact Mende carriers were constantly in demand 
not only in Sierra Leone but also in other parts of West 
Africa.42
"Cheerful... amenable and hardy," the Mendes were reputedly 
the best carriers in West Africa.43 Glowing accounts already 
abounded of their carrier work in the Cameroon campaigns. 
The attempts for example to cross the river Fumban through 
Bangetabe were bedevilled by marshes and swampy forest paths 
obstructed by waist-deep mud holes and low overhanging 
branches. The distance of five miles spanned seven hours but 
"the way in which the gun carriers from Sierra Leone managed 
to transport their loads was a source of astonishment and 
admiration."44 Although the Haywood mission had served to 
expose the fallacy of the "million Black army" he was 
confident that 10,000 carriers could be raised in Sierra 
Leone by voluntary means.
Carriers raised in April were to be divided into two 
companies of 500 each, every district supplying the following 
monthly quota -Koinadugu 250, Karene 150, Ronietta 100, 
Railway District 250, Northern Sherbro 200, and Sherbro 
District 50.4S The Corps left Freetown on 22nd April via the
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Cape, the voyage lasting six weeks. On 30 th May, two 
companies disembarked at Kilwa Kisiwani in ex-German 
territory to join the Gold Coast Regiment and the remaining 
companies later disembarked at Dar-es-Salaam.46
The history of carrier recruitment in Sierra Leone throughout 
the war presents an almost insurmountable problem for the 
researcher attempting to determine the precise number of non- 
combatants recruited. The evidence suggests that between 
August 1914 and August 1917, Sierra Leone had supplied 13,023 
non-combatants to the war effort in the Cameroons and in East 
Africa. Of these, 11,890 were carriers and 220 gun 
carriers.4-7 Although it is equally difficult to estimate the 
exact number of carriers sent to East Africa, the claims 
forwarded by chiefs to the military authorities are very 
revealing.
Whilst military sources argued that 4,756 carriers actually 
embarked for East Africa, chiefly lists show a total of 
4,964. According to the latter, the Railway District 
supplied 1,382 carriers, Ronietta 1,270, Northern Sherbro 
812, Karene 634, Freetown 531 and Koinadugu 335.4S By 
September 1917, a total of 4,953 carriers had been sent to 
East Africa from Sierra Leone and were despatched as follows 
- 1,042 on 29th May, 2,085 on 1st June, 275 on 6th June, 
1,051 on 20th July and 500 on 12th September.49 Whatever the 
disparities in numbers, it is clear that Sierra Leone did 
make a significant contribution to the war effort in East 
Africa.
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Compulsion clearly had its advantages in terms of increasing 
the number of combatants and non-combatants but it appealed 
more to the French and was not always resorted to in Sierra 
Leone. Haywood in fact had warned against it in West Africa 
particularly so when the number of recruits "who enlist from 
pure love of soldiering is very small."
Above all, it was bound to lead to resistance.50 The second 
attempt ever made in the history of the Colony to commandeer 
men for military service in 1912 had led to widespread 
disturbances at King Jimmy Wharf.51 Furthermore, many 
prejudices had to be overcome. Many recruits had never seen 
the sea and were afraid of it; with others, it was "against 
their fetish to cross the water." Many harboured an 
instinctive dislike of food other than that to which they 
were accustomed and feared that they would not be given rice 
overseas.
Elsewhere in Ghana and Nigeria, attractive rates of pay in 
the police force and the mines precluded many from enlisting 
for carrier service. Haywood therefore urged the grant of 
inducements - offering ten or five shillings to suppliers of 
recruits, granting tax remissions, separation allowances and 
increased pay to recruits- in order to keep the flow of men 
up to the requisite standard. Haywood was full of praise for 
Sierra Leone's carriers. Practically the whole country 
except Muslim groups like the Susu, Koranko and Mandingo who 
occupied the northern frontier, could provide non-combatants. 
Sierra Leone therefore agreed to provide 10,000 carriers- 
between 1,000 and 1,500 during the first six months of 1917 
and between 700 and 1,000 on a monthly basis afterwards. The
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total number of fit and available men from the Temne, Mende, 
Sherbro, Limba and other groups then was 11,005.52
Clearly Sierra Leoneans were providing abundant proof of 
their capacity for carrier service elsewhere. In the small 
government labour corps in the Gold Coast, (then 350 strong) 
almost all were Mendes from Sierra Leone. Similarly, in the 
gold mines where 27,000 labourers were employed, 4,500 came 
from Sierra Leone.53 The Sierra Leone Carrier Corps which saw 
continuous service with the Gold Coast Regiment and the 
Nigerian Brigade was therefore well suited to the tasks of 
providing first and second line transport during the 
operations which lasted from June to December 1917 and which 
were carried out in the east of the country, north of the 
Rufiji river to the Rovuma on the Portuguese border, until 
the enemy was forced to retreat into Portuguese East Africa. 
In East Africa itself, the men were to maintain in "unabated 
measure their reputation as hard and willing workers,"54 and 
"it is no exaggeration to say that theirs was a very 
important contribution to the successful operations that 
added by mandate 374,085 square miles to the empire."55
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN RECRUITING CARRIERS
The task of securing carriers in Sierra Leone to service the 
contingents in East Africa posed considerable problems for 
the authorities. In a bid to escape recruitment, many able 
bodied men were to migrate from Karene district to some of 
the towns near the frontier.56 February 1917 was a busy 
period for the authorities particularly in Pujehun where no 
carrier had been recruited since the beginning of the war.
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The D.C. could therefore not ascertain what number he could 
raise, though he promised 350.5? Moreover, because the idea 
of carrier service in the district was entirely new, it was 
"impossible to say how the young men...will respond to it..."
Very few Mendes (the group which usually volunteered for 
service abroad as carriers) lived in the district then58 and 
the Gallinas and Krim "were nervous and inclined to run 
away."59 Although Kenema promised 450 and 20 headmen by 12th 
February, and 300 carriers and 10 headmen by 1st March,60 the
D.C. Moyamba needed to confer with "all my chiefs."61 Karene 
however pledged to send 250 carriers and 10 headmen initially 
and the same number in the second batch.62
Despatching carriers from the Protectorate to Freetown was to 
prove particularly burdensome for D.C.'s and railway 
officials who had to make dispositions for rolling stock.63 
Because it was impossible to provide the necessary 
accommodation for the men at collecting stations, D.C.'s had 
to request special trains to run, for example, from Bo to 
Daru and back.64 At Kenema in particular there was every 
possibility of those already concentrated in large centres 
"melting away."65 Even when transport was available, there 
were considerable delays. By 9th February, arrangements had 
been made to transport 800 carriers from Yonibana, Mano and 
Moyamba, but "transport will probably not arrive till 
26th..." At Moyamba, other problems compounded the 
difficulties encountered in securing carriers. The incidence 
of smallpox made it inadvisable to continue recruitment 
there.66 By 12th February, 400 carriers had been assembled
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at Pujehun ready for despatch to collecting stations at Bo, 
but the problem of transportation made it necessary to 
"disperse them for the time being."67
Conditions were not materially different at Port Loko where 
transport could not be secured to despatch the first 
complement of carriers.68 The situation was all the more 
serious especially at a time when the O.C. Carrier Corps 
wished to form Numbers 5 and 6 Companies "without delay."69 
Most of those assembled at Moyamba "were full of enthusiasm" 
but "many desertions were feared" and the only alternative 
open to recruiting commissioners, was to disband them 
temporarily and reassemble them again at three or four days 
notice.70 This course of action was to lead to problems at 
Port Loko where carriers were already deserting,71 and D.C. 
Kemp apprehended the same results at Bo.72
In many ways, government's dependence on chiefs provided a 
perfect pretext for personal gain by the latter and recruits 
were always the losers. Many carriers accused "King" George 
of bribery during the process of selection, and also charged 
him with "acts of great injustice..." The lot of the
carrier was also worsened by war time privations. Due to the 
high price of rice, government found it hard to feed carriers 
at Pujehun even at a rate of 3d per day,73 and by 24th 
February, even the increase in rations could not solve the 
problem.74
By April 1917, the demand for carriers had become more 
insistent, 500 more being required to proceed with the first
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batch already raised.75 Though the D.C. Kenema promised to 
raise 250 in ten days and the D.C. Moyamba 200,76 the 
Colonial Office was requesting 4,000 carriers from West 
Africa.77 D.C. Kemp at Bo promised to raise 250 per month 
for three months and 100 afterwards for three months.78 
Karene promised 100 per month and a maximum of 1,000.79
Pujehun could only promise a maximum of 400 and the D.C. 
estimated that were conscription to be introduced, 10,000 
could be secured in 10 months.80 Though Koinadugu promised 
250 monthly, the D.C. needed a month's notice as the district 
had never supplied carriers for war service.81
At Waterloo it was "difficult to obtain even as many as
six."82 On the whole, matters relating to the Corps were
essentially ad hoc and D.C.s knew neither whether more
carriers would be required or when.83 By May 1917, 
commissioners still had to contend with the problem of
desertion in Karene and this necessitated further calls on 
the chiefs. Apart from the lack of food, the high incidence
of medical rejections precluded the preparation of an
accurate roll except "immediately prior to embarkation.84
Other problems soon erupted at Karene. Because they were 
being drilled by officers who attended parade in "Sam Brown" 
belts, recruits feared that they were being enlisted as
soldiers. So that out of the 300 recruited, only two were 
volunteers, the rest having been enrolled by their chiefs. 
Many able bodied men ran away to Freetown to avoid being 
taken on "and the chiefs are asking if anything could be done 
to prevent this emigration..." The only legal provision for
114
enforcing their return then, was the Vagrancy Ordinance No.19 
of 1905, but traditional rulers in Freetown connived with 
emigrants, refusing to send them back and by so doing 
compounded the problems already being encountered in securing 
carriers.85
In the Port Loko sub-district of Karene, where D.C. Frere in 
June was attempting to recruit carriers from Magbema and 
Billeh chiefdoms, five whole towns ran over to French 
Guinea.86 The depopulation of whole villages was to arouse 
suspicions of compulsion and the Acting Colonial Secretary 
had to warn against any pressure being used.87 In the south 
west of Koinadugu the failure of the 1916 rice crop made it 
difficult for D.C. Hollins to provide his quota on time. The 
same problems were faced by the Assistant D.C. at Gbangbama 
so that by late May, the O.C. No. 2 Coy at Mano was some 30 
men below strength.88
The resort to further compulsion in July 1917 was fraught 
with serious consequences. Wilkinson complained that "the 
old West African tendency...to use forced labour has asserted 
itself." Caught up in a war that made little sense to them, 
resistance and trouble soon followed in the wake of attempts 
to requisition manpower for the Corps and as many fled into 
French territory, whole villages were deserted. Apart from 
compulsion, the apparent lack of care for the carrier was to 
erode whatever enthusiasm was left in the villages. Though 
Wilkinson urged that they be kept contented, there were very 
few officers who could gain the confidence of the men, "turn 
out a better class of carrier" and preclude disturbances in
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the Protectorate.
Clearly, the officers sent out lacked the "tact and 
experience" required for "handling" Africans. As Wilkinson 
rightly argued, refusal to enlist was due inter alia to the 
indefinite prolongation of the war and fears that they would 
be required to serve for as long as it lasted. Wilkinson 
found himself in a very unenviable position "without 
any...knowledge of War Office intentions," or when the demand 
for carriers would end.
The spate of insurrections due to conscription in French West 
Africa was to alert the Governor to the spectre of revolt in 
the dependency and he therefore urged "a policy more 
considerate to the natives."89 This was all the more 
important especially so at a time when Africans in the Gold 
Coast were beginning to construe the feverish pace of 
recruitment as "a sign of weakness" in the ranks of the 
allied forces.90 The problems associated with recruitment 
were to exert a negative influence on the Reserve Force which 
dropped from 72 in November 1916 to 6 in November 1917.91
The urge to enlist had dwindled considerably, punctuated in 
many ways by apprehensions of a possible breach of faith were 
the carriers to be used in another theatre of war. Neither 
the Colonial Office nor the Army Council knew what promises 
had been made to the men by their officers and because "the 
reliance placed by the West African...in the promises of his 
European officers is absolute... it is essential that this 
confidence should be maintained.1192 Above all, as "long as
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the chiefs are called upon by government to assist in
recruiting, the carriers are not strictly speaking
volunteers." Many agreed to serve "simply because they are 
under tribal discipline..." argued D.C. Stanley.93 By 
August 1917 however, the demands on Sierra Leone had abated 
considerably and this meant disbanding between one and two 
hundred carriers then assembled at Mano.94
SIERRA LEONE AND THE INLAND WATER TRANSPORT
The despatch of Sierra Leone's contingent to the Inland Water 
Transport was preceded by considerable equivocations by the 
Colonial and War Offices in their search for labour, first in
France and then in Mesopotamia. Once more the shift to
Sierra Leone was to come at a time when confidence in the 
combatant capacity of Sierra Leoneans was on the wane. When 
in September 1915 the War Office proposed recruiting a small 
labour corps of about 100 West African miners for work in 
France and the Mediterranean, the Governor of the Gold Coast 
countered that the expense to be incurred would be great, the 
quality of the labourers doubtful and that the local mining 
industry would be dislocated. Lugard in Nigeria was to share 
the same sentiments and both deplored the use of West 
Africans in Europe during the cold months of the year. In 
April 1916 however, it was further proposed that Kroo "boys" 
from Sierra Leone be recruited for dock work in Marseilles.
Wilkinson offered to provide a first batch of 500 and then
1,000 at a later date, but the committee responsible for 
Imperial Defence soon decided to abandon the scheme. Though 
a sea-faring group and accustomed to work in ships bound for
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England, and therefore better suited to withstand the
European climate, it was doubtful whether the Kroo were 
suitable for the service contemplated in France. Further, 
the rate of three shillings proposed for them (per diem) was 
found to be considerably higher than those laid down in the 
Army Pay Warrants.95 By May therefore, the idea had been 
abandoned much to the chagrin of Chief Brown and his
"boys."96 Towards the end of August, the War Office once 
more turned to West Africa for 1,500 labourers for the Inland 
Water Transport and Sierra Leone offered to provide ordinary 
carriers at the rate of l/2d a day.
In their bid to furnish relief for European Artillerymen 
employed in providing continuous supply service for siege 
batteries, the Army Council in September 1916 proposed to 
raise a force of some 6,000 "coloured" troops either in West 
or South Africa. These were to be organised into ammunition 
supply companies and a Royal Garrison Artillery. In all, 22 
companies were required - the desire being to "secure
personnel of a similar stamp" as those in the Bermuda
Artillery Militia Siege Battery sent to France and the West 
Indies contingent.9,7
Recruiting in West Africa was however fraught with 
difficulties. The Colonial Office feared that West Africans 
would be "murdered by France's winter." Commander Henderson 
of the Intelligence Department, War Office, argued that 
Sierra Leoneans "would die like flies" in Mesopotamia, but 
because Nigerians were not suitable for the work in question, 
"the most probable source of supply...was from among the Kroo
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men of Sierra Leone and Liberia." Though Wilkinson was sure 
that ordinary carriers could be recruited from Sierra 
Leone," the rates of pay and separation allowances proposed 
by the War Office were considered insufficient for the
Kroo.100
Above all, the Colonial Office found the much vaunted idea 
about large populations living in West Africa, chimerical. 
The season itself was not propitious; it was harvest time in 
most of the colonies and volunteers were not forthcoming.
Only 22 were secured from Ibadan, Oyo and Oshogbo in Nigeria
and in Sierra Leone where the bulk of the population was 
engaged in agriculture, Mr Ellis was doubtful of any
success.101 The Colonial Office's preoccupation with 
utilising the manpower resources of West Africa was to arouse 
the suspicion's of Captain Harfood, who pointed to the danger 
of infecting Africans with disease in Europe.103
By December 1916 however, the War Office had concluded that 
West Africans were particularly suitable for work with the 
I.W.T. and the Royal Engineers in Mesopotamia. Captain 
Andrews was therefore despatched to Sierra Leone to raise 
1,500 men for the purpose.103 Recruits raised were to be 
divided into six companies of 250 each. Enlisted as labour 
companies of the Royal Engineers, I.W.T. , they were not 
required for combat. Their engagement was to last throughout 
the war though it could be terminated sooner. They were to 
be paid at the rate of £2 a month, two thirds being deferred 
pay, payable on discharge. This consolidated rate was to 
cover all allowances -separation, family and dependants -
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except rations, uniforms and quarters. The men were also to 
receive a gratuity not exceeding £12 in cases of disablement 
to be paid, in accordance with the degree and duration of the 
injury, to their next of kin in the event of death.104
Many factors accounted for the dependence on Sierra Leonean 
labour for river work. It was doubtful whether men from the 
Gold Coast or Nigeria would volunteer for service in 
Mesopotamia. The people of the Niger Delta in Nigeria were 
written off as "the bush native type and the idea of putting 
them into uniforms... is preposterous." Though these 
sentiments may have been exaggerated, Lugard was convinced 
that "the Kroo boys are by far the most likely source..." He 
therefore urged the War Office to increase their pay from £2 
which was based on the rates offered to the Cape Labour 
Battalions.105
In May 1917, 978 men left Sierra Leone for Mesopotamia106 on 
the vessel Ivy. The ship called at Dar-es-Salaam where the 
Gold Coast Regiment and the Gambia Company disembarked. 
Calling initially at Karachi in July 1917, a detachment of 
168 left for Basra in August, and once the twin problems of 
cholera and beri-beri were contained, the rest of the unit 
left for Mesopotamia, disembarking at Basra on 19th October. 
Once in Mesopotamia, the men were divided up to form crews 
for large paddle and stern wheel steamers, motor launches and 
salvage barges. Others attended lectures and received 
instructions at the I.W.T. school on marine engines and were 
trained as drivers of motor launches. Many were detailed to 
the construction department where they moved timber, 
discharged barges and worked as pile drivers. At Nahr Umar,
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22 miles above Basra, some did excellent work discharging 
large ocean steamers and working as winchmen and stevedores 
in the holds. In January 1918, eight monitors of the "Fly" 
class, employed on the middle and upper Euphrates, were taken 
over by the Royal Navy and manned by the men of the unit. At 
the same time, small detachments stationed at Dhibban, 
Ramadie, Feluja and Hit, were busy loading and unloading 
barges.
"With the unit thus scattered on both sides of the Euphrates 
and Tigris, the difficulty in keeping daily records of the 
disposition of the detachments" was intensified. What is 
clear is that on 30th July, the contingent embarked for 
repatriation landing first at Cape Town. Together with a 
detachment of the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps, they worked 
assiduously in the thick of the influenza epidemic, erecting 
hospital camps at Newlands and Green Point, burying the dead 
at Maitland Cemetery, supplying fatigue parties to handle 
ordnance and providing orderlies at hospitals. The
contingent finally arrived in Sierra Leone on 7th January, 
1919.107
THE IMPACT OF RECRUITMENT
Perhaps the most immediate consequence of carrier recruitment 
was the continued depletion of the revenue of the country. 
Because so many able bodied men were taken away to East 
Africa and Mesopotamia, there were fears of a possible 
reduction of £3,000 in the house tax in the estimates of 
revenue for 1918.108 At a time when the power of the 
"sovereign is hardly more than half its value,"109 the return
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of consumptive carriers from East Africa was to raise the 
question of establishing sanatoria for the prevention of 
phthisis.110
By 29th November 1918, 3,028 carriers had returned from East 
Africa and £100,000 was required to pay them. Arrangements 
were therefore being made for the amount to be sent in silver 
currency111 but the shortage of silver coins112 was to play 
into the hands of profiteering shopkeepers who discounted 
currency notes and put a premium on silver. Government’s 
response to these malpractices was to suspend the standing 
orders and pass a bill with stiff penalties prohibiting the 
discounting of currency notes.113 At the root of the problem 
was the aversion shown towards currency notes and the 
preference for silver in the dependency, in spite of 
government's efforts "to remove native prejudices by printed 
notices and verbal instructions."114
Whilst the deployment of carriers and labour gangs helped to 
reduce the crime rate in Freetown in 1918,115 it also 
exercised a baneful influence on the output of produce in 
Sherbro district due to serious labour shortages.116 
Conditions were no different in Karene where the failure of 
the rice crop in 1918 was attributed to the dearth of labour, 
chiefly due to recruitment and the tendency to migrate to 
escape service with the Corps.117 In the wake of 
recruitment, the Admiralty faced difficulties securing the 
necessary labour for coaling vessels and Mr Anderson was to 
warn that "unless sufficient numbers are retained, the 
movement of transports between Australia and this country
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will be seriously interfered with."118
By July 1918, many carriers had not yet returned from East 
Africa and official silence over their fate was to cause 
great anxiety and apprehension among friends and relatives. 
Such fears bred rumours of an impending rising in the Railway 
District from which most of the carriers came. This forced 
the O.C. Daru to abandon regimental exercises and to
concentrate on Pendembu where about 200 "Syrians and educated 
natives" had taken refuge in a bungalow.119 The frenzied 
purchase of machets and the abandonment by a manager of the 
Bank of British West Africa of his safe containing £4,000, 
all tended to lend credibility to these rumours which were 
aggravated by reports of a pregnant woman whose "child was 
taken out to make medicine with which they swear and as the 
Mende believe in swear, none will reveal the secret."
By 21st July, the rumours had assumed diverse dimensions. 
Whilst according to one source, it was to be a rising among 
the Mende to celebrate the 1898 war, it was also to be a 
"war...to stop the progress of the railway" by chief Gborie 
of Baoma. Furthermore, the almost feverish assemblage of
Poro conclaves by chiefs Farma of Panguma, Boima of Bo , Bai 
Coomber of Baima, Bargong of Mamboma, the chief of Pendembu 
and many others,120 were intended to expel the Temnes from 
Laoma, Fauru, "and towns where Temnes were established". 
Other sources argued that the Poro meetings held in the 
Bambara chiefdom in the towns of Mana of Kunya, Penyo of 
Topombu, and Boro of Sahu as early as May 1918, were aimed at 
liberating these towns from the yoke of Panguma.121
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In May, it was held that the unrest in the district owed its 
origins to a plot by chiefs Samawova, Baion, and Staffa at 
Lalihun to expel all Creoles and Syrians because the former 
took advantage of their women and because the "Syrians 
flogged their boys."122 By July the rumours came to be 
associated with grossly exaggerated versions of the submarine 
attack on Monrovia. The Pendembu alarm itself had broken out 
with the arrival there of Moses Allen from Liberia. Allen 
came with reports that Germany was winning the war, that they 
had burnt some Liberian towns and that they would soon attack 
Freetown.123
D.C. Bowden at Ronietta was to describe such rumours as "a 
mixture of hysteria and gossip with a strong flavouring of 
cowardice, " but he was quick to observe that "there is much 
discontent among the natives..." What compounded the 
situation was the fact that "hints have been dropped that all 
is not well with us in Europe..." Bowden feared that a 
reversal of the allied cause in Europe would lead "some of 
the bolder spirits among the chiefs to try conclusions with 
what they might deem a weakened government."
The role of the press was no less influential in magnifying 
any little detail that will bear an unfavourable construction 
as to the course of the war..."124 By 12th July therefore, 
government found it could no longer afford to be complacent 
over the mounting disquiet among the relatives of carriers 
who flooded D.C. Craven's office daily with applications. 
What enhanced fears in the district was the spate of rumour 
mongering in connection with the fate of the carriers. The
124
D.C. on many occasions would surprisingly learn of the death 
of a carrier through his relatives. He then had to refer 
such cases to the O.C. Transport,125 and this embarrassed 
him greatly.
Elsewhere in Northern Sherbro, many carriers by July had yet 
to receive payment due to delays in furnishing their 
accounts. Most of their next of kin could not be traced 
because many notifications of deaths were "badly prepared." 
The military authorities in East Africa were particularly 
culpable for failing to furnish returns of deaths prepared 
from company rolls, neither did D.C.s receive enough notice 
regarding the return of carriers.126 The complexity of the 
rumours in the Railway District poses great difficulty for 
the historian seeking a connection between alleged Poro 
conclaves, chiefdom "palavers" and war time privations.
What is clear however is that by mid July, the discontent 
among relatives had become firmly wedded to the hardships 
brought about by the war, punctuated by the indiscriminate 
exactions of chiefs. The spiralling inflation in the
district and the high prices of European goods prevented 
people from buying freely and due to the early rains, the 
rice crop in the district was a particularly bad one in 1918 
and "ought to be carefully watched."127 To compound the 
situation chief (Madam) Humonyha of Kenema in the district 
was imposing rice levies on the people and by so doing, 
precipitated a rebellious spirit at Sumbuya. At Sembehun, 
Paramount Chief Suluku had been collecting money to purchase 
a car and the people objected to the impositions on them.
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Events in Liberia were also crucial in fuelling unrest in the 
district and elsewhere. D.C. Addison at Bonthe, Northern 
Sherbro suspected that pro-German feelings in Liberia, where 
the British were blamed for the poor prices of produce and 
the scarcity of spirits and tobacco, may have spread into the 
Protectorate, where the people were not averse to using the 
occasion as a pretext for venting their objections to the 
"unauthorised coition between their wives and white men." At 
a time when the high prices of liquor and sugar were breeding 
"a certain amount of discontent" in the Railway District, 
Krio apprehensions came to centre around memories of their 
fate in the 1898 risings. Together with the Syrians, they 
"know that if anything happens they will be the first to be 
attacked. 1
Though D.C. Addison found no evidence of a Mende plot 
"against the white man," he agreed that "there is a feeling 
of unrest." No risings actually occurred, but war time 
privations and the unrest among relatives of carriers had 
clearly taken their toll on the men of the West African 
Regiment, who detested the cutting of wood and the clearing 
of ground round their barracks. At Port Loko, discipline in 
the detachment was bad. They flouted orders, "were too fond 
of using the butt...of a rifle on the natives, they were 
continually thieving and...interfered with the women of the 
people." They constituted such a terror that "the sight of a 
red cummerbund was enough to make the people drop their 
loads...and run into the bush."128
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THE FATE OF RETURNEES
The fate of returned carriers and labourers was not an 
enviable one. Up to August 1918, carriers were still being 
invalided home from East Africa but the very poor welcome 
accorded them was to arouse the anger of D.C. Bowden at 
Ronietta. On 4th August 1918, 300 carriers were sent to Mano 
"packed in goods trucks, forty in a truck...in which they 
could not sit down and in which travelling is of the roughest 
and most uncomfortable..." D.C. Bowden was convinced that 
such treatment would convey "the worst possible impression" 
for though the men had "given good service, some...their 
lives and many their health, it seems a poor welcome...to 
send them to their homes in trucks used...for conveyance of 
cattle..." What made their plight so lamentable was the fact 
that most of them were "unlettered and unable to voice a 
grievance."129 The General Manager Railway, could only plead 
shortage of rolling stock.130 It was apparently "ill 
treatment" of this kind that the Reformer referred to when it 
argued that the Black man had derived no real benefit by 
shedding his blood in the European war.131
Long before the end of hostilities in East Africa, government 
had decided that returnees were to be sent back to their 
respective villages with their pay. They were not to be 
allowed to "linger in Freetown where they would inevitably 
spend their wages in a variety of unprofitable ways." 
Government had to be extremely cautious in resettling them. 
They had been supplied by their chiefs and headmen and were 
they to be removed from traditional discipline, it was feared 
that recruiting would be rendered "more difficult and
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uncertain" in future.132 Returnees were entitled to keep 
their uniforms but all articles similar to those worn by the 
military or Court Messengers were to be surrendered.133
By March 1918, many who served in East Africa from Ronietta 
had returned to the district and had been paid but this was 
the exception rather the rule,134 for though 69 carriers had 
returned between August and November 1917, only nine had 
received payment.135 Many returnees found themselves heavily 
indebted to "King" George who was well placed to benefit from 
the advances paid to carriers. Of the 22 returned in August, 
15 owed the "King" the sum of £24.15s which they had borrowed 
from him "...apart from the chop supplied to the men...for 
which. ..George Cummings is entitled to draw 3d per day per 
man."135 District Commissioners were responsible for sending 
the carriers back to their towns but the difficulties 
encountered in despatching them and the problems of 
identification were to cause serious delays in payment. This 
was particularly so at Pujehun where by 24th December, only 
three carriers could be identified on the list sent by the 
Colonial Secretary.
By 4th January 1918, Massallay of Fejeh, Pejeh Chiefdom, 
Murinama of Lahun, Kpaka Chiefdom and Moriwuru of Gisiwuru 
Makpli Chiefdom, had been waiting at Pujehun for over one 
month for their pay. The same was true of six other carriers 
at Moyamba, Ronietta District.137 By 12th July 1918, nine 
carriers were still to receive their pay and were constantly 
visiting the D.C.'s office at Pujehun.138 Matters were 
further complicated by the failure to get particulars of the
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men from the nominal rolls supplied by the Army Service Corps 
and this made it even more difficult to effect payment to 
chiefs who had supplied carriers.139
Closely related to these problems was the tendency by certain 
officials to misappropriate monies owed to carriers. Mr. 
Vergette was found guilty of embezzling £97/19/1, "being 
interest on certain sums drawn by him from the Colonial 
Treasury in respect of the estate of deceased carriers."140 
Not least important was the fact that many carriers had the 
same names. Due to these problems, payment was delayed even 
up to 1920. By April 1920, Gigi and Mori Nama of Kpanga and 
Kpaka Chiefdoms respectively (in Northern Sherbro) were yet 
to receive their full wages. The G.O.C. Sierra Leone was to 
deplore "the inconvenience and hardship caused to these men 
by sending them back without any pay sheets." He therefore 
recommended that each man be paid an advance of £2 pending 
receipt of their papers.141
The problem of paying carriers was further compounded by the 
confusion which erupted over their identity discs. They had 
left Freetown with locally issued identity discs, the 
numbers of which were entered in the records in Sierra Leone. 
In East Africa, it was found that these numbers coincided 
with those of others in that theatre of war. They were 
therefore issued with fresh discs and new numbers, but up to 
May 1918, no papers concerning this change had been received 
in Sierra Leone.
Matters were not helped by the tendency of carriers to gamble
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away their discs,142 and to adopt nick names.143 The 
authorities also had to contend with trouble makers who, 
"having been paid off, have by some means possessed 
themselves of particulars of men to whom money is due and are 
unable to claim it, and represent themselves as the persons 
entitled to payment."144 A major problem confronting the 
authorities was determining the legal heirs of carriers like 
Soriba of J Company who had slave mothers.143
Like the men of the Sierra Leone Battalion and other units, 
government was faced with the problem of finding "suitable 
work...or some help" for returnees. Ansumana for example, 
had lost a leg in East Africa and was consequently discharged 
as unfit for service. By 23rd August 1918, government found 
it difficult to honour his request for "help to enable him to 
live," because as a carrier, he "can claim no pension or 
gratuity." Ansumana*s case was however considered in the 
Legislative Council "with sympathy," Wilkinson being 
requested to take the matter up with the Secretary of State. 
Bureaucratic hurdles of this nature constituted severe set 
backs to the fortunes of returned carriers, at a time when 
"every assistance is being extended to the families of 
European officers...and...the more poorly paid European and 
native officers who are suffering hardship through the 
increased cost of living.11146
The fate of African Medical Corps dressers was no different 
from the carriers'. Ralph Smith, nephew of Chief Kangaju of 
Moyamba, Ronietta District, spent 18 months as a dresser with 
the Corps in East Africa. In January 1919, he was seeking
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employment because "I have come to my country having nothing 
to do..." but there was "no vacancy to which you can be 
appointed" was the reply of the Colonial Secretary.147 Even 
his application for war bonus was rejected.148 Local Matter 
files for 1919 in the Sierra Leone Archives are replete with 
applications for employment and war bonus by men from the 
Inland Water Transport. It was the mounting tide of 
unemployment and government's apparent discriminatory 
approaches to the grant of war bonus that was inter alia, the 
trigger for industrial disputes in the turbulent days of 
1919.148
Official attitude to the men of the Carrier Corps was far 
from encouraging. In 1920, Wilkinson, District Commissioners 
and members of the Executive Council advised against the 
award of the British War Medal in bronze to the carriers 
because of the difficulty in the preparation of medal rolls. 
Milner was however convinced that uniform action was to be 
adopted throughout the East and West African Colonies and 
Protectorates. He therefore urged the grant of silver medals 
to all gun carriers and machine gun carriers who served with 
the W.A.F.F. in the Cameroons, Togoland and East Africa and 
any carrier similarly enlisted in, and on the establishment 
of the W.A.F.F. The bronze medal was to be awarded to men 
who served as machine gun porters, stretcher-bearers, 
interpreters, signal porters and scouts.150 By 1930 a 
decision had been taken to commemorate the memory of 795 
carriers who died in East Africa. Unlike the men of the 
W.A.F.F., their names were not to be engraved on the cenotaph 
and this was excused on the grounds of economy.151
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The fate of the returnees back home was rendered even more 
precarious by their experiences in East Africa and 
Mesopotamia. If carriers and labourers were less exposed to 
fire power at the front, perhaps their most gruelling 
experience was the unmitigating spread of disease among them. 
In July 1917, the Sierra Leone contingent of the Inland Water 
Transport had to be quarantined due to the outbreak of 
chicken pox among the Gold Coast Regiment on board the Ivy. 
This was accompanied by an outbreak of cholera (which claimed 
29 lives) and beri beri at Karachi.
In Mesopotamia, their efficiency was impaired by the outset 
of winter and in spite of the excellent clothing supplied, 
bronchitis and pneumonia caused 30 deaths among the men. On 
30th July 1918 when the contingent embarked for repatriation, 
B Company had to be segregated because of an outbreak of 
small pox152 and many like Privates Benjamin, Momo and Tommy 
succumbed to the spread of disease at Basra.153 Conditions 
were not any different among the men of the Carrier Corps in 
East Africa, one company of which had to be quarantined 
before joining the Nigerian Brigade.154 Because they had not 
been vaccinated, most were vulnerable to smallpox155 and this 
compounded the incidence of disease among the men of the
I.W.T.156 By September 1917, there were reports of high 
rates of mortality among carriers from Sierra Leone and Lagos 
due chiefly to chronic ameobic dysentery.157 In the main, 
the complications resulting from the disease-ridden 
conditions in East Africa, Mesopotamia and Basra were taken 
to Freetown in their most malignant forms. By March 1918, 
there was much evidence of disease among invalided carriers
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from East Africa and labourers from Mesopotamia. The 
hospital at Mount Aureol abounded in many incurable cases 
with carriers like Margai and Dauda dying in May,15S whilst a 
large number suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis.159
With large numbers of men weakened by disease contracted 
whilst on military service, the problems of health and 
sanitation in wartime Sierra Leone were to be considerably 
magnified through the outbreaks of epidemics in 1916 and 
1918.
133
REFERENCES
1. G.W.T. Hodges - "African Manpower Statistics for the
British Forces in East Africa, 1914-1918" in J.A.H., 19, 1,
1978 p.102.
2. C. Lucas - The Empire at War (London, n.d. 1925)
3. H. Clifford - The Gold Coast Regiment in the East 
African Campaign (London 1920).
4. W.D. Downes - With the Nigerians in East Africa (London 
1919).
5. Hodges - "African Manpower Statistics" op.cit. p.101.
6. S.L.W.N. 7/11/14
7. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. LM 93/15 - Daniel S.C. Pratt to
Merewether 15/5/16.
8. ibid, Pratt to Merewether, letter undated.
9. ibid, Pratt to Merewether, 3/12/15.
10. ibid, Governor to Colonial Secretary, 3/12/15.
11. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/62587 - Major Beattie to Mr Strachey,
29/12/16; Mr Strachey to Mr Read 30/12/16, W.A.F.F./Nigeria 
Sierra Leone/East Africa.
12. ibid, B.B. Cubitt to Under Secretary of State, 28/12/16.
13. P.R.O. CAB 45/27 - Memorandum by the Historical Section, 
War Office, 1933. Brigadier R.H. Haining, D.D.M.O. and I to 
Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds, 15/6/33. SECRET 0165/2168 
(MOI); see also P.R.O. CAB 37/133/16.
14. See D.C. Savage and J. Forbes Munro. "Carrier Corps
Recruitment in British East Africa" in J.A.H. VII, 1, 1966
p. 315ff.
15. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/62587. Major Beattie to Mr Strachey 
29/12/16.
16. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/35856 - Wilkinson to Walter Long
2/7/17. W.A.F.F. S.L.
17. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Lieutenant Schultze - "The 
Sierra Leone Carrier Corps in East Africa."
18. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 3/17 - Paraphrase of Telegram
from War Office 14/1/17.
19. ibid - Acting-Colonial Secretary to D.A.A. and Q.M.G. 
19/1/17.
20. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/1822 - B.B. Cubitt to Colonial Office 
9/1/17.165/8133 (F.6) W.A.F.F. S.L./East Africa.
134
21. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/3483 - B.B. Cubitt to Under Secretary 
of State, 18/1/17. W.A.F.F. Nigeria; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 
3/17 -Walter Long to Wilkinson, 19/1/17.
22. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 3/17 - Major C H B Weston,
A/D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial Secretary 20/1/17; Weston to 
Colonial Secretary 25/1/17.
23. ibid, Major Weston to Colonial Secretary, 2/2/17.
24. ibid, Telegram, Colonial Secretary to D.C.'s Moyamba,
Karene, Kenema and Pujehun, 2/2/17.
25. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/9123 - W.A.F.F. East Africa, 17/2/17. 
Being responsible for the offensive north of Lake Tanganyika 
the Belgians had every reason to be uncooperative. As Major 
Grogan (British) argued, British forces "were in the habit of 
discussing the Belgians and their troops in a rather 
disparaging manner calling their askaris cannibals." See Lt. 
Col. O.F. Watkins, Director of Military Labour, Dar es Salaam 
- Memorandum to all Heads of Departments and Commanders of 
columns. Confidential, 25/6/17,in East African Carrier Corps 
Papers, MSS. 468 (Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London)
26. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/9123, W.A.F.F., East Africa - Mr. A 
Fiddian to Mr Strachey and Mr Read, 19/2/17.
27. ibid, 20/2/17.
28. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/10273 - B.B. Cubitt to under
Secretary of State, 28/2/17 0165/8297 (S.D. 2). The
conference included representatives from the Foreign Office, 
the Colonial Office and the War Office.
29. ibid, War Office to G.O.C.-in-charge, East Africa 
1/3/17, SECRET.
30. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/25969 - Annual Report Northern
Sherbro, 1917.
31. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/29256 - Annual Report Karene 
District 1917.
32. ibid - Annual Report Port Loko Sub-District.
33. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. WD 177/17 - Lists of carriers, 19/11/17 
and.30/11/17.
34. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. No. 131, M.P. D.C. Railway 18/19 - 
Annual Report Railway District 1918. See also P.R.O. C.O. 
267/580/18879.
35. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/44125 - Enclosure to despatch,
W.A.F.F., S.L. 17/8/17; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. W.D. 60/17 -
Lieutenant Reaney, Acting O.C. "E" Company Carrier Corps, 
Mano to Colonial Secretary, 20/4/17.
36. P.R.O. C.O. 267/576/61907 - Wilkinson to Walter Long, 
S.L. Conf. 24/11/17.
37. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 13/17 - D.C. Ronietta to Colonial
135
Secretary, 3/5/17; Acting Colonial Secretary to D.C. 
Ronietta, 2/5/17.
38. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. Conf. 12/3/08; see also S.L. Conf. 
29 MPC 55/10.
39. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/16462 - B.B. Cubitt to Under 
Secretary of State 29/3/17 0165.
40. ibid, Telegram, Walter Long to Wilkinson, 2/4/17. 
W.A.F.F., East Africa.
41. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/17115 - "Fifth Report on Recruiting 
in West Africa, 5/2/17, 27/ADR/W.A.
42. Sierra Leone Annual Report 1908, p.60 (F.B.C. Library).
43. Military Report on the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra 
Leone Vol. 1, 1933 (War Office, London 1933) p.118 (F.B.C.
Library).
44. ibid, Chapter 2, Section 2 (XVI) November to December
1915 p.49.
45. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 13/17 - Acting Colonial Secretary 
to D.C. Ronietta 2/5/17.
46. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Lieutenant C.J. Lees
Schultze -"The Sierra Leone Carrier Corps in East Africa," 
Encl. E.
47. P.R.O. C.O. 267/578/40857 - Telegram, Wilkinson to
Secretary of State, 23/8/18.
48. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Koinadugu 29/18 - Colonial 
Secretary to Wilkinson, n.d.
49. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/48141 - W.A.F.F. East Africa,
27/9/17.
50. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/27100 - Haywood - "Recruiting in West 
Africa" SECRET, 2/5/17.
51. S.L.W.N. 9/3/12.
52. There was then in Sierra Leone a total of 440,000 Mendes 
with 220,000 males, 330,000 Temnes with 165,000 males,
106.000 Sherbros with 53,000 males, 220,000 Limbas with
100.000 males. Other groups totalled 250,000 with 125,000 
males.
53. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/27100 - Haywood - "Recruiting in West 
Africa" SECRET 2/5/17.
54. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Lieutenant C.J. Lees
Shultze-"The Sierra Leone Carrier Corps in East Africa," 
Encl. E.
55. P.R.O. CAB 45/113 - C.V. Owens - "Sierra Leone troops in 
the Great War 1914-1918, Summary of Operations for War Office
136
Military Handbook," December 1931.
56. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/29256 - Annual Report Karene
District 1917.
57. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 3/17 - D.C. Pujehun to Colonial 
Secretary 2/2/17.
58. ibid, D.C. Northern Sherbro to Colonial Secretary
5/2/17.
59. ibid, D.C. Northern Sherbro to Colonial Secretary
9/2/17.
60. ibid, D.C. Kenema to Colonial Secretary 2/2/17.
61. ibid, D.C. Moyamba to Colonial Secretary 3/2/17.
62. ibid, D.C. Karene to Colonial Secretary 5/2/17.
63. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Pujehun, 8/2/17.
64. ibid. Assistant D.C., Kenema to Colonial Secretary
5/2/17.
65. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Kenema, 8/2/17.
66. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Moyamba 9/2/17.
67. ibid, D.C. Pujehun to Colonial Secretary, 12/2/17;
Colonial Secretary to D.C. Pujehun, 12/2/17.
68. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Batkanu, 22/2/17.
69. ibid, Colonial Faunce, W.A.R. O.C. Troops, West Africa
to Wilkinson, 20/2/17.
70. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Moyamba 13/2/17.
71. ibid, D.C. Karene to Colonial Secretary 14/2/17.
72. ibid D.C. Kemp to Colonial Secretary 14/2/17.
73. ibid, D.C. Pujehun to Colonial Secretary, 12/2/17.
74. ibid D.C. Stanley to Colonial Secretary, 24/2/17.
75. ibid, Colonial Secretary to D.C. Kenema, 12/4/17;
Colonial Secretary to D.C. Moyamba 12/4/17.
76. ibid, D.C. Kenema to Colonial Secretary, 12/4/17; D.C.
Moyamba to Colonial Secretary 13/4/17; Aide-de-Camp to 
Wilkinson, to G.A. Boddam-Whetham, D.A.A. and Q.M.G., 
13/4/17.
77. ibid, Walter Long to Wilkinson, 2/4/17; Colonial
Secretary to all D.C.'s, 3/4/17.
78. ibid, D.C. Kemp to Colonial Secretary 4/4/17.
79. ibid, D.C. Karene to Colonial Secretary 7/4/17.
137
80. ibid. D.C. Pujehun to Colonial Secretary 7/4/17; D.C.
Pujehun to Colonial Secretary 14/4/17.
81. ibid, D.C. Hollins to Colonial Secretary, 7/4/17.
82. ibid, D.C. Waterloo to Colonial Secretary 10/4/17.
83. ibid, D.C. Railway to Colonial Secretary 20/4/17; D.C. 
Pujehun to Colonial Secretary, 25/4/17; Acting Colonial 
Secretary to D.C. Pujehun 26/4/17.
84. ibid, D.C. Karene to Colonial Secretary 14/5/17, 
10/5/17; O.C. No. 2 Coy Carriers, to Colonial Secretary 
16/5/17.
85. ibid, D.C. Karene to Colonial Secretary 23/5/17; The
Vagrancy Ordinance, Regulation No. 12, p. 2058, of Volume 5 
of the Ordinances empowered "tribal" rulers in Freetown to 
return "any Temne man who has left his chiefdom in 
contravention of the native law."
86. ibid, D.C. Port Loko to D.C. Karene, 11/6/17.
87. ibid, Acting Colonial Secretary to all D.C.'s rxcept
Sherbro and Headquarter districts, 26/6/17.
88. ibid, D.C. Hollins Kabala, to Colonial Secretary
15/5/17; O.C. to Colonial Secretary, 25/5/17.
89. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/35856 - Wilkinson to Walter Long
2/7/17, W.A.F.F. S.L. Conf.
90. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/31551 - B. Moutray Read, Acting Chief
Commissioner, Northern Territories to Acting Governor, A R 
Slater, 30/3/17 - Enel in W.A.F.F. Gold Coast Conf 29/5/17.
91. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/62032 - "Report on Reservists 1916"
W.A.F.F. S.L. 24/11/17.
92. P.R.O. C.O. 445/39/60110 - Mr Read to Secretary, War
Office 6/12/17, W.A.F.F. Nigeria/East Africa.
93. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Northern Sherbro 18/17 - D.C. W.B. 
Stanley to Colonial Secretary 11/2/17.
94. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 3/17 - Telegram, Secretary of 
State to Wilkinson, 22/8/17; Acting Colonial Secretary to 
D.A.A. and Q.M.G. 28/8/17.
95. P.R.O. C.O. 554/28/48183 - "Memorandum on steps taken to
increase the supply of coloured troops, coloured labour and 
on their use by the naval and military authorities." 
Miscellaneous No.331 Confidential; P.R.O. C.O. 537/952/42950. 
Mr Read to Secretary War Office n.d. September 1916.
96. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Secret 12/16 - Wilkinson to Bonar Law, 
15/4/16, 17/4/16.
97. P.R.O. C.O. 537/952/42950 - B.B. Cubitt to Under
Secretary of State 8/9/16, 121/8655 (S.D.Z.)
138
98. P.R.O. C.O. 267/572/44424 - Mr Read to George Fiddes 
20/9/16, Lugard to Mr Harding.
99. ibid, - Telegram, Wilkinson to Secretary of State 
16/9/16.
100. P.R. C.O. 537/952/42950 - These rates were laid down in 
Army Order No. 5, 1916 for the British West Indies Regiment 
and were regarded as "utterly inapplicable to West Africans.
101. ibid.
102. P.R.O. C.O. 554/32/61940 - Captain Harfood - "The
employment of the races of Tropical Africa in Europe 
considered from the Health standpoint," 23/12/16.
103. P.R.O. C.O. 445/37/59718 - Instructions to Major
(temporary Lt. Col) A H W Haywood," War Office, December 
1916.
104. P.R.O. C.O. 554/31/40535 - B B Cubitt, War Office to 
Under Secretary of State, 121/3/169 (Q M G 2D) 24/8/16.
105. P.R.O. C.O. 554/31/50251 - B B Cubitt to Under Secretary 
of State. 121/3/169, (M.R.3) 19/10/16.
106. P.R.O. C.O. 267/578/40857 - Telegram, Wilkinson to
Secretary of State, 23/8/18.
107. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Major E S Bosworth, O.C.
W.A. Contingent, I.W.T. R.E., "Report on services of the
I.W.T., West Africa Contingent," Encl. D; For the influenza 
epidemic in Cape Town, see W.M.M.S. 105th Annual Report. 
1918, p.85 (S.O.A.S.) West Africa Magazine. 29/3/19.
108. P.R.O. C.O. 267/576/6218 - Despatch No. 324, 27/11/17.
109. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/23280 - F A  Miller, President of the 
Sierra Leone Civil Service et al, to Walter Long, 16/4/18.
110. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/16810 - Wilkinson to Walter Long
15/3/18.
111. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Telegraphic Despatches - Sierra Leone 
Telegraphic, Wilkinson to Secretary of State, 7/1/19.
112. Due to the sharp fall in commodity prices coins had 
become surplus to requirements in the colonies. The West 
African Currency Board could not afford to store silver 
coinage locally and pay out its face value in London. It 
therefore had to ship it. From 1915 onwards, the Royal Mint 
argued it could not supply the Board's requirements due to an 
increasing demand for silver in Britain itself. Currency 
notes were thus sent out as an emergency measure. See J.B. 
Lyons - The West African Currency Board, 1912-1962 (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode Ltd, 1962) p. 20. See also A. A. Lawal - "West 
African Currency Board Earningsand the distribution of its 
income, 1912-1945" in Odu 35, January 1989.
113. P.R.O. C.O. 267/580/4877 - Wilkinson to Walter Long
139
8/1/19 -"Discount on Currency Notes and Premium on Silver 
Prohibition Ordinance No 18 of 1919, Colony of Sierra Leone, 
31/12/18," Government Printing Office Freetown, M.P. S.S.T. 
63/18. 1/19; See also S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Encl. in S.L. Conf. No. 
12, 8/1/19.
114. On this point, see Allan Macphee - The Economic 
Revolution in British West Africa (George Routledge and Sons 
1926) p.244.
115. P.R.O. C.O. 267/581/28863 - Annual Report. Sierra Leone 
Police Force 1918.
116. P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/16811 - Annual Report Sherbro
District 1917 and S.L.N.A. C.S.O. S.L. No. 160, D.C. S.25/19- 
Annual Report Sherbro District 1918.
117. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Enel in S.L. No. 176. D.C.K. 25/19 -
Annual Report Karene District 1918 and P.R.O. C.O. 
267/581/23343, 3/4/19; P.R.O. C.O. 267/577/29256 - Annual
Report Karene District, 1917.
118. P.R.O. C.O. 445/41/2737 - J.W. Anderson to Under
Secretary of State 13/1/17, M.O. 513, W.A.F.F. S.L./East 
Africa.
119. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential 78/18 - Acting Colonial
Secretary to all D.C.'s, 6/7/18; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential 
73/18 - O.C. Frontiers to G.S.O., 21/5/18.
120. ibid - Letter by "one settler at Bo," to the D.C. 
Railway District, 19/6/18.
121. ibid - Information by M Qaiteh et al as to rumours of an 
intended native rising in the Railway District.
122. ibid - Enquiry into the cause of alarm among Europeans 
and Creoles of Pendembu on the nights of the 9th, 19th and 
20th May, 1918.
123. ibid - Acting Colonial Secretary to Chamber of Commerce 
6/7/18; D.C. Railway District to Colonial Secretary, 26/6/18.
124. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential 78/18 - D.C. Bowden to 
Colonial Secretary 6/7/18.
125. ibid - D.C. Craven, Railway District to Colonial 
Secretary 11/7/18.
126. ibid - D.C. W.B. Stanley, Northern Sherbro to Colonial 
Secretary, 12/7/18.
127. P.R.O. C.O. 267/580/18879 - Annual Report Railway 
District 1918.
128. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Confidential 78/18 - D.C.W. Addison, to 
Colonial Secretary, 16/7/18. See also S.L.N.A. C.S.O. 
Confidential 68/18; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Petition 11/18; S.L.N.A.
C.S.O. Colonial Secretary 198/18; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. 
Koinadugu 16/18; S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Miscellaneous 81/17.
140
129. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Ronietta 50/18 - D.C. Bowden to 
Colonial Secretary, 5/8/18.
130. ibid - Mr Morcom to Colonial Secretary 10/8/18; See also
S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 63/18.
131. The Reformer Vol.1 No.l 7/8/20. Only one disintegrating 
copy of this paper survives in the Sierra Leone Archives. 
This in fact seems to have been the only edition and was 
published by W.C. Labour, (Proprietor and printer) of 39 
Upper Waterloo Street.
132. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. D.C. Northern Sherbro 18/17 - D.C. W.B. 
Stanley to Colonial Secretary 11/2/17; S.L.N.A. C.S.O, M.P. 
Confidential 24/18.
133. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 177/17 - Colonial
Secretary to D.C. Port Loko 14/12/17.
134. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Encl. in S.L. No.164 M.P. D.C. Ronietta 
11/19, 27/3/19; P.R.O. C.O. 267/580/22154 - Annual Report,
Ronietta District 1918.
135. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 177/17 - Captain, Army
Service Corps to Colonial Secretary, 19/11/17.
136. ibid - Captain, Army Service Corps to Colonial Secretary 
4/12/17.
137. ibid - D.C. Pujehun to Colonial Secretary, 24/12/17;
D.C. Ronietta to Colonial Secretary, 22/1/18.
138. ibid - D.C. Stanley to Colonial Secretary, 12/7/18.
139. ibid - Colonial Secretary to D.C. Moyamba 8/1/18.
140. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. M.P. Confidential 37/19 - Acting 
Governor Evelyn to Milner, 6/8/19.
141. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 177/19 - C Hayes O.C.
Accounts Adjustment Branch, Dar-es-Salaam to Lieutenant 
Stanley, Freetown 28/4/19; D.C. Northern Sherbro to Colonial 
Secretary, 12/4/20.
142. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 52/18 - Major General C W 
Thompson, Commanding the Troops West Africa, to Secretary,
War Office, 4/5/18. For problems relating to identity discs 
in East Africa, see Military Labour Bureau Handbook (Standard 
P & P Works, Nairobi and Mombassa, 1917) enclosure - East 
African Carrier Corps Papers MSS.468, Royal Commonwealth 
Society Library, (R.C.S.L.) London; Standing Orders and 
Regulations for the Forces in British East Africa, 1915. 
(R.C.S.L.)
143. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 85/18 - D C  Bowden
Ronietta to Colonial Secretary 25/6/18.
144. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 63/18 - Mr Turnbull,
Public Works Department, to Colonial Secretary 21/1/20.
145. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonies 49/18.
141
146. P.R.O. C.O. 267/578/44591 - Wilkinson to Walter Long 
23/8/18.
147. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Matter 15/19 - Ralph Smith to 
Colonial Secretary, n.d. and Colonial Secretary to Smith, 
17/1/19.
148. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Matter 16/19 - Ralph Smith to 
Colonial Secretary 9/1/19 and Acting Colonial Secretary to 
Smith, 13/1/19.
149. See S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Matter Files 1919 and in 
particular, L.M. 368/19 - L.A. Archer, Agent Coaling Company 
to Colonial Secretary, 17/7/19 and S.L.N.A. C.S.O. 
Commissioner of Police 54/19.
150. P.R.O. C.O. 445/50/4477 - Wilkinson to Milner, 13/1/20, 
W.A.F.F. S.L. No.2 and H J Read to the Secretary, War Office 
21/5/20.
151. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Open Policy Files on the Navy and Royal 
W.A.F.F. N 25/30 - Principal Secretary, Imperial War Graves 
Commission to Colonial Secretary 20/1/38. 8/27/13/ S.l. 
Elsewhere, the number of deaths among the Corps is put at 
852. See G W T Hodges "African Manpower Statistics for the 
British Forces in East Africa 1914-1918" in J.A.H. XIX, 1 
(1978) p.116
152. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Major E S Bosworth, O.C. 
West Africa Contingent I.W.T. R.E., "Report on the services 
of I.W.T., Encl. D.
153. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Colonies 13/18, Colonies 14/18 and 
Colonies 17/18.
154. P.R.O. C.O. 267/582/43238 - Lt C J Lees Schultze - "The 
Sierra Leone Carrier Corps in East Africa;" Encl. E.
155. P.R.O. C.O. 445/42/35432 - Telegram, G O C East Africa 
to Secretary, War Office 2821 M.D. n.d. in W.A.F.F./K.A.R. , 
23/7/17.
156. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 177/17 - Captain, D.A.A. 
and Q.M.G. West Africa to Colonial Secretary, 17/11/17.
157. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. Local Miscellaneous 1917 - G.O.C. Cape 
Town to General, Sierra Leone, 1/9/17. See also S.L.N.A. 
C.S.O. War Department 138/17, 66/17 and 150/17.
158. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 28/18 - Major J A Black, 
S M O to Military Headquarters 1/3/18 and Major Weston 
a/D.A.A. and Q.M.G. to Colonial Secretary, 23/5/18.
159. S.L.N.A. C.S.O. War Department 16/18.
142
Chapter 4: SANITATION, DISEASE AND WAR
The periods between April 1915 to June 1916, and August to 
November 1918, were trying ones for Sierra Leone. This was 
due to the outbreak of small pox and the influenza pandemic 
respectively. This part is therefore concerned with the 
impact of disease in Sierra Leone in war time. Because many 
factors made the dependency particularly vulnerable to the 
spread of disease, the approach here is predicated on the 
socio-economic model of disease causation1 in Sierra Leone. 
In order to appreciate the spread of disease in war time, 
there is a need to examine the problems of sanitation and 
public health, official policy towards health and the 
etiology of disease in Sierra Leone. It is here posited that 
in the period under review, initiatives mainly rested with 
colonial governors who not infrequently clashed with the 
Colonial Office over many a matter of policy revolving around 
colonial interests on the one hand, and imperial interests on 
the other.
SANITATION AND HEALTH - 1916
The history of sanitation in Sierra Leone between 1897 and 
1918 could be gleaned from "a series of reports on the 
sanitary condition of the city and recommendations for its 
improvement." In 1898, Dr. Prout , then Medical Officer of 
Health submitted to the municipality a report on the 
"Sanitary Department and the Health of the city for the year 
1897" which contained many recommendations for improving the
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sanitary conditions "few of which have however been carried 
into effect." Sir Ronald Ross, famous for recognising the 
anopheline mosquito as a vector of malaria,2 was to lament in 
his book The Prevention of Malaria that so little was being 
done in British possessions to combat the disease. Even "in 
Sierra Leone where the disease was the principal enemy of the 
Colony little had been done," Ross observed.
By 1902, in spite of his campaign against the "anopheline 
enemy" at Freetown, in spite of "the object lessons given" 
and the assistance rendered by men sent out from England, the 
work was stopped for financial reasons and "local authorities 
did not appear very anxious to continue."3 These 
considerations accounted for Dr. Alexander's objections to 
the government adhering to the International Sanitary 
Convention signed in Paris on 17th January 1912. Alexander's 
objections were based on the lack of efficient drainage and 
sewage disposal in Freetown, the absence of an organised port 
and medical service necessary for the reception of a ship, 
"whatever its health condition" and for determining whether 
such a ship had "undergone the definite and laid down 
sanitary measures," and the lack of an efficiently equipped 
bacteriological laboratory.
Alexander was convinced that the advantage the Colony stood 
to enjoy from being a party to the convention would not be 
commensurate with the expenses involved in observing the 
rules of the convention. Rather, he urged the government to 
"observe" only those portions relating to the notification of 
plague, cholera and yellow fever as well as to exercise its
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discretion as to the extent to which notification was to be 
made to countries which had no consular representatives in 
the Colony and between which and Sierra Leone, there was no 
direct communication.4 On the eve of war therefore, "it 
cannot be said that the sanitary outlook of Sierra Leone will 
be particularly bright for some time to come..."5
By 1916, the organisation and planning which had 
characterised the early settlement of the Colony had been 
abandoned by successive administrations. R.J. Wilkinson who 
succeeded Merewether as governor on 9th March 1916,e was 
struck by "the squalid appearance of the Freetown streets." 
In a lengthy despatch to the Colonial Office, he deprecated 
the "erection of obstructive and unsightly buildings" which 
"has shut off the streets from the sea view and sea breezes 
which they were intended to enjoy. " Wilkinson was most 
critical of previous administrations for allowing the 
erection of verandahs and arcades to narrow the roadways and 
for neglecting the proper alignment of the streets. The 
Public Works Department was equally culpable for the rather 
erratic manner in which the water-mains were laid. 
Obstructing the main roadway and rendering it dangerous to 
wheeled traffic, it meant that the mains would have to be 
relaid again at very great expense "if any comprehensive 
scheme of roads is carried out."
These conditions of squalor which characterised the Colony 
were not lost on concerned members of the public. A 
deputation of the Native Produce Dealers Association called 
the new governor's attention to the insanitary conditions
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then prevailing at "Saw pit steps," a very important landing 
place in the business quarter. Wilkinson found the whole 
place "littered with filth...The stench was disgusting and 
the condition of the whole of this business resort was 
disgraceful." According to the Senior Sanitary Officer, the 
squalor in many other parts of Freetown was "indescribable."7 
The insanitary condition of Smythe Street in the west end was 
at once "loathesome and disease creating...the maintaining of 
a mosquito factory and all its incidental diseases; the 
establishment of a frog depot; the stagnant pools... and all 
the evils attendant to health and human life from such 
conditions cannot be overlooked..."® Conditions at Right 
Path Street in the east were not very different.9
At Brookfields, work on the drainage begun in 1911, was by 
1916, still marking time. Between 1914 and 1915 mosquito 
larvae cases in the Freetown Court numbered 1,333. The water 
supply of the Railway Reservation at Cline Town from the 
mountain torrent, usually liable to pollution, had to be 
replaced by that from the Freetown water supply. During this 
period also a total of 4,928 rats were taken to the Colonial 
Hospital by an employed rat catcher, paid for at the rate of 
one penny each.1°
Conditions in the Protectorate were far from satisfactory. 
Only in 1915 was the Public Health (Protectorate) Ordinance, 
the first of such ordinances, enacted but this merely placed 
sanitation in the Protectorate on "a definite legal footing" 
though it replaced the old system of "advise and persuasion.1 
If Bo in the Railway District was declared a sanitary
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district under the Ordinance,11 Bonthe was characterised by 
"bad drainage bad water, dusty streets" and "mosquitoes are 
abundant."12
Although by 1916, much had been achieved through rigid 
sanitary inspection, the execution of minor sanitary works, 
and the introduction and subsequent increase of pipe-borne 
water supply, it was obvious that the lack of funds for 
drainage work, (surface and sub-soil) failure to adopt the 
pan latrine system universally, the absence of a water 
carriage system and the problems associated with the closure 
of wells in order to make the pipe-borne supply the only 
water available, were bound to render conditions 
unsatisfactory for a long time.13
OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARDS HEALTH AND DISEASE
In examining official policy towards sanitation and disease 
in Sierra Leone during the war, the chief variables to be 
considered are - the problem of financial constraints; the 
perennial bickering among respective Sanitary and Health 
authorities in the Colony; the racial ethos that had come to 
dominate the medical service and which ensured a considerable 
dearth of medical personnel to meet an emergency and above 
all, the conflict between imperial and colonial interests.
Official policy towards sanitation and disease, at least up 
to the outbreak of smallpox in 1915 was essentially ad hoc 
and the already lukewarm commitment towards health matters 
shown by the_Colonial office was compounded during the war by 
the economic and manpower needs of the empire. Furthermore
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the inconclusive results of researches into the etiology of 
certain diseases in Sierra Leone, did not enable the 
authorities to map out any plan of action. Dr. E.T. Ward, 
Medical officer of Health found that the outbreak of beri­
beri in the Freetown prison between September 1912 and March 
1913, was a function of an exclusive diet of polished white 
rice.14 Once embroiled in war, the Colonial Office was to 
relegate the health interests of Sierra Leone to second 
place. Only with the outbreak first of a small pox epidemic 
and next the influenza pandemic were officials in the 
Colonial Office alerted to the urgent health needs of the 
dependency.
The need to meet the demands of war time, was to lead 
officialdom to eschew more scientific approaches to combat 
the diffusion of disease and to pass wide ranging 
legislation. In August 1914, when sleeping sickness 
threatened the country, an Order-in-Council was passed adding 
the sickness to the list of diseases for which persons could 
be compulsorily arrested and confined to a contagious disease 
hospital.15 Then for the first time in 1914 a Registration 
Office was opened at Cline Town to register births and deaths 
among the Muslim community. The Protectorate portion of 
Headquarter District was also merged with the Ronietta 
Registration District.15
Financial constraints were also important in determining 
official policy. Although the Sierra Leone administration 
had begun to consider the question of disinfecting ships 
calling at Freetown harbour well before the outbreak of war,
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nothing concrete had been done by August 1914, By 1915 when 
the question came up again, the financial position of the 
Colony made it impossible to purchase a clayton apparatus, a 
barge and a launch, or to make provision for the necessary 
increase in the European and African establishments in the 
Sanitary Department, in the estimates for 1916. Officials at 
the Colonial Office argued that "Sierra Leone will have to do 
without this apparatus whether it is essential or not."1'7 
Indeed the constraints of economy imposed by the war and the 
deficiency in the facilities provided by the port were to 
compound the situation and make the dependency a ready target 
for the spread of disease in war time and as the war dragged
on, the health needs of the Colony and the need to preserve
imperial interests were drawn into an inevitable clash in 
which imperial interests took precedence.
In late 1914, Brigadier General Dobell, in charge of the 
Expeditionary Force in the Cameroons, began to make demands 
on the medical staff in Sierra Leone. In November, he
requested one doctor, one nurse and three dressers. In 
governor Merewether's opinion, this meant "leaving some 
district entirely without medical assistance." He however 
managed to send Dr. Easmon, an African Medical officer, and 
engaged Dr Jarrett, a government pensioner to fill his place 
at the usual rate paid to professional men temporarily
attached to the medical department (i.e. £1/1/0 a day plus a 
hammock allowance). Though he approved of Miss L. Stevens, 
the matron at the Colonial Hospital proceeding to Duala, 
Merewether found it impossible to send any government dresser 
"as the number left is already insufficient." In the
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circumstances, he engaged two druggists outside the 
government service at the rate of 6 pence a day plus ration 
allowance, this "practically...on their own terms."18
Colonial office responses made it evident that imperial 
interests were to supersede those of the Colony. If the 
Governor was addressing the realities of the situation, the 
Colonial Office thought differently about his intentions . 
Many officials regarded his reluctance as another example of 
his "obstructive tactics" for "Rather than leave one of his 
districts without a Medical officer he would let the whole 
Cameroon expedition go to the dogs"19 they contended.
By 1915, the demands on Sierra Leone by the Colonial Office 
for more medical officers to be lent to the military 
authorities for the duration of the war, "as soon as the 
demands of the Cameroons Expeditionary Force came to an end," 
became more urgent.20 Between August 1914 and December 1915, 
seven European medical officers had been withdrawn for 
service in the Cameroons - one from Freetown, one each from 
Batkanu, Daru, Kaballa, Kailahun, Pujehun and Waterloo. 
Kissy, Makeni, Moyamba, Bonthe and Bo were without medical 
officers. The further provision of reliefs for the officers 
ensured a total contribution of ten medical officers by 
1915.21
Whilst Dr. Rice, Principal Medical Officer felt that ten more 
could be released, Merewether was apprehensive about 
rendering the medical staff so shorthanded. Only eight 
European medical officers would then be left in the Colony
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and "no allowance has been made for sickness" and "for 
dealing promptly with any epidemic which may occur. There 
has recently been a...serious outbreak of smallpox in the 
Protectorate with which the medical department... found it 
very difficult to cope."22
Mr Fiddian was to put the case of the Colonial Office more 
succinctly against a governor whose "administration" was 
regarded as "lethargic" and against one which "accomplishes 
the minimum of results with the maximum of fiction. . 1123 To 
Fiddian, "the illness or death of an occasional European or a 
hundred natives in Sierra Leone would be alesserevil than 
inadequate medical and sanitary attention for a battalion in 
Flanders." Whilst he admitted that there was a danger to 
Sierra Leone and the empire as a whole, he argued that "the 
danger to Sierra Leone is the less serious of the two."24 
Later events and the consequent shortage of medical personnel 
in 1916 and 1918, were to vindicate Merewether's 
apprehensions over the likely outbreak of disease.
The conflict between imperial and colonial interests which 
successfully impeded the formulation of policy over sanitary 
and medical matters, was to find its parallel in the constant 
bickering among respective sanitary and medical officers 
within the dependency, and which pointed to a "lack of 
administrative efficiency and coordination in matters of 
municipal government." The tendency of each department to 
"disregard the interest and aims of the others prompted 
Governor Wilkinson to recommend the appointment of "one 
officer or board" to take charge of municipal work; for "we
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cannot have efficiency under several independent and often 
conflicting departments."
The situation by 1916 was calling for reform. For example 
whilst the Sanitary Engineer designed the dustbin the 
Director of Public Works repaired it and the Senior Sanitary 
Officer attended to scavenging. Each official was apt to 
"blame...the contributory negligence of the rest...it is 
always possible for the Senior Sanitary Officer to say that 
the bin is too small...and...the Sanitary Engineer...that it 
is not cleared out enough...And of course all departments 
alike can fall back on the time honoured expedient of 
criticising the parsimony of a government that does not give 
them deputies or assistants to do the work." In May 1916, 
Wilkinson was recommending the appointment of one officer - 
preferably the Sanitary Engineer to carry out all the duties 
of a Municipal Engineer, and another, the Medical Officer of 
Health, to work exclusively as the Municipal Health Officer, 
both being directly subordinate and responsible to the 
Municipal Authority.
Wilkinson found municipal work in Freetown at its worst; 
there were still important municipal building regulations to 
be drawn up as well as a comprehensive scheme for the streets 
and drains of Freetown. Mr. Simms in charge of all this, was 
accounted "a capable and ambitious officer; but a perusal of 
his report shows...that his mind is taken up more with the 
difficulties and grievances of his position than with the 
opportunities it has given him for most valuable work." The 
same was true of medical officers who wasted time on "petty
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personal bickerings even where there is a small pox epidemic 
to combat."
Wilkinson also pointed to a "lack of continuity in policy" in 
contrast with India where the Municipal Engineer and the 
Municipal Health Officer were not independent but executive 
officers directly responsible to their boards. Conditions 
were not helped by the apparent distortions of the Sanitary 
experts1 vision of themselves i.e. as "consultants, critics 
and censors (often of their predecessors' work); disregarding 
all financial considerations as outside their province; 
sacrificing "practical and cheap improvements for the sake of 
academic truisms" and resenting the "performance of 
monotonous executive duties which though unimportant in 
themselves give a real grasp of local conditions."25 
Personal idiosyncrasy of this sort was to seriously 
complicate the problem of "dual control" over sanitary 
matters, with all the potential for friction between 
officers.26 For example, the fact that the Sanitary
Engineer was attached to the P.W.D. and yet autonomous in 
the sense that he had under his control a Sanitary Works sub­
department without a full complement of staff made it 
"awkward to have an officer whose duties are sharply 
defined."
The Sanitary Engineer urged that his "opinion be regarded as 
authoritative" and resented his being regarded "as a sort of 
emergency man to be used for any work" in the P.W.D. where 
the Director wanted him to act in an advisory rather than in 
an executive capacity.27 The better part of the first half
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of 1916 was therefore devoted to squabbling among sanitary 
and health officers, climaxing in a carefully calculated 
insult from Dr. Beringer (Senior Sanitary Officer) to Dr. 
Mayer (Acting Principal Medical Officer) who resented the 
"tone" in which the former had refused to acknowledge him as 
acting P.M.O.28
Whilst smallpox raged on in Sierra Leone in 1916, and whilst 
Sanitary and Health officers dissipated their energies in 
petty squabbling, there were more serious problems to attend 
to. Wilkinson found that before 1916, vaccination had not 
been made compulsory; although this had often been proposed, 
it was always vetoed by the previous governor.29 He 
therefore requested the Attorney-General to draft amendments 
to the vaccination law for he was sure "compulsion would 
become inevitable" against the background of widespread 
hostility towards vaccination by people in the Protectorate. 
If by 1916 there were no spray pumps (for spraying 
disinfectants) in store although there was an officer
responsible for indenting for them,30 the problem was further 
complicated by the dearth of medical officers who were few
and far between. This was due to the P.M.O. and the West
African Medical staff’s aversion to employing African
Vaccinators or doctors.31
The reasons for this were easy to discover and what the 
Weekly News construed as typically racial, was attributed to 
"the insatiable thirst for "albocracy" in all departments of 
the service."32 The evidence shows that from at least 1887 
onwards (and since the Hut Tax Rebellion for which the Krios
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had been blamed by officialdom) the policy of racial 
discrimination had become a marked feature of Anglo-Krio 
relations.33 By the outbreak of war, the Krios had become 
the "bete-noire" of the administration and were not 
infrequently the victims of the exclusivist policy of 
officialdom with regards to recruitment in the various 
branches of the Colonial service - especially the West 
African Medical Staff.
As early as 1902, Governor King-Harman, in consultation with 
the P.M.O., had rejected proposals for five African medical 
officers to "retain their present salaries until they can be 
replaced by Europeans."34 Official attempts to stifle 
indigenous talents were not lost on the press. The Weekly 
News was most vociferous in its denunciation of the Colonial 
Office's "retrogressive scheme...one so glaringly and 
gratuitously insulting to the national instinct of a race." 
The paper argued that "there are and will always be qualified 
medical men who have taken and will continue to take diplomas 
in British institutions."35
By 1913, parliamentarians in Britain were taking up the cause 
of the African doctor, but Governor Merewether was less 
inclined to alter the "colour bar" which applied to almost 
every limb of the colonial service, though he conceded that 
"the young men who are educated in England. ..obtain good 
degrees and diplomas."36 The Acting Principal Medical 
Officer found the exclusion of African practitioners, "a 
great hardship for men who have...succeeded in acquiring 
qualifications in medicine which place them on an
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equality...with European doctors in general and the members 
of the West African Medical Staff in particular....1' Yet he 
argued that the African medical officer was "unreliable as a 
systematic worker when he is independent of direct European 
supervision." Their inclusion in the service would therefore 
be "highly prejudicial to the status and prestige of the West 
African Medical Staff."37 In the circumstances, the only 
recourse open to African officers, was to resign from the 
service, as did Dr. Renner in 1913.38
By 1916 therefore when smallpox assumed epidemic proportions, 
the West African Medical Service was seriously depleted. 
Drawing upon an already diminutive medical service, large 
districts had to be run by medical officers who had to 
contend with the difficulty of keeping a balance between the 
curative work demanded by their hospitals and the public 
health exercises required in the district. Judged from the 
problems outlined so far it would appear that in Sierra Leone 
by 1916, the problem of hygiene and sanitation, seemed a 
largely administrative, and not a scientific one.
At the more practical level approaches to health and 
sanitation in the dependency were sometimes very crude and 
expensive. Rat collection was undertaken with an obsession 
unprecedented in the history of the Colony - the government 
paying a penny for every rat killed. Furthermore,
Protectorate Chiefs "whose zeal in promoting the sanitary 
conditions of their chiefdoms... appeared to merit 
recognition" were awarded "swords" and certificates.39 
Whilst special censuses were organised in order to help
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prepare Medical and Sanitary reports, few positive results 
were enjoyed by both departments.40
THE ETIOLOGY OF DISEASE
Historians concerned with the medical history of Africa, have 
attributed patterns of disease inter alia to the European 
conquest of the continent. They argue that one of the 
immediate consequences of the European thrust was 
"epidemiological disaster." This they suggest was due to the 
demand for migratory labour by plantations and mines, the 
construction of dams, roads and railways, resettlement 
programmes and population mobility.41 For Prothero, man and 
his environment are closely linked to complex relationships 
which frequently present conditions of disequilibrium in 
which diseases flourish and health is impaired.42 Indeed the 
evidence shows that cities, which normally attract rural 
migrants and which also constitute the hub of transportation 
systems, are usually foci for the diffusion of disease. To 
these factors, Hartwig and Patterson have added the impact of 
psychological stress, with all its potential for reducing 
resistance to infection. Uprooted and malnourished
populations were generally very vulnerable to diseases like 
smallpox.43
The evidence for Sierra Leone yet largely untapped, would 
show that both internal as well as external factors accounted 
for the spread of disease both before and during World War 1. 
By the outbreak of war, the administration had every reason 
to be worried about congestion, which had became so marked a 
feature of life in Freetown, and which owed its origins to a
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largely uncontrolled rural - urban migration. This
phenomenon had begun to attract the attention of the press as 
early as 1900.44 By 1901, many chiefs were complaining to
the Governor of "the inducements offered to their young men
to leave their farms and go to Freetown" where many of the 
unemployed lapsed into criminal habits, "peopling the 
hospitals and gaols."45 By 1907, the Freetown Municipality 
was expressing great apprehension over the situation,46 but 
the lack of clear boundaries between districts was to ensure 
a burgeoning "vagrant population" in Freetown on the eve of 
war.4V
The war itself was a major catalyst and an examination of 
statistical returns for Freetown, the mountain villages, the 
peninsula areas (Kissy, Wellington, Wilberforce, Murray Town, 
Tassoh, Hastings, Waterloo, Songo, Hamilton, York, Kent, 
Tombo and Banana Islands) and Bonthe, Koinadugu, Karene, 
Railway, Northern Sherbro and Ronietta districts, show a 
consistently steady rise in the death rate in Freetown than 
in any other area between 1911 and December 1914. For 
example, from 779 in 1913, it went up to 997 in 1914. This 
was mainly attributed to the influx of adult males from the 
Protectorate who came in search of work - for coaling and
ship labour - many of whom died whilst resident in
Freetown.45 The Wesleyan Methodist Church itself was
expressing concern over the increasing "evil of Sabbath 
desecration" by these migrants,49 by 1914.
A brief look at conditions in the Protectorate would reveal a 
more graphic picture of depopulation. St. Matthew's (church)
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District at Benguema "had not seen a growth in population" 
between 1903 and 1914 chiefly due to "deaths and
emigration.1150 At Benke, "the grown-up lads and young
girls" were all moving "to Freetown, to carry on their trade 
and branches of industry."51 In the River District and 
Tassoh, migration was the bane of missionary activity; by
1914/15, the district was "greatly depleted" and the same
pattern in Sherbro District caused a significant fall in 
church receipts.52 As the war quickened migration to
Freetown, the consequent congestion was to ensure all the 
makings of a disease prone capital. Migrants congregated 
"insanitarily in herds of some twenty...in a single shanty 
fit for...four lodgers," thus "rendering
their. . .neighbourhood unhealthy. . .1,53
Elsewhere in what the Sanitary Officer described as "tenement 
houses" could be found some thirty or forty persons "sleeping 
in one house under conditions... prejudicial to health." 
Returning carriers from the Cameroons merely worsened the 
situation,54 by their refusal to go back to the Protectorate 
in order to avoid chiefly abuses ranging from extortion to 
forced labour.55 This apart, they themselves were to 
introduce chicken pox and other diseases like amoebic 
dysentery to an already smallpox infected country.
If by 1916 the increased scale of communication networks, 
served to open up the country to greater trade possibilities, 
these changes were often a curse in disguise as far as the 
transmission of disease was concerned. A few examples would 
suffice. By September 1912, the branch line of the railway
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had been extended to Rowalla in Ronietta, the first portion 
having been opened to public traffic as far as Yonnibana on 
1st September 1912. These developments together with the 
Government mailboat service, were to revolutionise trade and 
as traders flocked to the district, the inevitable 
consequence was the growth of towns like Sembehun, Yonnibana, 
Mano and Kangahun.56 By 1913, the branch line had been 
opened to Makump and the construction of many feeder roads 
was begun by various chiefs in the district.57
Up to the end of 1914, railway, road and bridge construction 
proceeded with relative ease and there was no significant 
dearth of labour for the prosecution of public works in the 
Protectorate.58 Even by 1916, when the Colonial Office 
ordered work to stop on the export wharf,59 Wilkinson was 
still battling to persuade the Colonial Office to continue 
the railway extension to Baga which had been abandoned 
because of the need to keep expenditure down in war time.60 
Positive as these developments were, the evidence would later 
show that railways, roads and the mushrooming trade centres 
were to constitute the main channels for the diffusion of
disease in war time. Traders were to bring smallpox to
Freetown via the railway and canoes, striking at the very 
heart of congested residences occupied by the labouring 
class.61
As if oblivious of these developments going on around them, 
victims of disease were prone to search for its origins in
religion - in this case Islam - which by 1916 was deploring
the material pursuits of the population as well as its
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obsession with "women and pleasure." An "evil wind carrying 
sickness and death will" therefore "pass over this country 
and will involve every man, woman and child, freeman and all 
slaves great and small..." prophesied Alhaji Omaru, believed 
to have been "inspired from Mecca..."62 For many in Islamic 
circles, disease was the work of God - "Allah sent it, it was 
not man's work."63 The rapid growth of Islam during this 
period was itself lending credence to this phenomenon of 
divine punishment.64
The recourse to religion in Sierra Leone in 1916, was in 
part, a reflection of the psychological stress society was 
going through as a result of the war; and this made them even 
more vulnerable to the spread of disease. Food shortages 
also added to the crisis. In the Colony, Local Matter files 
were punctuated by applications for employment and complaints 
about the hardships brought on by the war. "Food is getting 
dearer,"65 was the usual refrain by 1916. At Karene, the 
seat of smallpox in 1916, there was a marked "deterioration" 
in "the physical condition of people"66 and in Kissi country, 
the plate laying gangs along the line between Pendembu and 
Daru were "seriously emaciated.1167 At Bo, Pendembu, Daru and 
Kenema, Major Farrar saw very few persons "who could be 
termed plump."68 The problems of starvation therefore 
provided a ready ally for an already disease ridden 
envi ronment.
As the Colonial Office was to discover, external factors 
played a great part in introducing disease to the country, 
and by the eve of war, the Colonial administration was being
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advised to take prophylactic action to prevent diseases from 
these sources. One such source was through labour migration 
to distant places - to the Congo, the Cameroons, Portuguese 
possessions, to Liberia and Fernando Po - a process that had 
begun to worry officials even as early as 1901.69 By then 
the labour pool in Sierra Leone was seriously dwindling, many 
having left for the Ashanti war to take up employment "as 
carriers or hammock men." Significantly enough, the outbreak 
of small pox in 1901 at Waterloo, was traced to carriers 
returned from the Gold Coast."71
By 1913, there was an extensive trade network, prosecuted by 
vessels between Sierra Leone and French Guinea, Portuguese 
Guinea and Liberia and this it was believed held the answer 
to the controversy regarding the origin of the outbreak of 
yellow fever in Freetown in 1910. This was all the more 
important in terms of the number of people who commuted 
between the various ports. For example, between 1910 and 
1913, 142 vessels traded between Freetown and French Guinea,
1,126 between Mahela and French Guinea, 14 between Mano 
Salijah and Liberia, 9 between Gene and Liberia and 13 
between Freetown and Portuguese Guinea.*72
The apprehensions governing the likely sources of diseases 
introduced into Sierra Leone by sea-borne traffic were to 
lead the Colonial Office to ask Merewether to instruct the 
port health authorities to undertake an examination of 
vessels "of every class trading with the ports of the Colony, 
with a view to determining the presence, and when present, 
the degree of prevalence of the stegomyia mosquito on board
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both at the larval and at the adult state.'173 Dr. J.M. 
Clarke, who had written a lengthy report on the possibilities 
of fumigation observed that the mosquitoes found on board the
S. S. Warri which called at Freetown from Sapele and Warri 
between 8th April and 24th May 1914, must have come from 
those latter ports. Of the twelve ships examined during this 
period there were 14 cases of illness - nine malarial, one 
intestinal, one yellow fever and three with pyrexia and 
headache.74
There was clearly a need for examining ships calling at 
Freetown, most of which were rarely disinfected before 
coaling. This was particularly dangerous because during 
coaling many labourers were employed on or in the vicinity of 
the ship. The most effective way of disinfecting a ship 
then, with a view to exterminating the mosquitoes on board 
was by means of clayton gas which the Freetown harbour 
lacked. Steamers therefore had to resume their voyages as 
"suspected ships," their crew being subject to the risk of 
infection and the ship, to the disabilities incidental to 
further quarantine on the homeward voyage. With the 
exception of the Gambia, Freetown was the only British port 
on the coast north of Forcados with a safe harbour for large 
ocean-going steamers. It was therefore the first port at 
which ships could have been disinfected by clayton gas since 
the rough seas and the absence of harbour facilities at the 
intermediate ports, precluded the employment of a clayton 
launch or even of an improvised clayton machine or lighter,75 
These considerations constituted the basis for suggestions 
that every ship calling at Freetown, and which had previously
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touched at a West African port, should be visited by a 
medical officer.
Dr. Kennan, in 1915 was to argue that "the need for special 
facilities for the fumigation of vessels at a port is 
inversely proportional (other things being equal) to the 
facilities the vessels themselves at the port possess for 
fumigation." No steamer calling at Freetown carried a 
clayton machine though some ports made it obligatory for 
ships to do so;77 but despite the obvious dangers inherent in 
the use of sulphur,7Q the war made it impossible to buy a 
clayton machine although "the matter is one which should not 
be lost sight of.1,79 Such problems assisted the spread of 
diseases in Sierra Leone and rendered the dependency very 
vulnerable to influenza when the "S.S. Mantua" called at the 
Freetown harbour in August 1918.80
Apart from the threat posed by sea-borne traffic to the port 
of Freetown, the cattle trade with French Guinea was to cause 
considerable dangers to the cattle herds in Koinadugu, 
Railway and Karene districts, all of which shared extensive 
borders with the latter. Much of the livestock imported into 
Sierra Leone then was brought from French Guinea, principally 
to Mahela, which port had the most intimate connection with 
any of the neighbouring territories.81
In spite of the prohibition of the export of cows and heifers 
from French to British territory by 1914, there was still a 
thriving trade in Koinadugu up to 1915, interrrupted only by 
the outbreak of anthrax and pleuro-pneumonia. In 1915 alone, 
one chiefdom suffered a loss of about £350, this at a time
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when herds were also dying in French Guinea.32 In Railway 
District contacts with French Guinea were sustained through a 
thriving Sunday Market at Buea, near the Guinea border of 
Kissi country. As the only market of its kind in the 
Protectorate, it brought thousands of people together both 
Africans and foreigners alike.83 The threat to cattle herds 
by diseases from French Guinea was most conspicuous in 
Karene.
In September 1914, there was a serious cattle epidemic in 
Northern Karene, this attributed by the people to the bite of 
a fly (identified by the District Medical Officer, Dr. 
Clearkin as Stomoxvs Nigra) which came down from French 
Guinea at regular intervals of five or six years. In 1914 it 
penetrated the regions down to Batkanu causing 46 deaths 
among 133 herds bought for the War Department.84 The 
elimination of this disease in 1915 through the burning of 
the grass, once again revived the cattle trade with Guinea,85 
but throughout the period of the smallpox epidemic in the 
district (6th May 1915 to October 1916) this robust cattle 
trade was threatened by further outbreaks of pieuro-pneumonia 
among the herds.86
In the context of insanitary conditions and constant 
population movements, the authorities were ill prepared to 
combat the smallpox epidemic which erupted in 1915.
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Chapter Five: THE SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC 1915-1916
The considerable impetus which international trade received 
in the period just prior to the outbreak of war was fraught 
with serious epidemiological consequences. One major result 
of this experience was the transmission of smallpox from 
Kindia in French Guinea to Sierra Leone. This was made 
possible by the great movement of people between the two 
ecological zones who, became what Prothero has described as 
"active transmitters" of disease.1 Apart from the extensive 
sea-borne traffic between Sierra Leone and French Guinea,2 
and the thriving cattle trade between the two territories,3 
up to 1917, Syrians were still streaming into the Colony and 
Protectorate from French Guinea. Four months after the 
commencement of hostilities, Governor Peurvergne of Conakry 
was seeking permission from Merewether before granting the 
Syrians passports to travel from French Guinea.4 In Freetown 
there were already apprehensions about what Merewether 
regarded as the "exceedingly insanitary"5 dwellings of the 
Syrians and by the outbreak of war complaints against the 
latter, based on sanitary grounds, had become a constant 
feature of the Sierra Leone Weekly News; such complaints had 
also attracted the attention of the Sanitary Department.6
Syrian participation in commerce ensured constant movement 
across the frontier with French Guinea. By 1914 the demand 
for Sierra Leonean kola in Portuguese and French Guinea, 
Dakar and the Gambia was very high following the profits made 
on a large groundnut crop in 1913 which fetched very high
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prices on the European market. This increased the purchasing 
power of the inhabitants of those countries. Added to this 
factor was the massive outlay of railway works which was 
opening up the Protectorate to greater trade possibilities. 
The new barons of trade, the Syrians, were to follow the 
railway further and further into the interior to make huge 
purchases of kola. In time they not only came to dominate 
this export trade but gave it a new fillip as well. In 1915 
when smallpox erupted in Karene, "the kola market was a short 
and brisk one" because of the "shortage of money upcountry"7 
but Syrians like L. Hajje, the Abdo Brothers, J. Charaf and 
others "were able to buy" and prosecute the kola trade with
Conakry, Dakar, the Gambia, Nigeria, St. Louis and
Tenerrife.8 As the principal buyers of kola, their dominance 
of the trade was facilitated by the huge remittances in 
C.F.A. Francs which they obtained from Dakar.9
Trade movements across the frontier were not one sided. In 
early 1917 when Mohammed Eunies was seeking permission to go 
to Conakry "to continue his business...",10 Rezk Habib of 
Conakry also wished to travel to Sierra Leone "chez son frere 
pour inspecter comptoir".11 Many more arrived in Freetown 
from French Guinea without reporting their arrival,12 at a 
time when the authorities were experiencing problems 
determining the precise numbers of Syrians in the
Protectorate. Apart from pursuing trade, others like P.J.
Stambouli wished to go to Guinea for health reasons.13
Apart from Syrians other movements across the frontier were 
also facilitated by the process of recruitment in both French
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and British West Africa. As many Africans fled across the 
borders to avoid recruitment, Merewether was urged "to 
prevent... the exodus of natives, which the arrival of 
recruiting commissioners might provoke..."14
From the above, the epidemiological importance of increased 
trade and other contacts between French Guinea and Sierra
Leone can easily be appreciated. Such contacts facilitated
the spread of smallpox long after war had begun. It has been 
suggested that the distance of movements, the ecological 
zones crossed, the number of people moving, the nature of 
their contacts with populations en route and at their
destination, and the previous disease exposure of the groups 
involved, are among the variables which must be considered.15 
Although the evidence of the number of people who travelled 
between the two regions16 is rather spotty, what mainly 
occurred between April 1915 and October 1916, was the meshing 
of two environments, the people participating directly in 
long-distance trade acting as the agents of transmission.17
Given the need to pay greater attention to population
movements in epidemiological studies,18 the aim of this 
chapter is to examine the hypothesis of disease as a function 
of increased population mobility and trade contacts. This 
approach also takes congnizance of patterns of population 
distribution, the structure of dwellings and the range of 
economic activities involved in.
THE ENDEMICITY OF SMALLPOX IN SIERRA LEONE
Although the evidence relating to the origins of smallpox in
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Africa is as yet inconclusive, medical historians are agreed 
that the disease probably appeared in Africa in ancient 
times. Some accounts suggest that it was reintroduced by 
Arabs who crossed the Sahara during the eighth and tenth 
centuries A.D. It was well known on the Guinea coast during 
the seventeenth century; in 1627 there was an outbreak of 
epidemic in Angola caused by the movements of refugees from 
Portuguese depredations.19 Mungo Park, who visited the Niger 
basin twice between 1796 and 1805 believed that smallpox had 
been introduced to West Africa by infected Moors from across 
the Sahara.20
By 1800 ships were constantly bringing in smallpox to the 
continent.21 Since the mid-nineteenth century, parts of 
Africa had long endured smallpox. C.J. Wilson of the C.M.S. 
recorded in 1887 that smallpox was "one of the most fatal" 
diseases to which the Ganda were subjected. It came at 
intervals in epidemics and carried off thousands of victims. 
Whatever its origins (Central Africa or India as others 
suggest) smallpox or "variola major" (its most virulent form) 
was widespread in Africa by the period of the European 
conquest, and in Angola in 1864 was associated with an 
increasing export trade in wax and ivory. By 1891 smallpox 
was a constant threat to the people of Uganda.22
West Africa did not avoid this threat and Sierra Leone was 
particularly vulnerable to smallpox. There is evidence to 
show that smallpox was endemic in both the Colony and 
Protectorate of Sierra Leone at least between 1898 and 1915, 
when the disease assumed epidemic proportions. Despite the
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relatively few towns and villages visited and the minute 
proportion of the population observed by medical officers, up 
to 1915, there was no year in which there was not at least 
one case recorded. In 1898, 85 cases were recorded in
Freetown alone; none was found in the Protectorate. In 1899, 
there were 157 cases in Freetown. By 1900, the incidence of 
smallpox was vastly reduced, but there were still 8 cases in 
Freetown and 11 at the Kissy Infectious Diseases Hospital of 
which two died; only occasional outbreaks were reported in 
the Protectorate.
By 1901, pattern of the disease was manifesting itself in 
terms of its origins. There were 9 cases in Freetown and 22 
at the Kissy Infectious Diseases Hospital (K.I.D.H.) out of 
which 11 died. The Peninsular area suffered the heaviest 
casualties. At Waterloo alone, 42 people died. There was 
also a slight epidemic at Moyamba (Ronietta District) and one 
case each in Koinadugu and Railway districts. Significantly, 
the majority of the cases at Freetown and Kissy were 
introduced by steamers or from the Protectorate. The cases 
at Waterloo were introduced by carriers returned from the 
Gold Coast.
Most of the cases in 1902 were traced to the Protectorate and 
in this year, there were four in Freetown, 12 at the K.I.D.H. 
out of which two died, two in the Railway District and 10 at 
Waterloo. No records are available for 1903 and there was 
probably no epidemic during the year. The sources of 
smallpox in 1904 were found to be the same as those for 1902. 
There were 20 cases in Freetown in 1904 in which year also
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105 cases were treated in both the Colony and Protectorate, 
six dying out of the 34 admitted at the K.I.D.H.23
In 1905, the disease raged with disastrous results and the 
tendency to conceal it by those affected merely ensured the 
spread, especially at Kossoh Town in the east end of 
Freetown. There were 371 cases in Freetown and 629 at the 
K.I.D.H., out of which 130 died. Although there were sporadic 
outbreaks in Northern Sherbro and Sherbro districts, the 
incidence did not assume epidemic proportions. 28 cases had 
to be treated in a temporary hospital at Koinadugu.
By 1906, smallpox had abated in Freetown and there was no 
case reported. But Kissy continued to be infected. Out of 
101 patients, 14 died at the K.I.D.H. Villages near Bonthe 
in Sherbro district and several towns in Railway and Ronietta 
districts also suffered from a mild epidemic (two being 
treated in hospitals and 35 in dispensaries). Although the 
outbreak was mild in 1907, there were still 20 cases in 
Freetown, 20 at the K.I.D.H. with one death, two at Sherbro, 
one at Hastings, one in Karene and three in Railway district. 
Only the Railway (four cases) and the Ronietta districts were 
affected in 1908. The singular case in Freetown in 1909 was 
introduced by a steamer. There was also one at the K.I.D.H., 
one suspected case at Waterloo and a few in the Protectorate. 
In this year also, 6,980 successful vaccinations were carried 
out. In 1910 when 5,440 persons were successfully vaccinated, 
there was no outbreak in Freetown, but there was one case at 
the K.I.D.H., two at York and one in Bo (Railway district) 
Conditions seemed to have improved by 1911 when only one case
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was reported at the K.I.D.H. The singular case in Freetown 
was said to have been introduced from the military barracks 
at Tower Hill.
By 1912 the disease was confined to Koinadugu (four cases) 
and Railway (one case at Panguma) districts. By this time 
also, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the number of 
cases reported from year to year offered little or no 
indication of the actual extent of smallpox. Reports simply 
recorded "the number of sufferers" brought to the notice of 
the Government Medical Officer. Only one case was reported 
in 1913, in Karene; there were two at Mabanta, two at 
Batkanu in the same district, one at Kabinkolo in Koinadugu, 
two in Northern Sherbro and four at the K.I.D.H., one at 
Kissy, five at Sumbuya and an outbreak of serious dimensions 
(as the following sections will show) in Karene from October 
1915.
It should be observed that among the cases admitted at the 
K.I.D.H. were "infected persons from native craft" trading 
between Freetown and the Protectorate, from neighbouring 
villages and not infrequently, from travellers by rail or 
road on their way to Freetown, and brought there by the 
police, sanitary constables and friends. Quite often, they 
were directed there by strangers.24 So endemic was smallpox 
in Sierra Leone and so accustomed were the people "to its 
occurrence that until recently, when it was found out that 
one or two natives from the district (Karene) had carried the 
disease to Freetown, the chiefs did not realise that the 
government wish such outbreaks to be reported."25
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SMALLPOX IN KARENE AND THE PROTECTORATE
The smallpox epidemic of May 1915 to June 1916, was preceded 
by several local outbreaks in Karene in 1915, The mortality 
rates resulting from these outbreaks were low. Chiefs 
reported cases in their chiefdoms and isolated patients 
without waiting for instructions and during the year, the 
Protectorate Health Ordinance came into force. Despite the 
emphasis on sanitation, no medical officer had been stationed 
in the district before 6th May.26 By October, the disease 
had come to constitute the most notable feature of public 
health. The epidemic, though of a mild form, originated in 
French territory and spread down the trade route from Kindia 
to Kambia on the small Searcies river in October. In many 
ways, the epidemic was indicative of the problems which long­
distance trade was bringing into the country.
The incidence of smallpox in October was hardly mitigated by 
the outbreak of other diseases. There were six cases of 
Blackwater fever and three cases of sleeping sickness at 
Kissy, Makeni and Kabala. Only after the recommendations of 
Professor Warrington York and Dr Blacklock who had visited 
the Colony late in 1914 under the auspices of the Liverpool 
School of Tropical Medicine, were measures taken to limit the 
breading of glossinae. The high incidence of other diseases 
like tuberculosis, and malaria in 1915 and the high mortality 
rates resulting from them, compounded the sufferings brought 
on by war conditions on the populace. 109 cases of 
tuberculosis were treated in 1915, mostly of the pulmonary 
variety. Very virulent in character, tuberculosis usually 
ran a fatal course and out of 992 deaths for the year, 31
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were returned as due to it. In 1915 also, 22 cases of 
leprosy were treated. Malaria returns showed that 2,460 
cases were treated in 1914 and 2,221 in 1915. These factors, 
added to inadequate public health measures, the lack of 
adequate medical personnel and the general stress on the 
population, provided ready allies for the smallpox 
epidemic.2v
In October 1915 two people from Karene were admitted to the 
K.I.D.H. suffering from smallpox. Later enquiries revealed 
that an outbreak of serious proportions existed in the region 
of the Searcies rivers in the district but the provincial 
administration had not reported the outbreak. Just at this 
time, a smallpox epidemic was raging in French Guinea to the 
north west of and adjacent to Sierra Leone. The people of 
the Protectorate attributed the Karene outbreak to this 
epidemic and the French authorities were notified on 15th 
November.28
Conditions in Karene were particularly favourable for the 
spread of disease. With headquarters at Batkanu and two sub­
districts at Port Loko and Makeni, it was the most westerly 
of the Protectorate. Spanning an area of between 5,500 and 
6,000 square miles, its greatest breadth was from Balo point 
to the Rokel river near Mapaki, a distance of 88 miles; its 
length 84 miles from north to south from the French boundary 
near Saionia to the Rokel river. Its greatest length spanned 
128 miles from Tagrin Point to the Small Searcies at the 
French boundary. This geographical proximity to French 
Guinea facilitated trade contacts and increased population
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mobility between the two regions.29 Population mobility 
created conditions for congestion and this latter development 
was clearly a function of the relative prosperity which 
characterised trade in the first six months of the war in the 
district.
More than during any other period before it, 1914 was 
significant for having recorded the highest revenue and the 
chief variable in this connection was the railway. In 1914, 
the extension of the Branch line to Makeni was opened to 
traffic, and provided an important attraction for nine 
European trading stores close to that centre. In early 1914, 
the D.C.s office was flooded with applications for leases of 
land so that by 1915, Messrs Paterson Zochonis and Company, 
Stinus Depuichaffray, E.Sourjous, M. Jourdan, The French 
Company, The Societe Commercials de L'Ouest Africain, M. 
Petit and Mrs. Teckham, a Sierra Leonean, were all occupying 
lands on lease from the traditional authority at Makeni. As 
the railway progressed, other traders - Krios and Syrians - 
flocked to the district to continue the kola trade. 
Population increases in the district were clearly reflected 
in the increased revenue derived from the house tax, store 
and hawkers1 licences and the added importance of Bombali 
country in the south-eastern corner of Karene.30
Other factors favourable for epidemic condition were soon to 
make themselves felt in the district. By September 1914, 
trade had begun to lose its usual vitality in Port Loko 
caused partly by the war and the excesses of the men of the 
West Africa Regiment who were notorious for plundering
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cassava farms31 all over the country. Dubbed "red belly" 
(after their red cummerbund worn round the waist) by the 
public, they were held responsible for the "barefaced 
depredations" of farms at Wilberforce and Murray town and for 
the general scarcity of "foofoo" in the village.33
These activities combined to "disturb people from up country 
on their way to Port Loko. . . the rumour of ill-treatment at 
the hands of the military"33 was to considerably reduce trade 
in the district. Trade in the sub-district was further 
affected by escalating prices in Freetown, especially the 
prices of tobacco and salt. But the greatest threat came 
from the spate of rumour-mongering which followed in the wake 
of the order to mobilise and "which disturbed the people." 
The D.C. therefore had to reassure all Paramount Chiefs and 
urged them to continue their normal trading routine.34 Almost 
the same drawbacks were evident in Sherbro,35 Headquarter,36 
Railway, Koinadugu, Northern Sherbro37 and Ronietta 
districts3® which also suffered from the epidemic in the 
period under review.
In Karene in general, the fortunes of its principal exports - 
palm kernels and palm oil, kola, cattle and rice were 
rendered particularly hazardous by the outbreak of war. Palm 
kernel lost its chief market, Hamburg and although there was 
some improvement in November and December, by January 1915, 
prices remained low. Furthermore, the production of surplus 
rice did not lead producers to a more judicious use of the 
commodity, and by the beginning of 1915, it was obvious that 
"very few" had "sufficient to last them until the next
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harvest." This was particularly serious for, while the 
piassava trade had yet to demonstrate its economic viability, 
cassava, millet, guinea corn, maize, "fundi", groundnuts, 
sweet potatoes, yams and pumpkin were not grown in sufficient 
quantities for export, though a considerable market-garden 
trade was carried on with Freetown. Up to 1915 the district 
had yet to turn to good account "the miles and miles of 
country" in the coastal regions, so eminently suited for the 
cultivation of coco-nut. Matters were not improved by the 
outbreak of a cattle epidemic in September 1914.39
Conditions had not materially changed by the time of the 
outbreak of smallpox in 1915. 1915 itself was characterised
by a severe depression in trade evidenced in dwindling 
revenue returns in the district. Even though the cattle- 
trade picked up, there was a slight drop in the numbers 
brought over from French Guinea.40 To add to this catalogue 
of depressed conditions, upland rice suffered considerably 
from the heavy rains and many farms had to be abandoned; even 
swamp rice from the Little Searcies was destroyed by the high 
tides.41 On the whole, population mobility, population 
increase, increased trade contacts with Guinea albeit on a 
less profitable scale - a generally depressed socio-economic 
scenario - were to lead to psychological and physical stress 
and made the populace easy targets for smallpox.
Detailed to the Searcies rivers on 9th October 1915, Dr Clark 
found that the disease had been present in Susu-Limba country 
on the mid Great Searcies river adjacent to the French border 
since April. From here, it spread south and south west;
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three cases were reported in May in Port Loko. Initial 
responses to the disease ranged from isolation of the sick, 
to inoculation but African prophylactic measures were
inadequate. In one town, out of 20 cases, 10 had been 
inoculated each by a single mark on the left arm. Because 
there was no control over contacts, vaccination was resorted 
to. Lanolinated lymph was also used added to fumigation and 
disinfection. The authorities used sulphur and izal which
prevented itching and healed the pustules rapidly. This
early phase was significant for appreciating the spread of 
disease. The crowning of an Alimami (chief) around November 
brought together a large number of people in the district. 
Though many were vaccinated, they subsequently helped to
spread the disease. By the end of November, the shortage of 
medical officers aggravated the situation and more cases were 
reported from the central and western parts of Karene.42
In December, the Guinean origins of the disease were further 
confirmed through the discovery of a distinct history of 
infection by a trader from French Guinea. The rather poor 
methods of isolation rendered conditions particularly 
difficult. Fumigation was done in a shelter half a mile from 
the town, but infected clothing was still left in the house 
of patients; movement between towns still continued and Dr 
Clearkin found that attendants of victims were usually but 
not always rendered immune by a previous attack. The 
fumigation of mud huts with grass roofs clearly failed to 
yield positive results. The air spaces between the roofs and 
the walls were closed up with mats and mud, but the sulphur 
fumes managed to escape through the grass. By the end of
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December, smallpox had spread to some six miles around 
Makump,43 round the Searcies rivers and to parts of Sanda 
chiefdom.
African suspicion did little to mitigate the problem. 
Victims were always loath to abide by what they construed as 
government's draconian measures to combat the disease - such 
as curtailing freedom of movement. In their bid to preserve 
trade and the traffic from the Searcies and Port Loko, even 
"loyal" chiefs concealed the disease. "In one town contacts 
and a case of smallpox ran away after instructions had been 
given for isolation." Others refused vaccination and by so 
doing, ensured the spread in the district and along the 
border with French Guinea.44
Smallpox was also aided in its course by the rice harvest 
when "many people from towns are gathered together." During 
December, the disease spread to Mambolo and Samu chiefdoms 
and by January 1916, infection from other parts had increased 
significantly. By March, all 50 chiefdoms in the district 
had been infected and towns and villages in neighbouring 
Ronietta were also beginning to suffer from the disease. The 
same was true for Railway, Koinadugu, Sherbro, Northern 
Sherbro and Headquarter districts. In the main, smallpox 
followed the great trading centres such as Rotifunk on the 
railway in Ronietta District, Blama in Railway District, 
Songo in Headquarter District, the Songo-Rokel Road in 
Ronietta, Kabala in Koinadugu District, and the neighbourhood 
of Sumbuya on the Bum river. In many places, it exhibited a 
differential impact.
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In December 1915 and January 1916, there were several
infected towns in the Railway and Northern Sherbro districts. 
Though smallpox was of "small proportions," in the town of 
Kallah, nearly half the people were said to be infected; in 
February 1916, there was only one case at Kabala; in June, 
there were four in the village of Kwelu some eight miles 
north of Moyamba in Ronietta.45
By the end of February 1916, the epidemic had subsided at 
Port Loko. At Dixing, the chiefs to the south and west were 
strictly enforcing the policy of isolation "no one being
allowed to pass except on government duty." But in the 
neighbourhood of Makeni, a severe and widespread epidemic had
to be combatted. The same was true of the region of the
newly opened railway between Makump and Kamabai. By April, 
the acute shortage of staff forced the government to 
establish an immune belt "as broad as possible south of the 
Rokel river extending from the sea eastwards well beyond any 
known infected area and as far as possible, to vaccinate 
universally within this belt, dealing with towns and villages 
in the infected area to the north by paying flying visits as 
necessity arose." By 8th June, the disease had subsided in 
many places except for a few isolated towns in distant parts 
of the country which were being dealt with by dispensers 
Scott and Heroe.46
An examination of the course of the disease in various parts 
of the district helps explain its spread. The disease was 
introduced to Port Loko from French Guinea in May 1915 by 
traders passing through the trade route in Dixing chiefdom.
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From here, it spread to Dibia (in November) "one of the most 
thickly populated parts in the country," thence to Magbema 
and further south through the trade route and to Kambia and 
Port Loko, to both sides of the Great Searcies and to a town 
in Bullom on the south bank of the Little Searcies, in 
December. To the west of Karene also, the disease had come 
directly from French Guinea and here Tonko Limba Chiefdom was 
a more important nucleus from which infection was carried 
widely elsewhere including Sanda chiefdom. In this part of 
the district, only one town was infected from Maligia in 
French Guinea.
In Eastern Karene in May 1915, a man returning from Rotifunk 
on the railway fell ill with smallpox at Pendembu and from 
this case began an epidemic of unparalleled severity in this 
part of the district.47 In Koinadugu, smallpox ran its fatal 
course until October 19164s in Simiria chiefdom. By 20th 
October, there were two deaths and 11 severe cases in 
Simiria, this at a time when reports were to hand of similar 
outbreaks in the two Koinadugu chiefdoms of the Makeni sub­
district.49 In central Karene, the epidemic lasted from 
January to March 1916 around Batkanu. First intimations 
about the outbreak in Northern Karene came to hand in 
February 1916 and fresh outbreaks in June led to a dispenser 
being sent there. Although the source was traced to French 
Guinea, the towns in the far north were not visited by 
medical officers.
The close proximity of Ronietta to Karene made the spread of 
smallpox to the former a inevitable. In March, 1916 cases
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were reported at Magbile an important trade centre on the 
north bank of the Rokel river and in villages further down 
the river.50 It spread into Kwaia chiefdom through which 
passed the trade route from Magbile to Songo town on the 
railway,51 and appeared in Masimera. Further east, Mabang 
and Gbonkolenken were infected from Karene and there were 
rumours of infection from Kunike and Sanda.
THE EPIDEMIC IN FREETOWN
Given the north-westerly position of Karene, there was a 
clear danger that the disease might spread to Freetown. 
Prophylactic measures therefore had to be taken. Apart from 
the immune belt created to the south of Karene, careful watch 
was kept on vessels and passengers arriving in Freetown and 
on 16th January 1916, all District Commissioners were 
officially circularised regarding the outbreak. But these 
initial measures proved unhelpful to the Sanitary 
authorities. Only one D.C. replied and he said that he was 
unable to trace cases of smallpox; no other replies were 
received and the failure to control the movement of people 
brought the disease to Freetown. Traders were the main 
transmitters from Karene and smallpox struck at the heart of 
congested residences occupied by the "labouring class."
The histories of six imported cases to Freetown, admitted at 
the K.I.D.H., between 22nd December 1915 and 23rd March 1916, 
shows a distinct connection between the outbreak in Karene 
and that in Freetown. Travelling by canoe, the victims had 
all passed through infected districts. Three came down via 
Port Loko and the other three via Kambia, the great trading
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centre on the Searcies. Three went directly to the K.I.D.H. 
and the others settled in the east of Freetown (one at Hagan 
Street, one at Mountain Cut, and one at Kossoh Town). During 
the same period, six non-imported cases were reported from 
Rawdon Street, Lucas Street, Malta Street, Patton Street, 
Goderich Street and Krootown Road. That at 18 Lucas Street 
was traced to the imported case at Kossoh Town. Though other 
parts of Freetown were affected, the disease was particularly 
prevalent in the centres of congestion, for which Kossoh Town 
(between Savage Square and Patton Street) was notorious. The 
town was a rendez vous for migrants from Karene52 and the 
evidence is illustrative of this tendency even up to 1916.53
Between 16th and 31st March 1916, seven non-imported cases 
were admitted; five from Waterloo Street in the West end of 
Freetown had once lived in Karene. The others came from 18 
Lucas Street and Soldier Street respectively. Between 23rd 
and 31st March, only one imported case was admitted, again 
from Karene. Of the 19 non-imported cases admitted in April, 
seven came from Kossoh Town. (5 from a house at the corner 
of Fourah Bay Road and Patton Street). Outside Kossoh Town, 
four were from Pademba Road, two from Kroo Town, two from 
Fula Town, one from Ingham Street, one from Walpole Street, 
one from Mary Street and another from Charlotte Street. The 
4 from Pademba Road, lived in the same house and had all come 
from Karene. In April, there were two imported cases - one 
from Bui lorn and one from Bo. By May, the majority of 
imported cases came from the east end of Freetown. Of the 
eight cases reported, two were from Kossoh Town, two from 
Ross Road, one from Tarlton Lane, all in the east end. One
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came from the Kingtom peninsular, one from Dundas Street and 
one from Chapel Street, all in the west end.
The case at Chapel Street was a very good example of the 
dangers resulting from concealment. The house in which was 
found two cases of chicken pox in addition to smallpox was 
used as a traditional hospital in charge of a Temne "medicine 
man", Patients attended here for treatment and in this way 
spread the disease. By June, the epidemic had subsided and 
only one case was reported.54
In Freetown, the authorities found it difficult to trace the 
movement of a particular case. The statements of patients 
were extremely unreliable and the information given was of a 
very general nature so that deductions were of necessity the 
same. It is worthwhile to observe that from an 
epidemiological standpoint, out of a total of 40 non-imported 
cases reported between 22nd December 1915 and 10th June 1916, 
22 had lived at one time in Karene District. The social 
intercourse taking place among people from the same district 
may partly explain why the disease was more widespread among 
people from Karene than among those from other parts of the 
Protectorate or among the Krio population, though the 
infection became more general later.
Of the 51 cases admitted at the K.I.D.H., the average age was 
29.58 years. No person under 12 was found to be infected, 
but this was only a rough average of the age incidence, the 
available data being extremely unreliable. Only a few women 
were attacked by the disease. This was mainly because many
189
houses in certain parts of the town were almost completely 
occupied by single labourers among whom the infection spread. 
In a practically un-vaccinated community like Freetown, the 
death rate of seven could not be taken as a high case of 
mortality. In all 43 out of the 51 cases were vaccinated for 
the first time on admission; one of these had been 
unsuccessfully vaccinated twice and another 29 years before 
the outbreak in 1915.5S
MANAGEMENT OF THE OUTBREAK IN FREETOWN
The large concentration of infected persons in Kossoh Town 
forced the authorities to devote great attention there. 
Between January, February and part of March, the Public 
Vaccinator worked continuously in the district and a Sanitary 
Constable patrolled Susan's Bay where arrivals from the 
Searcies rivers and Port Loko disembarked. However, 
information about arrivals and the movement of imported cases 
were generally very scanty and most times "action had to be 
taken on what was sometimes little more than a suspicion."
Reports of two non-imported cases on March 23rd 1916 led the 
government to declare Freetown an infected port under the 
Quarantine Ordinance of 1916 and extensive prophylactic 
measures were taken to deal with the disease. In addition, 
various vaccination centres were established at the Colonial 
Hospital, the Cline Town dispensary, the Sanitary Department, 
at the various surgeries of the Sierra Leonean medical 
practitioners and at 99 Campbell Street. African
practitioners were also appointed public vaccinators under 
the Vaccination Ordinance and a number of young men were
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especially trained as temporary assistant vaccinators.
Fear of the impending attack made vaccination initially very 
popular but the rush soon depleted the supply of lymph 
vaccine despite a large consignment from French Guinea. Arm 
to arm vaccination was therefore resorted to; but even though 
the practice was to undertake vaccination wherever the 
disease was reported and though all schools were visited, the 
difficulty of finding all the inmates in one house made it 
uncertain that all contacts had been dealt with.
According to the Quarantine (Anti-smallpox) Regulation, no 
one was allowed on board a ship without producing evidence of 
recent vaccination. In this way Kroo men employed at 
Freetown to work cargo at various ports on the coast and who
otherwise "might have been very difficult to deal with"58
were vaccinated. The results of vaccination were usually
satisfactory but there was opposition to it in some places.
This resulted in prosecutions and convictions under the 
Compulsory Vaccination Ordinance.5"7 By 30th June, the 
declaration of infection had not been rescinded and there 
were still difficulties in finding the residences of victims 
who reported at the hospitals. Changes in names, a common 
practice, created problems for the authorities.
The usual process of fumigation was also carried out with 
sulphur fumes.58 All articles of clothing, bedding and other 
furniture were soaked in lysol solution, useless bedding and 
matting being burnt. Even the clothing of contacts likely to 
be infected were treated and when it was impossible to make
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houses airtight, the walls and floors were scrubbed with 
disinfectant. In addition, infected houses were isolated and 
kept under observation for 14 days, the victims being 
transported later by fly proof stretchers to the K.I.D.H. at 
night.
However, as the authorities devised precautionary measures, 
so did infected persons, at times in collusion with the non­
infected, resort to evasive tactics. Victims were sometimes 
driven to the outskirts of the town. The five from Fourah 
Bay Road were driven out of the house as soon as the rash 
appeared; they were discovered hiding in the bush near Kissy 
Road Cemetery and by the time their residence was found out, 
the other inmates had disappeared. Another was found at Hill 
Station near a spring believed to have healing powers. 
Elsewhere, cases were removed to neighbouring villages.59
On 22nd April 1916 powers were obtained for house-to-house 
visitation, Drs. Ward, Clarke, Maxwell and the Medical 
Officer of Health being appointed house-to-house visitors. 
The results of their efforts were limited as only two cases 
were found. The exercise itself conflicted with their normal 
duties; many houses were found closed and unless there was a 
suspicion of concealment, they were not invested with powers 
for forcible entry. In all, 1426 houses were either
partially or wholly inspected but a general inspection was 
difficult to accomplish. Met generally with "locked doors,1 
the team resorted to a random selection and ended up
inspecting only a few houses in each street. Legal action
was taken in three cases against persons for wilful
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concealment and all were convicted.60
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the policy of 
containment was the enforcement of the Quarantine Ordinance 
of 23rd March 1916. As the most important port on the 
British West African coast, Freetown had to be protected 
first, to prevent the disease from being exported, and then 
to avoid creating severe problems for the shipping trade. 
Practically every British West African steamer called at 
Freetown either outward or homeward-bound for water or coal61 
and to enlist Kru (usually regarded as extremely probable 
carriers of infection)62
The enforcement of the Ordinance was to tax the energies of 
the Sanitary department to the full. All intending 
passengers, Europeans, Africans and Kru were examined and, 
during quarantine, 3,000 certificates of "freedom from 
infectious disease" were granted. The fumigation of baggage 
was conducted twice daily beginning at 8.00 a.m. and 4.00 
p.m. The Elder Dempster Line provided lighters alongside the 
jetty near the fumigation chamber to take baggage to the 
steamers. But the very limited capacity of fumigation 
building posed problems. It had two chambers - one for 
fumigation and one for storage - each of about 3,000 cubic 
feet. The resulting congestion when two or three steamers 
were expected, was considerable.63 Furthermore, the
isolation chamber, a hut at King Jimmy, opposite the Colonial 
Hospital, was regarded by the P.M.O. as "a disgrace to the 
Colony...it is small...in it men and women are placed 
together...all infectious cases are mixed up together in it -
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chickenpox and smallpox."64
Further preventive measures included the examination or 
vaccination of labourers everyday (where necessary) before 
being allowed to handle cargo on the wharf. Labourers of the 
Sierra Leone Coaling Company were exempted because they did 
not actually go on board, and only worked on stages by the 
side of the ships. As before, most of these measures were ad 
hoc ones designed to meet the emergency so that sanitary and 
health officers had to contend with the arduous and daily 
routine of vaccination and examination - of purveyors of 
fruit and provisions to ships and boat-men who plied for hire 
between ship and shore. Quarantine orders extended to the 
local coast traffic between Freetown and other local ports 
(either foreign or in the Colony). Apart from lighters, no 
craft of 10 tons or over was allowed to anchor in Susan's 
Bay, between Falcon Bridge and Mabela Point. No such vessel 
was allowed to lie alongside the jetty at night and no member 
of the crew was allowed to come ashore at any time without 
the permission of the Health Officer.65
THE OUTBREAK OF CHICKENPOX OR "VARICELLA"
The smallpox epidemic was assisted in its course by a 
simultaneous outbreak of chickenpox. Though few cases were 
reported every year, "such an increase as has been 
experienced this year, has not...been known here for some 
time."66 Chickenpox was more a direct outcome of the war for 
just at the same time, the disease was "fairly common in the 
Cameroons" and was brought to Sierra Leone by a "large number 
of carriers (mostly Mendes) from Duala."67 The histories of
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infected persons showed that they had just arrived from the 
Cameroons before admission. Eight cases were reported from 
the farm of King George, a Mende ex-chief who had been
commissioned by the military authorities to recruit carriers 
for the Cameroon Expeditionary Force and to whom many went on 
their return.63 Although the epidemic attacked all groups in 
Freetown, the Mendes, who constituted the bulk of the Carrier 
Corps were the worst hit. A few cases were also imported
from the hinterland "where the natives do not look upon the
disease as serious."
The outbreak of chickenpox was sudden. Between January and 
February 1916 only one (one imported) case was admitted at 
the K.I.D.H. By March, 10 cases one of which was imported 
had been taken in. The imported case had lived at Malta Lane 
in the east end of Freetown and had arrived from the Railway 
district three days before admission. During April, 35 cases 
were admitted; five of these were imported ones and of the 
latter, one had arrived from the Cameroons shortly before 
admission; two came from Bui lorn and were discovered at 
Susan's Bay. One came from the Railway district and another 
from Bonthe.
The non-imported cases were admitted from all parts of
Freetown and included three from King George's farm.
During May, 31 cases were reported, five of which were 
imported. Of the latter, four came from the Cameroons and 
one from Wilberforce barracks. Further, three non-imported 
cases were reported from King George's farm and two from 
Ginger Hall, the residence of the Mende tribal authority in
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Freetown. During June, nine cases, all non-imported were 
brought to light, the last being reported on the 26th. As in 
the case of smallpox, the epidemic subsided with the onset of 
the rainy season in June69 when rainfall levels peaked to
149.21 inches - the greatest registered since 1909.70 It 
would appear that humid conditions helped to check the spread 
of the disease.
Of the 84 cases admitted to the K.I.D.H. the average age was
26.21 years and out of a total of 86 cases, only 17 were 
females, further underscoring the thesis of the tendency of 
diseases to spread among labourers. Occurring as it did 
simultaneously with the smallpox outbreak, chickenpox was 
treated as part of the latter, the normal processes of 
isolation, fumigation, vaccination and observation being 
adhered to. This precluded.any chance of infection resulting 
from an error in diagnosis.-71
During the first half of 1916, 37,879 vaccinations were
administered; 24,070 in Freetown and Hill Station; 1,840 in 
the Freetown Police District outside the former, 868 in the 
Colony proper and 11,101 in the Protectorate including the 
Protective Belt. 20,090 of these were reported as successful 
but the war was a serious hindrance in the management of the 
crisis.
At the beginning of the epidemic, supplies of lymph were 
received regularly from England through the Crown Agents. 
Later a maximum of 250 tubes sufficient for about 2,500 
vaccinations were received about once a fortnight. However
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interruptions in the mail service because of the war and the 
epidemic itself made delivery at times very difficult. The 
administration in French Guinea had to come to the rescue, 
supplying lymph made at Kindia near Conakry. 7,000 doses 
were received early in April and 8,000 later in the month. 
Subsequently the French administration was requested to 
supply 1,000 doses weekly and during July, August and 
September, (the rainy season) 500 doses were considered 
sufficient. Earlier supplies came in the form of gifts but 
the latter ones were paid for at the rate of 6 francs, 56 
centimes per 1,000 doses. Bacteriological examination of the 
French lymph carried out to avoid accidental contamination 
showed that it was an organism of non-pathogenic 
properties.7:2
There were problems of an even greater magnitude. The 
provisions of the Quarantine Ordinance could not be carried 
out sufficiently thoroughly to meet the objects for which 
they were intended. This was so because it was impossible to 
prevent movement in and out of the region and measures of 
compulsion forced many victims to conceal the disease. 
Furthermore, the medical staff was grossly insufficient for 
the purpose. Worse still there was no organisation for 
checking the pass system. Few of those available were able 
to read and the authorities feared that compulsion would lead 
to a great exodus of people thereby spreading the disease.
Administrative problems were also to impinge on efforts to 
enforce the Quarantine Ordinance. The first was the problem 
of dual control examined in Chapter 4. The other was the
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problem of divided control in the enforcement of the 
regulations. Apart from the military and naval authorities, 
the Harbour Master, the Comptroller of Customs and the 
Commissioner of Police were all more or less involved in the 
process. Each was head of an independent department and was 
in no way subordinate to the Sanitary authority. Their 
duties with regard to quarantine were additional to their 
normal duties. At one time during the epidemic, the 
Comptroller of Customs was also the Harbour Master; at
another time, the Harbour Master was an Assistant 
Commissioner of Police.
Conscious of these administrative drawbacks, the Junior 
Sanitary officer, Beringer, urged compulsory vaccination in 
the whole of the Colony and Protectorate, the appointment of 
an adequate staff of vaccinators to accomplish this aim, the 
presentation of periodic reports of outbreaks of smallpox by 
District Commissioners, the careful drawing up of revised 
quarantine regulations for dealing with future epidemics 
together with details of organisation and action and the 
purchase of portable spray disinfectors. Beringer also 
recommended the setting up of a central organisation for
dealing with quarantine free from dual control.*73
PROBLEMS IN COMBATING SMALLPOX IN THE PROTECTORATE
The problems encountered in eradicating smallpox in the 
Protectorate were not very different from those experienced 
in Freetown. Despite the vigorous measures taken to
vaccinate the population and in spite of the scheme for the
systematic isolation and disinfection of victims, the disease
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not only infected almost all the towns in the region of 
Karene, but also spread to other areas. Out of 6,880 
vaccinations administered in the district, 4,976 were
successful and 1,276 unsuccessful. The rest were not 
observed. The situation was not helped by officialdom's ad 
hoc approach to vaccination. Thus between 1909 and 1915 the 
number of successful vaccinations for the whole of Sierra 
Leone, averaged 6,724, in a total population of 1,402,149.74 
This was particularly serious considering the fact that 
during 1915 and 1916 there were temporary increases in the 
population of Freetown due to the return of large numbers of 
carriers from the Cameroons many of whom were allowed to 
reside in the capital before going back to the
Protectorate.75 The number of official vaccinations
performed other than under official direction was negligible 
and immunity was, for the most part, the result of earlier 
epidemics.
Apart from vaccination, inoculation was performed in certain 
districts but definite information was difficult to obtain 
and statements were for the most part contradictory. A 
District Commissioner argued that "...wherever a virulent 
outbreak of smallpox occurs, and natives are dying from it, 
they invariably commence to inoculate each other from arm to 
arm with smallpox... in outbreaks of non-malignant forms of 
smallpox inoculation is not practised." Furthermore,
vaccination interfered with farming cycles and bred hostile 
reactions. Although many chiefs isolated patients, their 
commitment was generally lukewarm and "in no single case was 
isolation properly carried out..."
199
It was clear that in the estimation of the chiefs/ commercial 
interests were to take precedence over any official policy 
which tended to interfere with the usual routine of their 
people. They resented government's decision to quarantine 
the whole of Dixing. If the government's intention in doing 
so was to close the road to French Guinea and prevent 
reinfection, the action also curtailed trade much to the 
chagrin of the chiefs.’76 Not even the grant of sanitation 
prizes in the form of ornamental swords and illuminated 
vellum certificates,77 succeeded in securing the much needed 
cooperation the government had hoped for.
The African response to official policy was varied. This 
ranged from the use of traditional medicine, 78 dependence on 
the African herbalist and his wide ranging pharmacopoeia, 
intercessions to gods through priests, the resort to Islam79 
and a much more overt hostility to Western medicine and 
vaccination.80 The last two responses are more pertinent for 
appreciating the problems faced by officialdom. The 
increasing recourse to Islam as an attempt to explain the 
origin of disease has already been examined.81
Hostility to Western medicine and vaccination in the 
Protectorate normally took the form of desertions and 
concealment. At Kwaia where smallpox persisted till August 
1916, victims were removed "from one town to another..." 
Karamoko Beneh argued that the people were afraid due to 
rumours that some of those vaccinated at Songo had died of 
the vaccine ulcers. They also feared that vaccination would 
introduce smallpox into any town not previously infected,
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apart from the fact that it interfered with their farm work.
The success of vaccination mainly depended on the consent of 
the Paramount Chief, who resided at Gbagbai. Here, the 
medical dispenser was delayed for six days after June 18 
"doing nothing" whilst the people all fled to their farms.32 
The chief's men argued that dispenser Scott was attempting 
"to combine land piracy with vaccination" and that whilst 
they were favourably disposed to the latter they deeply 
resented compulsory methods.33 This case was coloured by 
great controversy. Whilst the P.M.O. found D.C. Stanley's 
report "alarmist," the Colonial Secretary argued that Scott 
had "displayed a considerable want of tact and consideration 
towards those to whom it was to his interest to conciliate 
and persuade."34
In Kholifa and Yonni chiefdoms, knowledge of the persistence 
of smallpox in October came at a time when the chief was 
planning a meeting at Matamp Wallien.85 But the reaction of 
the people of Yonibana was not materially different from 
those at Kwaia. Those at Rotching "especially said they 
would not be vaccinated" and the only positive results were 
achieved at Mayosso, under Paramount Chief Bai Yosso whose 
town was suffering from the epidemic and "I think strong 
action is very necessary to bring the people to their senses 
as they are at present in an unruly and defiant state."83 The 
persistent subjection of medical officers to "derision and 
obloquy" was to lead the P.M.O. to suggest that the entire 
Colony and Protectorate be brought under compulsory 
vaccination.8-7 But there was a further problem to be
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contended with.
By the time of the outbreak, the West African Medical staff 
was badly depleted.ss No medical officer had been stationed 
in Karene since 6th May 1915s9 and the resultant dearth of 
medical personnel hindered attempts to prepare even a single 
hut for fumigation. This usually involved between 12 and 20 
men and lasted for about three hours but it was "never done 
properly unless under the supervision of a dispenser or a 
medical officer." Even when the latter were involved, 
"scarcely enough pressure of sulphur fumes is obtained owing 
to gradual leakage through the grass thatch...90
THE IMPACT
The outbreak of smallpox in 1915-16 was to have a 
differential impact on nearly every aspect of life in Sierra 
Leone. From the standpoint of health and sanitary reforms 
which followed in its wake, the disease was really a blessing 
in disguise. The outbreak forced the government to pay 
serious attention to the question of fumigating ships as well 
as the need for enforcing proper quarantine measures. It was 
the occasion for passing wide-ranging regulations. 
Thereafter, masters of ships were required to anchor at not 
less than 440 yards from the shore. All passengers and 
members of the crew signing on at Freetown were to be 
examined by a medical officer and were required to produce a 
medical certificate showing that they were free from any sign 
of smallpox, a medical certificate of recent vaccination or 
exemption from vaccination and a certificate showing that 
their baggages had been fumigated prior to embarkation.
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Furthermore, a medical officer was to examine all labourers 
engaged to coal or handle cargo. Labourers without the 
necessary certificates stipulated above, were not to be given 
permission to leave the shore. All persons intending to do 
business on board were to be examined by a medical officer 
and were required to provide the necessary certificates 
against smallpox. The Governor took discretionary powers for 
providing "sanitary stations or buildings for labourers or 
other persons... required in or about ships and for carrying 
goods from infected areas." He was also empowered to order 
the isolation of such persons in such stations or buildings. 
These regulations were to apply to Freetown and were to 
commence on 22nd May 1916.91
By the second quarter of 1916, several improvements had been 
effected. A new, efficient and rapid means for disinfecting 
huts and houses was introduced. The Colony and Protectorate 
staff of vaccinators was greatly increased, specially 
selected Africans being trained and appointed Assistant 
Public Vaccinators among their own people in the 
Protectorate. All District Commissioners were also appointed 
Assistant Public Vaccinators and were to deputise for the 
Medical Officer whenever the latter was absent. The aim was 
to suppress the disease before "it should assume epidemic 
proportions." It should however be noted that the K.I.D.H., 
established at Kissy, a very long distance from Freetown, was 
"in such an unsatisfactory state, the buildings being old, 
dilapidated and quite unsuited for infectious cases that it 
is hardly worthy of the name it bears."92 The subsequent 
instructions by the Army Council to Commandants of prisoners
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of war that all effects and articles of clothing of those who 
died from infectious diseases during internment were to be 
disinfected before being despatched to the Information 
Bureau, were apparently a function of these latter drawbacks 
at the Kissy hospital.93
One notable outcome of the outbreak was the intensification 
of research into diseases in Sierra Leone, such as malaria,94 
dysentery and insect-borne diseases.95 In Freetown for 
instance the increase in Benign Tertian Malarial Fever was to 
mark the beginnings of "serious attempts at Peninsula village 
sanitation" this after many parasites had been subjected to 
microscopical examination in the clinical laboratory in 
Freetown.96
Apart from these reforms, smallpox exercised a negative 
impact in other spheres of life. That the disease followed 
the trade routes underscores the fact that there was a great 
movement of people in war time. The threat to whole villages 
was therefore great. To the east of Karene there were 107 
cases resulting in five deaths and only 10 non-immune persons 
were left in one village. In a town west of Karene in Susu- 
Limba chiefdom, there were over 200 cases; between August 
1915 and April 1916, 25 towns and villages in the
Kunso-Myata-Musumba area were infected. In Susu-Limba 
country, smallpox curtailed farming activity "so that a local 
famine prevailed."
From a demographic standpoint, only 1,351 cases were known to 
Dr. Wood and his team. This clearly did not reflect the true
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picture and probably "...not more than a third either of 
cases or of deaths were discovered by the authorities."97 
The fact that the population of Freetown had declined from 
34,090 in 1911 to 31,4169S would indicate that the mortality 
rate resulting from smallpox was definitely higher than that 
known to the authorities.
Apart from threatening maritime trade at the port at 
Freetown, the enforcement of the Quarantine Ordinance meant 
considerable expansion of the role of sanitary officials. 
The military was also affected for at a time when the 
authorities were experiencing difficulties in securing 
carriers to replace the casualties in the Cameroons 
recruitment could not be carried out in Karene due to the 
epidemic. The same reason99 precluded a company of the 
W.A.F.F. being sent to the district in April 1916 after 
demobilisation.100 Added to these difficulties, the
expenditure entailed in containing the disease worsened the 
financial position and led to cuts in budgetary allocations 
for public works. In November 1916, Wilkinson declared that 
"The continuance of the smallpox epidemic with its attendant 
expenditure... and the uncertainty as to the Colony's 
financial position in 1917 have led me to curtail... 
expenditure on railway expansion."101
In Sierra Leone, the epidemic gave added impetus to a process 
of Islamic revival that had begun even before the outbreak of 
war. At Falaba, just north of Karene, "Mohammedanism was 
making progress in all the Yalunka chiefdoms...whenever one 
goes about these parts...there are almost always some 
followers of the prophet..."102 In 1916103 a District
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Commissioner observed, that "Nowhere in this Protectorate has 
missionary enterprise come into such close competition with 
the spread of Mohammedanism. A very large proportion of the 
Gallinas tribes are already Mohammedans...1' In a context in 
which western medicine failed to combat smallpox and against 
the background of the failures of the "powers of medicine men 
and the efficacy of charms to avert evil,"104 the Muslim 
prophet Alhaji Omaru entered the stage with a distinct 
millenarian message and hope for salvation. Aware of the 
socio-economic privations caused by war, he called for the 
sacrifice of "10 white kolas and 10 pieces of bread; for the 
people "to kill a fowl" and "cook rice and divide the food
into three parts for three basins and give it to others."
Muslims were also to write a prayer which was to be made into 
a potion and drunk.105
Omaru apparently saw the epidemic as a punishment for the 
material pursuits of a society that was also obsessed with 
"women and pleasure." Islamic evangelism in this period of
stress was prosecuted throughout the Protectorate, first by
the Walihu and then by the "open sedition" of Seku Darami.105 
Islamic revival posed a threat to Protestants and other 
Christian confessions in Sierra Leone. Bishop Johnson was to 
attribute the failure of the Sierra Leone Church Missions 
among "the natives upcountry" to the "diabolical charms of 
the Mohammedan Alfa or the grovelling fetish of the medicine 
monger..."107 At Moyamba, Father Flottat complained that the 
advent of the Walihu was marked by deep "unrest. He 
endeavours by all means in his power to make converts to his 
religion...and I do my best for my own belief..."108
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Chapter 6: THE INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC
Background to the outbreak
When the "Spanish" influenza eventually reached Sierra Leone 
in August 1918, many in their bewilderment saw it as a divine 
"test"1 intended to show that "Sierra Leoneans have for some 
time been getting out of hand and...greatly needed a reminder 
that they are temple children." The paralysis of church work 
at Ebenezer Circuit, the feverish resort to prayers and open- 
air services by the Christian Conductors' Union, with 
"churches empty of worshippers,"2 coupled with the
devastating spread of the disease and its unprecedented death 
toll, convinced many that "the visitation is a stranger in 
our history and in our land."3 By September, local 
interpretations of the crisis had become deeply reminiscent 
of the increasing disobedience of the Israelites in the 
wilderness of Sin. It was therefore urged that the epidemic 
be called "Man hu,"4 (an obvious corruption of "manna") 
meaning "what is it?"5 after the Israelites1 interpretation 
of the rounded objects like coriander seeds sent to them as 
food from heaven.
The considerable efforts made by officialdom to improve 
health conditions and sanitation in Sierra Leone after 1916 
had done little to cushion the dependency against diseases 
introduced by sea-borne traffic.6 In August 1918, the H.M.S. 
"Mantua" sailed into Freetown harbour from Plymouth, its crew 
badly infected with influenza. Within three weeks, the
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disease spread with devastating consequences'7 far surpassing 
those of the smallpox epidemic.
The Influenza pandemic of 1918 has only recently begun to 
attract scholarly attention;® but the available literature is 
still patchy and skewed towards Southern Africa. Although 
influenza constituted "the most lethal outbreak of disease in 
World history," and though the mortality rate resulting from 
the disease alone rose to a total of one million in Africa,9 
the history of its impact on the continent has not received 
the attention it deserves.10 This chapter examines the impact 
of influenza on Sierra Leone between August and November 
1918. It is here posited that apart from insanitary 
conditions, the vulnerable position of the port of Freetown, 
food shortages and malnutrition in war time, made the 
population very susceptible to the ravages of the pandemic. 
Moreover, the suddenness of the outbreak, the rapidity of its 
spread, the diversity of the types and symptoms manifested by 
the disease, thwarted both official and local efforts to 
contain the crisis. So traumatic was the impact that the 
1918 pandemic is still spoken of with awe by those who 
experienced it.
Up to August 1918 (according to Dr. Tweedy) it was impossible 
to find "a really healthy person in Sierra Leone." Tweedy 
argued that diseases like dysentery were clearly the result 
of poor diet and the precarious "means of livelihood" in the 
community. Although £44,337 of the total revenue of £550,000 
was allocated to the medical and sanitary departments, 
hospitals were still "few, small and poor" in the Colony.11
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In the Protectorate where 95 per cent of the population 
lived, it was an "exaggeration to say that one per cent are
benefited in any way by government medical and sanitary
work..."
The existing system of dual control continued to exercise a 
baneful influence on sanitary developments and "prejudices in 
matters of health relating to the European and the native" 
did little to ameliorate the situation.12 The Weekly News 
was deeply critical of a system which refused "native 
applicants" admission at the Colonial Hospital, and continued 
to exclude "African medicos" from the W.A.M.S. in the 
"present war emergencies."13 In the face of economic
backwardness and dwindling trade returns, Wilkinson
attributed "the main cause of ill health" to "distress" among 
the population.14 It was therefore "an exception to find.a 
person...free from some pathogenic parasites whether it be of 
skin, tissues, blood or intestines."15
Serious technical problems stood in the way of reform. Apart 
from the Quarantine and Public Health Protectorate 
Ordinances, the health laws of the Colony were badly 
"scattered" "complicated" and "unsuitable for application." 
Assisted by two European inspectors and 18 African officers, 
the Medical Officer of Health for Freetown was responsible 
for sanitary work, scavenging and conservancy in Freetown 
with a population of 34,000 and about 7,000 huts and houses. 
Hindered by lack of expertise and staff shortages, and 
encumbered by "varied duties," sanitary inspectors could only 
visit each hut or house once in five weeks thus allowing
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ample time for anything of an insanitary nature to take place 
in the interim. The amount of sanitary work done in 1916 was 
therefore inadequate and the smallpox epidemic helped to 
reduce the frequency of visitations and the oiling of wells 
and cesspits to reduce stegomyia.16 Extensive quarantine 
measures had been passed in 1916 but by 1917, the authorities 
found it impossible to undertake medical examination of all 
ships calling at the harbour17 and the lack of fumigating 
machinery was to lead to the prevalence of malaria on board 
vessels calling at Freetown.18 The situation was all the 
more serious as Freetown was a "routing and convoy" port 
during the war.19
The period preceding the outbreak of influenza was 
characterised by much controversy between medical authorities 
in Sierra Leone over what could be called the "malaria 
question." By early 1918, the results of an inquiry 
conducted at Liverpool and Glasgow showed that the two main 
sources of malaria on the West Coast of Africa were Freetown 
and Dakar. Accordingly, staff Surgeon E.J. Steegmann was 
detailed to Freetown to ascertain how effectively the powers 
of the naval, military and civil authorities could be 
coordinated in a bid to prevent the infection of ships.20 
Although the Senior Sanitary Officer in Sierra Leone doubted 
the findings of the inquiry,21 the malaria question clearly 
pointed to the insanitary condition of Freetown as was shown 
by the Steegmann report. Though nothing could have been done 
in the circumstances, it is worth noting that (as Steegmann 
argued) the major problems then revolved around the 
prevalence of mosquitoes, artificial breeding places,
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defective drains and swampy grounds.
In addition to malaria, 700 wells promoted dysentery and 
intestinal diseases. Furthermore, the canalisation work 
recommended by Sir Ronald Ross had been "allowed to fall into 
decay." In most places, the ground was "rough...uneven and 
eminently suitable for the collection of puddles and 
pools..."22 The situation was not helped by the strained 
relations between the Governor, his medical staff and
sanitary officers. Although Steegmann recommended that the 
problem be treated as a "war emergency,"23 staff shortages 
and lack of funds made it necessary to defer action until 
after the war;24 the general clamour by medical authorities 
for better sanitation therefore came into conflict with the 
Governor's call for economy and "modest beginnings."25
The consequences of inaction were clearly disastrous, for the 
vulnerable position of the Freetown harbour and increased 
shipping activity in 1918 were to make the spread of
influenza inevitable. Possessing the only natural harbour in 
West Africa, Freetown came to assume increased importance in 
World War I as a naval station26 attracting ships not only 
from Britain, but from South Africa, South America, French 
possessions and Gibralter.27 By June 1915, the demands of
trade had led to considerable progress being made on the new
export wharf. By November the new jetty at the Freetown 
wharf had been completed, but financial constraints meant 
that work on the export wharf had to stop until after the 
war,28 Between 1915 and 1917, there was a considerable lull 
in shipping activity at the Freetown harbour due chiefly to
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the expulsion of German shipping,29 the withdrawal of over 
1,200 steam vessels from their normal employment by the
Admiralty in June 1915,30 the losses to British allied and
neutral shipping through enemy action in the first nine 
months of 191631 and the congestion of vessels at home ports 
especially at Liverpool.32
If up until 1917 the dislocation of shipping activity 
continued to paralyse industries, trade and traffic on the
West African coast,33 by 1918, the fortunes of mercantile
shipping as far as the Freetown harbour was concerned, were 
radically altered by many factors which inter alia 
facilitated the transmission of influenza. 1918 was a good 
year for shipping activity in terms of the number of vessels 
and tonnage which entered and left the port. This radical 
shift was chiefly a function of "the successful keeping of 
the seas, 1 the success of the allied navies in "maintaining a 
path through the perilous seas of 1918" and the efficiency of 
the convoy system especially at a time when the submarine 
menace from Germany was most threatening.34 Whilst in pre­
war days it was an exception to have two or three ships in 
the harbour at any one time, in 1918 "as many as forty to 
fifty have been counted together."35 By 1918 also, the port 
was serving as a connecting link in the great shipping convoy 
system.36 So busy was the port during 1918, that custom 
officers were taxed to their utmost in attempts to cope with 
the phenomenal increase in work required by the Merchant 
Shipping Act.37
The extent of the demographic impact and the widespread
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mortality rates caused by the pandemic could partially be 
explained by the severe food shortages and consequent 
undernourishment which preceded the outbreak and rendered the 
population particularly vulnerable to the virus. The problem 
of food and rice shortages did not suddenly rear its head in 
1916. Up to 1908, the Protectorate was "capable of producing 
sufficient rice for home consumption and a margin for 
export"38 but the terrible famine of 191039 was to force 
officialdom to turn its attention more seriously to 
agricultural matters. The acute shortage of rice and other 
articles of food in 1910 foreshadowed the shape of things to 
come on the eve of the outbreak of influenza. 1916 was 
marked by dire food shortages40 and this did not fail to 
attract the attention of a very hostile press.41 At a time 
when the scarcity of sugar was making itself felt,42 the 
movement of troops from Freetown via Mabanta to Wongkufu, 
after their return from active service, was to impinge 
significantly on the already depleted supplies of rice in the 
Protectorate.43
In August 1914, Governor Merewether had set up a Food 
Committee to deal with the local food supply. The committee 
had fixed minimum prices of the main articles of food and 
made it an offence by proclamation, to sell foodstuff above 
the regulated prices. By 1916 however, the lack of machets 
and inflated prices worsened the food situation considerably 
and forced the government to import larger quantities of rice 
flour and cabin bread biscuits to meet the needs of the 
population.44 Chiefly abuses in the Protectorate coupled 
with the compulsory purchases and requisitioning of rice by
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government officials were also to stifle government's efforts 
to deal with the situation.45
In Sherbro District, the sandy nature of the soil continued 
to prevent the cultivation of rice and forced the people on 
to an insufficient cassava crop.46 Until the harvesting of 
the new crop in late 1916, in Batkanu (Karene District) the 
food scarcity was the most serious since 1910;47 to the north 
east, in Koinadugu district, subsidiary crops such as sweet 
potatoes and cassava had to make up for the deficiency.48 On 
the whole, 1916 went down on record as "a year of partial 
famine when rice reached the extraordinary price of 25 pence 
for a Colonial bushel of 84 lbs.49 Conditions had improved by 
1917 but the threat of famine was accentuated by the 
destruction of the original rain forests of Sierra Leone and 
the desertion of vast acres of land after a few years 
farming. Many places lost their soil, the bare rock being 
exposed by erosion during the heavy rains when streamlets 
became rushing torrents.50 If the Food Committee succeeded in 
maintaining prices at a reasonable level, the generally high 
cost of living51 was still exerting severe strains on many 
families.52 It was in this context of shortage that Wilkinson 
advocated the teaching of Agricultural Education and the 
cultivation of more permanent crops, this at a time when the 
same questions were being considered in Nigeria.53
The general hardship caused by the war was to be clearly 
reflected in the war bonus controversy which erupted in 
1917.54 The controversy revolved around the different rates 
of additional payment to be made to European, West Indian and
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African employees in the Civil Service in order to help them 
cushion the strains of war. The situation was clearly an 
emergency for by 1917 "government offices, mercantile firms 
and other establishments," were pursuing a policy of 
retrenchment. Many able bodied persons therefore joined the 
ranks of the unemployed. Vigorous demands were therefore
made for war bonus by West Indian fitters in the Railway
Department to help maintain their families in Sierra Leone
and in the West Indies.55 By April 1918, African Civil 
servants who found it difficult "to meet the abnormally
increased cost of living...increased taxes and the necessary 
demands of our wives and families..." had joined the general 
clamour for war bonus.56
If on the eve of the outbreak of influenza, the cost of 
living was 75% more than in pre-war days"57 1918 itself was a 
particularly bad year for the rice crop.58 The persistent 
early rains which began in March prevented planters from 
clearing the mass of brush wood and timber which accumulated 
as a strong secondary growth and covered land best suited for 
cultivation.59 In Karene, conditions were so bleak that the
D.C. feared "a re-occurrence of the year 1910.1160 In August 
when influenza erupted, labourers engaged on first class road 
construction in Bonthe were caught up in a desperate effort 
to find their own food in the absence of free rations."61 
Very close to the outbreak of influenza therefore, widespread 
food shortages, "emaciation...suffering, and...distinct 
physical deterioration" with "very lean bellies,"62 were to 
ensure easy targets for the debilitating effects of the 
virus. The Weekly News perhaps best summed it up when it
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argued that the epidemic found "a large proportion of the 
poorer sections of our community ill-nourished on account of 
the hardness of the times."63
THE OUTBREAK
The occurrence of influenza in 1918 was not entirely new in 
the dependency. Medical reports before 1918 mentioned 
isolated cases in the Freetown hospital, 16 in the Freetown 
gaol, one at Moyamba, five at Bo and one at Daru.64 What made 
it so different in 1918 was the scale of the outbreak, the 
death toll which accompanied it and the diversity of the 
symptoms which baffled medical experts. At a time when the
sanitary affairs of war ships were completely outside
civilian control, the H.M.S. "Mantua" arrived in the harbour 
on 15th August 1918 with "cases of...'Spanish Influenza’ on 
board."65 In the evening two European doctors called on 
Wilkinson to apprise him of "the danger" and as the
seriousness of the risk was appreciated, the Governor secured 
assurances that no communication was being allowed between 
the "Mantua" and the shore. But between the 15th and the 
16th, the ship was coaled by local labourers ("without my 
cognisance or that of my sanitary authourities.") Although 
the Senior Sanitary Officer had advised that the labourers be 
landed afterwards at the quarantine station, the naval
authorities did not observe this precaution and the men mixed 
freely with others on their return to the premises of the 
coaling company.
The Mantua lay in the harbour for eleven days, its infected 
character "known to all." Just before her departure on the
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25th August, an orderly of the Royal Army Medical Corps was 
landed in Freetown and this elicited serious protests from 
the junior medical officers. It required the intervention of 
the Governor to return the man to the ship, but the damage 
had been done; very soon the disease broke out among the 
Royal Army Medical Corps and added to the spread already 
begun by the labourers of the Mabella Coaling station.66
During the week ending 24 August, the prevalence of catarrhal 
conditions of the nose and throat was noted by medical 
authorities, but this was not sufficient enough "to excite 
comment." Post-mortem examinations conducted on two 
labourers of the Coaling Company between 23rd and 26th August 
showed in one case that 24 hours before admission the patient 
had gone to bed with "fever and cough" and that he had become 
delirious about 12 hours afterwards. The autopsy revealed 
broncho-pneumonia involving both lungs and this was noted as 
being quite unusual in an adult; in the second case, the 
heart showed evidence of pericarditis. On Monday 26th 
August, many people flocked to the Colonial Hospital and 
Cline Town dispensary seeking treatment for "sore throat, 
headache and pains in the chest"67 and this provided the 
first inkling of "a new disease...among the community..."68
By 27th August, all out-patients departments were massively 
crowded as Drs. Wood and Wright contended with 
"symptoms...new to them." Many Syrians complained of "sudden 
illness" and an examination of a European Assistant of one of 
the firms showed that both lungs were "nearly solid, his 
tongue furred" and his "pulse rapid." Seven other cases
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among the Syrians and one African showed "subsequently that 
the disease was...influenza."69
The week ending 31st August was certainly the most critical 
phase. Influenza spread with "remarkable rapidity" and was 
in most cases marked by complications of the heart and lungs. 
Matters were aggravated by a serious depletion of the medical 
staff as five government doctors were attacked. Conditions 
had not improved the following week and death returns showed 
"a very perceptible increase." During this week, the disease 
reached its peak; the death toll rose from 28 and 34, 
registered at the Colonial Hospital between 1st and 2nd 
September, to 74 and 72, as registered on the 6th and 8th. 
During the week beginning 8th September, the death toll had 
subsided and by the 11th it had fallen to 40 a day at the 
Colonial Hospital. The doctors were soon able to resume 
work. The Coaling Company managed to procure the full 
complement of labourers required and many trading firms also 
resumed business.70 Shops were also partially opened to allow 
people to buy provisions. "The dismal aspects of the streets 
did not return...1171 and by Tuesday 18 th September, the 
number of registered deaths had diminished to 17.72
Widely attributed by the press to the "fatuous 
contest... among nations," influenza appeared to have followed 
a well defined course in Freetown. In the west end along 
Pademba Road and Grassfields, there was relative immunity to 
the disease but from the Government wharf on to Kissy Road, 
Fourah Bay Road and Fula Town, many succumbed to the attack. 
The fact that by 31st August, mortality rates resulting from
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the disease had not been publicly announced, created a false 
impression that the doctors had it "well in hand."73 By 
August, the disease had spread to the Protectorate. It was 
introduced in Karene by boat and canoe men from Freetown and 
by many Limbas fleeing the capital. At Port Loko, influenza 
found a ready ally in congestion - between 10 and 40 people 
living in one house;74 it continued well into November75 
claiming many victims.76
An examination of the most common symptoms of the different 
clinical types of influenza is instructive in order to 
understand why the disease was so debilitating. A rise in 
temperature, aches and pains were the initial symptoms, with 
the tongue furred and whitish green. Doctors found 
tonsillitis and pharyngitis in practically every case and in 
the fatal ones, the throat assumed a "dark reddish blue 
colour," became very dry, congested and extremely foetid, 
causing difficulties in breathing. Gastric disturbance was 
also common and was marked in the less fatal cases, by a 
disinclination to food.
In the more severe cases, there was bilious vomiting, 
constipation and pleurisy. The most fatal were the cardiac 
symptoms. The heart "sounds were booming" and post-mortem 
examinations showed myocarditis.77 Nervous manifestations 
were marked by fear and anxiety; sleeplessness was very 
frequent and twitching of the upper lip was especially 
evident if the patient attempted to speak. The period of 
convalescence was usually accompanied by great weakness, 
depression, giddiness and breathlessness due to the weakening
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of the heart muscles. Apart from broncho-pneumonia a few 
cases of meningitis, parotitis, middle ear infections and 
paralysis of the soft palate, complicated many cases.78 So 
widespread were these symptoms that "almost every other 
person one comes across had some personal or relative 
experience" to relate.79
The origin of influenza in Sierra Leone was to cause much 
controversy in official circles. In 1916, Captain
C.F.Harfood of the Royal Army Medical Corps had, in a very 
illuminating paper, isolated influenza as one of the major 
and "inevitable accompaniments of war," likely to pose a 
threat to the colonies,80 but very little could have been 
done to forestall an outbreak. Though the source of the 
Sierra Leone outbreak was not readily known, influenza, by 
August, had become a worldwide phenomenon. Since its 
occurrence in Freetown, it appeared in the Gambia, on the 
Gold Coast, in French Guinea and in Senegal, though in the 
Far Eastern Colonies, the accompanying disaster did not 
approximate that in Sierra Leone.81
To determine precisely when influenza was first introduced in 
Sierra Leone in 1918, is impossible as influenza of a very 
mild type was observed in Freetown and the neighbourhood "for 
some weeks before it manifested itself in a general 
outburst." But there was no doubt that influenza was 
"introduced into this Colony by vessels arriving from the 
United Kingdom or other infected ports."82 With the 
successful elimination of German shipping,83 Britain, by 1918 
had come to dominate shipping activity in terms of the number
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of sailing and steam ships which called at and cleared from 
the port,84 and in terms of the number of vessels with cargo 
and those in ballast.85
Out of 410 vessels which called at Freetown, in 1918, 341
were British. In fact, shipping returns show that by 1918, 
French and Belgian ships were no longer regular callers at 
the port.86 A serious problem surrounding the outbreak of 
influenza in Sierra Leone in 1918, was that the information 
then at the disposal of medical authorities regarding the 
global outbreak was scanty. Mr Read at the Colonial Office 
however did know of its spread "on the Gold Coast, in 
Nigeria, German East Africa, Nyassaland and Gambia."87 
Because influenza was not notifiable under the Quarantine 
Ordinance it was possible, argued Dr. Allan, that a ship may 
have arrived with the disease on board, only that it was not 
grave enough to have attracted the attention of the medical 
authorities. What could not be contested is that on board 
the "Mantua", influenza had assumed such epidemic proportions 
that precautions were needed to prevent it from getting 
ashore."8S
The flood of reports in the wake of the epidemic, and the 
apparent inconsistencies regarding dates, led the Colonial 
Office to suspect that certain officials were culpable for 
not having taken prompt action to contain the disease at the 
initial stages. Mr. Calder found the Governor particularly 
reprehensible for not having taken the initiative - "the 
inertia shown is a lamentable result of the Governor's 
boycott of his own medical staff" - and therefore requested
228
from him "precise information" regarding "the outbreak, 
spread and decline of the epidemic."
It was obvious that a purely medical problem had assumed a 
clearly administrative dimension and the questions to be 
answered then were -whether the "Mantua" was simply one of a 
convoy, her port of departure and when she sailed from there, 
what ports she called at before reaching Freetown, when the 
disease broke out on board the ship or other ships, the 
number of cases of influenza on board; the nature of her 
cargo, the other ships in the convoy if any, and whether 
influenza existed at its port of departure, or at any port 
where she called, or at the port of departure of any ship in 
her convoy or at any ports where such ships called.89 
Wilkinson was also to be interviewed at the Advisory Sanitary 
and Medical Committee for Tropical Africa.90 Although the 
Rear Admiral of H.M.S. Africa argued that influenza could 
have been introduced from diverse sources other than the 
Mantua91 and though it was suspected that the Cluny Castle 
and the Malta may have been responsible,92 the available 
evidence pointed to the Mantua as the source of infection for 
when it sailed from Plymouth and a case developed immediately 
after sailing, the disease was raging at that port.93
MANAGEMENT OF THE OUTBREAK
The suddenness of the outbreak, the failure to determine the 
origins of the disease and the rapidity of its spread, forced 
a collaboration between government and tribal authorities in 
a desperate bid to contain the epidemic. Initial measures 
included gargling of the throat, washing of the mouth,
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treatment of the expectoration and washing the nose with some 
mild antiseptic. Two dispensaries, for preventive and 
curative treatment were opened at Kissy Road and Campbell 
Street respectively. Handbills stating precautionary
measures were distributed throughout the town and similar 
notices were placed in the press and the Gazette.
The supply of throat gargle and disinfectant intensified 
applications for prophylactic medicines which became 
extremely popular. As in the case of smallpox, sanitary 
inspectors and disinfecting gangs visited the most insanitary 
and congested houses. These were clearly stop-gap measures 
designed to contain an apparently uncontrollable crisis that 
was bound to run its course. Unable to cope with the large 
numbers seeking admission at the Colonial Hospital, the 
government opened an auxiliary hospital at the Government 
Model School,94 where volunteers distributed food and 
medicines to the patients.95
In the early stages, a good purge was administered; quinine 
was used to combat the malaria parasites, aspirin for the 
aches and pains and a hypodermic injection of morphia for 
broncho-pneumonia. On the whole, there was much trial and 
error. While "Veronal" and "Trional" proved unreliable, 
cough mixtures and tonics helped in ameliorating the 
symptoms.96 Experiments in the prisons showed that cases 
detected much earlier responded to treatment better than "the 
ordinary native...left to his own devices..."9V By January 
1919, a bonus of "three weeks extra pay" had been awarded to 
African officers (£25 to nursing sisters) who showed
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"devotion to duty" during the height of the epidemic.98
Completely baffled by this "strange visitor, 1,99 the 
population turned to a wide range of local remedies and 
socio-cultural practices that in some instances represented a 
cross between traditional and western medicine. Many 
suggested the burning of tar as a disinfectant.100 One Justin 
Paul urged the government to fumigate the town by burning 
sulphur in incinerators. He had experimented widely with 
local herbs, drinking a concoction of "tea bush, " bush tea, 
lime leaves and "doni" or "oree" (an oily substance used as 
medication for pains and cold) which he recommended to the 
public. He also suggested various physical exercises to
contain the impact of the disease.101 Abdul Aziz was to
endorse the use of tea bush ("occimum viride") as a laxative
and antiseptic and for clearing the mucous coats of the 
throat. Aziz recommended good nourishing diets such as eggs, 
"cowfoot soup" chicken broth and "a whiff of brandy or good 
rum." During convalescence, he argued that the best "native 
tonic" was "gbangba root" (which contained strychnine) boiled 
with spice, finger root and "egbesi", ("morinda crititollia) 
known to contain quinine.102 So popular was traditional 
medicine that many came to believe that the victims were 
those who had stuck to western medicine.103 "Homely brews" 
like "ojuologbo" were therefore taken with a "religious 
fervour."104
The resort to local herbs and medicine by the public was to 
reflect the problems encountered by government to contain the 
disease; it was also intended to serve as a serious
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indictment of what the press described (albeit unjustifiably) 
as "a lack of skilled nursing and unfamiliarity with the 
peculiarities of the disease...;'1105 "the doctors are at
present flabbergasted."106 Influenza had started so slightly 
that it was treated as an ordinary cold;107 the naval 
funerals - there were three on one day-with the ceremonials 
attending them, should alone have sufficed to warn the
general public of the danger but no heed was taken and 
Wilkinson's two medical informants were ridiculed as
"alarmists. I myself heard the opinions of senior men quoted 
against theirs." In fact, a signal was sent to the military 
authorities about the imminent landing of an officer of the
R.A.M.C. but both the Officer Commanding The Troops and the
Senior Medical Officer were absent. Dr Allan, Acting Senior 
Sanitary Officer learned of the outbreak "for the first time" 
through the Governor's private secretary. Though Wilkinson 
could impute no wrong doing to the civil-sanitary authorities 
for the way in which the Mantua was coaled, he agreed that 
the precautions taken to protect the labourers were wholly 
inadequate.108
Many patients were to die for want of care and attention 
either because all of the inmates of a house were sick or 
because they were deserted by the other residents. In some 
cases, patients were actually turned out by the other 
occupants. There were further problems in getting many
victims to move to the Model School Hospital and when this
was eventually achieved, the hospital became badly congested;
some called there voluntarily, others were taken there by 
their friends and some were picked up in the streets in a
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"moribund condition."109 Later, some absconded and others 
were removed by their friends.110
Furthermore, doctors found it difficult to discover traces of 
the virus in more than 60 blood films examined in the early 
stages and the use of quinine was of little value in "spiky" 
influenzal temperature cases; in others, it proved very 
depressing.111 The situation was compounded by a
simultaneous outbreak of measles in the Central ward and 
smallpox in the East ward of Freetown.112 At the same time, 
Kunso in Bombali was found to be an endemic centre of yellow 
fever.113 Staff shortages added to the problem. With nearly 
all the doctors down with the "flu", Dr. Allan was the only 
officer available by 7th September to meet the heavy demands 
from every section of the community and during the previous 
"black and dreadful week", the mayor had to make arrangements 
for the burial of the "abnormal deaths" by volunteer grave 
diggers.114
At Hastings, matters were complicated by the premature 
removal of the resident dispenser, 12 months before the 
outbreak.115 Dr. Jenner Wright, an African doctor opined that 
during the epidemic, the Director of Medical Services shut 
himself up in the lighthouse and left the care of Freetown to 
him.116 On the whole it was the diversity of the clinical 
types and symptoms which compounded both official and local 
efforts to contain the outbreak. In some cases, influenza 
was diagnosed as "coryza", "toxaemia" and yellow fever;117 to 
the public, the symptoms "lean more in the direction of 
smallpox."11S
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THE IMPACT
As doctors battled in the hospitals with what had become a 
nationwide emergency, influenza struck with devastating 
results dislocating business in both the mercantile and 
official sectors,119 and halting the train service which was 
only resumed on 16th September.120 Because of government's 
orders to close all schools temporarily, the distribution of 
reports at the Annie Walsh Memorial School had to be 
cancelled; so were lectures on electricity at Fourah Bay 
College, "till more favourable health conditions 
return...11121 At the Methodist Boys' High School where the 
Rev. A.W. Moulton died from the disease, practically every 
boarder (except two) was bedridden.122 Generally, the 
disease aggravated an already worsening food situation and as 
the "very limited resources" of individual families were 
stretched to their utmost in providing medical comforts for 
their sick,123 employees like 4th grade clerk M.P.A. Nicolls 
were forced to request advances of salaries to cushion the 
burden "entailed by the ravages of the ...epidemic."124
As the "shadow of death" hung over Freetown, influenza 
generated a feverish urban-rural migration often with 
disastrous consequences. In early September, 40 Lokos bound 
for Port Loko were drowned in the process at Fintleh 
Point.125 On the whole, August to September 1918 was a 
rather gloomy period in Sierra Leone when even the atmosphere 
was "draped in sadness" and the streets "barren of 
pedestrians."126
In many ways, influenza was a major test of Sierra Leone's
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social, cultural, economic and political institutions in the 
circumstances of 1918. This was the "worst pandemic in the 
history of man on earth"127 claiming some six million lives 
world wide,12® and a run through its demographic impact in 
Sierra Leone is instructive. The disease was to cause a 
death toll unparalleled in the recorded history of the 
country; so pervasive was its accompanying "dry hacking 
cough", colds, rheumatism and related ills,129 that the 
Nursing Home "was full to overflowing,"130 and as patients 
were admitted in all stages of influenza or pneumonia, the 
death toll was very high.131 Within three weeks of the 
outbreak, 790 deaths were reported in the city alone;132 
within a week only - between 30th August and 5th September - 
223 deaths were registered. To these figures must be added 
the vast numbers who were ill in bed and totally 
incapacitated for business of any kind..."133
September was regarded as the "Black Month" in the history of 
Sierra Leone when undertakers had the busiest time on record. 
No measurement was taken of corpses "as in normal times" and 
very few mourners accompanied their dead to the grave. 
"Never was there a time in the history of this country when 
trenches were dug to bury its dead... about twenty and thirty 
coffins placed in the grave yard together for days without 
graves to put them in." No less than six trenches were dug at 
Ascension Town to bury paupers. In a bid to avoid a 
government "who with red tape will make matters worse by 
useless correspondence..." volunteer grave diggers like the 
Rev. F.H. Johnson, ensured the burial of abandoned
corpses.134
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By October, Wilkinson put the death toll at 1,000 in Freetown 
alone; many traders died and there was a heavy mortality on 
the ships in the harbour. On the flagship herself there were 
over 50 deaths. Approximately 70% of the population in 
Freetown was affected and "deaths are known to be very 
numerous" in the Protectorate also.135 Although both sexes 
were affected, of a total of 815 registered deaths at the 
Colonial Hospital, 472 were males and 343 females. The death 
toll was particularly high among persons from 15 to 35 
years.136 As more bizarre tales of deaths swept through the 
city, Government House was flooded with requests for free 
coffins, for the removal of the duty on timber and a 
suspension of the burial duty paid to the City Council.137 It 
is doubtful whether the precarious state of the economy 
allowed government to honour these requests.
Every sphere of life was affected. In the prisons, 256 out 
of 290 prisoners suffered from broncho-pneumonia and three 
from cardiac failure;138 at the Colonial hospital, the death 
rate was put at 19.8% whilst at the Nursing Home, several of 
the 48 patients suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis.139 At 
Kossoh Town and Bambara Town, there were horrific tales of 
corpses "enshrined in potato leaves and vine."140 At Kissy 
where there was only one dispenser, the "flu" attacked both 
adults and young and climatic factors such as dampness 
coupled with the insanitary conditions at both the Male and 
Female Incurable Hospitals, aided the spread.141 In the 
Methodist circuits at Wellington, Hastings and York, 
influenza caused "much suffering and many deaths and added to 
the burdens we have had to bear."142
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In the Protectorate where there was little medical care, no 
district escaped the hazards of the epidemic. At Kambia in 
Karene District, the graves of Tonko-Limba corpses stretched 
along a distance of a quarter mile.143 Influenza claimed 
many lives in the Railway District144 and paralysed the 
entire community at the Port of Sherbro with a mortality rate 
of 50.145 The installation of popular chiefs in, and the 
return of the Kategbe family to Northern Sherbro in 1917 had 
led to a massive influx of population in the district;146 in 
Ronietta,147 overcrowding resulted from attempts to evade the 
hut tax by joining the roofs of houses together. These 
conditions provided ready victims for influenza. The disease 
reached Koinadugu in September and claimed many lives 
especially in the southern and western parts of the 
district.148
The authorities found it difficult to determine, even 
approximately, the numbers affected by influenza. Though 
many sought treatment, some avoided the hospitals and 
dispensaries, whilst others migrated to the Protectorate. 
Attempts to determine the case incidence among certain groups 
proved futile and the Police force, then 180 strong with 130 
reporting sick, had to be used as an index of the impact and 
spread of the disease. The approach was based on the fact 
that the force was recruited from most groups in Freetown. 
This gave a case incidence of 73.2% and was used to reflect 
the percentage affected in Freetown generally. It meant that 
at least between 20,000 and 24,548 people were affected in 
Freetown out of a total population of 34,000. But there were 
problems in determining the numbers which died from
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influenza. Many corpses were buried without the usual 
certificates of registration and because the cemetery staff 
was affected by the "flu", not every burial was recorded. 
Many migrated to the Protectorate during the crisis and so 
made it difficult for the authorities to keep proper records.
Though the Registrar General's Office put the death toll at 
968 for the period 23rd August to 18th September,149 it was 
definitely far higher, for comparative figures show an 
increase of 1,506 deaths between 1917 and 1918 (1,895 for
1917 and 3,401 for 1918). That the toll was clearly higher 
is also supported by the fact that in the 1918 returns, no 
figures were entered for Koinadugu, Sherbro and Ronietta 
districts, and the port of Sulima. The enormity of the 
crisis could be appreciated from returns for Wilberforce 
where the average death rate between 1915 and 1917 was 60 (59 
in 1915, 62 in 1916 and 60 in 1917). In 1918, it was more
than doubled to 135.150 Influenza must have further depleted 
the already dwindling Krio population, a factor that by 1918 
was beginning to attract the attention of the authorities.151
When other variables such as famine and migration are taken 
into consideration, the demographic impact of influenza can 
easily be appreciated. Influenza must have shattered the 
natural resistance of many to other diseases for one month 
after it had subsided, D.C. Addison was attributing the high 
rate of infant mortality to the prevalence of venereal 
diseases.152 The disaster was best summed up by Knox-Hooke 
thus - "...No history of this land can tell of conflict
parallel to this... Tumultuous were the average deaths, when
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more than fifty souls a day collapsed..."153
It was this disastrous sweep of influenza that was to 
exercise a baneful influence on the supply of labour. In the 
week following the coaling of the "Mantua", 500 out of 600 
labourers were absent from work at the Coaling station; at 
Government House all 20 servants were incapacitated and the 
Governor himself had to do their work.154 Apart from 
disrupting work at the port, all trading firms and public 
offices were compelled to close down. "Labour became almost 
unobtainable... because of the number stricken with
sickness."155 Because contractors failed to send food, 
prisoners had to carry their own food and the magnitude of 
the death toll led to prison gangs being deployed as grave 
diggers.156
Influenza sapped the vitality of the Police force and Customs 
staff; at the Colonial Hospital, half the medical staff and 
nearly all labourers were badly affected. This made it
difficult to secure temporary help for the nurses.157 The 
dearth of labour meant that goods were abandoned in the
King's shed, unentered and uncleared and therefore became 
liable to higher rents.158 By September, the impact of
influenza made it impossible to get labourers for the 
construction, improvement and maintenance of roads in the 
Protectorate.159 The same was true of conditions in 
Headquarter District.160 At Bo, various short lengths of 
earthworks had been undertaken in 1918 on the Mandu-Kumrabai 
Road, but progress was seriously halted by the epidemic. By 
the end of 1918, there was only one mile to go before the Bo-
239
Pujehun Road was completed but "the chief impediment" was 
the "flu." There were therefore no permanent bridges on the 
road beyond Tikonko,161 and the proposal to convert the 
Kamabai-Kaballa Road through Falaba to the French frontier at 
Berea Futumbu, into a second class road was abandoned.162
The effects of labour shortages were to be felt in the 
agricultural sector. Throughout the country, the labour 
force generally employed in agriculture was immobilised as 
influenza combined with climatic hazards to deplete the rice 
crop, most of which "was in ear when the disease was at its 
worst." There were "very few fit persons to scare away birds 
which consequently took their tithe of the crop."163 
Ronietta164 and Karene165 districts were to suffer most in 
this respect. The disease was partly responsible for the 
drop in the export of palm kernels and palm oil. In fact, 
not a single gallon of oil left the country in September 
1918.166
PUBLIC REACTION AND IMPROVEMENTS IN SANITATION
So high was the death toll in Sierra Leone that it "stirred 
the native population very deeply and...led the Creole at 
least to indulge in a very abusive press campaign against the 
government and its alleged carelessness and indifference in 
matters affecting the health of the place."167 The Governor 
could not have summed up the situation better, for influenza 
was to provide an opportunity for petition writers and those 
imbued with nationalist thinking, to deplore what they 
perceived as the racist attitude of officialdom, and to 
emphasise the fact that "blacks and whites are all one."168
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The press embarked on a bitter condemnation of the Sanitary 
Department for concentrating only on "private dwellings" at a 
time when the nation had to contend with an unprecedented 
rate of "infant mortality...paralysis galore and pneumonia in 
excelsis. . .11169
As far as the public was concerned the disease exposed the 
inability of the W.A.M.S. to cope with an emergency; neither 
was the withdrawal from the local municipality of the 
responsibilities which it had hitherto shouldered seen to be 
justified by official handling of the epidemic.170 The press 
argued that Europeans themselves would have fared badly in 
the crisis in comparison with other groups, (out of 62 deaths 
in 1918, 46 died of non-climatic causes) but were saved by
"good quarters, proper attendance and an adequate supply of 
medical comforts..." not generally enjoyed by the "aboriginal 
natives."171
Educated Sierra Leoneans like Faduma were to join in the 
general condemnation of "tenement houses", the "sewerage 
system" and congestion.172 In September, government
attempted to exonerate itself from these charges, but the 
Colonial Secretary's criticisms of an alleged lack of help 
from the local community during the epidemic, merely 
exacerbated tensions between an already disgruntled Krio 
community and officialdom. The press countered that "the 
attempt to shift from the back of the Naval authorities the 
responsibility for the introduction" of influenza "and to 
place that responsibility nowhere is weak."173
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Whatever the measure of "carelessness" shown by officialdom 
in handling the crisis, influenza did alert sanitary 
officials to the need for greater improvements in sanitation. 
Prior to instructions issued by the Secretary of State 
regarding anti-malarial measures, Wilkinson had authorised 
the officers in charge of such measures "to divert to 
permanent work any sums that could be spared from direct 
mosquito destruction,"174 and by December 1918 five gangs had 
been employed to undertake bush cutting and to eliminate 
permanent breeding places for larvae. The possibility of 
extending the permanent drains was also considered because 
the rain worn channels on Tower Hill constituted an ideal 
home for mosquitoes, tins and bottles which were swept down 
into the nullahs and hidden in the rapidly growing grass.175 
By February 1919, Waterloo had been declared a sanitary area, 
a slaughter house selected, and a market provided to 
"prohibit the sale of fresh meat from disgustingly dirty 
shops..."176 It is doubtful whether such measures, had they 
occurred earlier, would have contained the outbreak.
The almost acrimonious debates surrounding the origins of 
influenza in Sierra Leone led the Secretary of State to 
insist on the "adoption of precautionary measures against its 
reintroduction ..."177 The first steps in this direction 
included the reading of the "Vaccination Ordinance" in the 
Legislative Council for the first time in October 1918.178 In 
May 1919, the Acting Senior Sanitary Officer emphasised the 
need to secure legal powers for drawing up regulations 
dealing with influenza and to add it to the list of diseases 
specified in the "Quarantine Regulations;" to declare as
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"infected places" all affected ports, to prevent the 
unauthorised landing of persons from infected ships and the 
unauthorised visiting of such ships by people from the shore. 
Anyone allowed to land was to be submitted to disinfection 
with a suitable disinfectant in a fumigating chamber. Farrar 
therefore urged the purchase of a portable steam sprayer for 
the purpose and were influenza to become prevalent again, 
leaflets, on the lines of those given in the Local 
Government's Board Memorandum, were to be distributed.179 It 
was however feared that stricter quarantine rules would 
prevent the coaling of ships in reasonable time.180
By 1920, influenza had been added to the Public Health 
Ordinance (No.15) of 1905 as an infectious disease,181 and in 
November 1920, additional powers were granted to the Health 
Officer to use his discretion to detain suspected persons for 
observation and to prevent boatmen and labourers from 
boarding infected ships. Any one guilty of "obstructing the 
execution of...these Regulations" was to be liable to a fine 
of not more than £50, or to imprisonment with hard labour for 
not more than six months.182 There were however major 
problems to overcome. Official rebuttal of public criticism 
of its handling of the epidemic and attempts to institute 
sanitary and health reforms were seriously hampered by the 
negative influence of influenza on the anti-malarial 
campaign. Malaria returns for 1918 had showed a marked 
decrease, but the figures were not very reliable because 
during the epidemic when the malaria incidence was very high, 
the routine examination of blood films in the laboratory was 
seriously interrupted and anti-malaria measures temporarily
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abandoned.183
Sanitary works were still being carried out in 1919 against 
all odds,184 but "if health and housing conditions 
...remained unsatisfactory...the heavy cost of buildings lies 
at the very root of these insanitary conditions..." As 
Wilkinson argued, the inevitable consequence of these 
drawbacks were" poverty and overcrowding."185
Unlike colonial Malawi,186 religion in Sierra Leone during 
World 1 was not used as a vehicle for the articulation of 
political protest, but the threat posed to society by the 
epidemic was to generate a sudden surge of religious revival 
and a general call for a more aggressive evangelism, 
punctuated by a distinct millenarian content. Given the 
difficulties in containing the disease at the outset, many 
Christians turned to religion attempting to find answers in 
"a moral and spiritual side to the present distress ...,I18V 
It was widely held that Christian association with "highly 
paganised ideas" was responsible for the crisis which was a 
"reminder" and punishment from God.188 In the wake of the 
epidemic therefore, much appeal was made to biblical 
teachings like the prayer of King Hezekiah in a time of great 
national distress. It was argued that "the Lord has a 
controversy with us and His hand is stretched out for 
vengeance..." Among the failings of the disease-ridden 
society of Sierra Leone were, it was suggested, "the common 
desecration of God's Holy Day - buying and selling, stock 
taking and shiploading" by the mercantile firms, Europeans 
and Syrians.189. Africans were equally culpable for
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organising processions of secret societies "even on the 
Christian sabbath."190
These drawbacks constituted the background to the wave of 
prophecy and eschatological teachings that preceded the 
outbreak of influenza in Sierra Leone and which were assuming 
currency in war time. Around April 1918, the prophet Waddy 
Harris, then on a visit to Sierra Leone had warned of some 
impending destruction; in September, a "Deba", (a high 
official) of the Bundo Secret Society at Waterloo dreamt of 
massive deaths and of trenches dug to bury the dead. In the 
dream she saw a man who said "this was only the beginning of 
greater calamity."191 In some circles, the epidemic was seen 
as a divine purge of witches. As Rambler argued in the 
Weekly News, the epidemic knew its targets and (translated 
from the Krio version) "as long as your hands are clean, no 
harm will come to you; only the witches and those found with 
charms will be killed".192
The only way to salvation, it was argued, was a return to the 
worship of God. As the Bishop's Commissary, Archdeacon 
Wilson in September circularised all pastors calling for 
prayer meetings in four centres - at the Cathedral, Holy 
Trinity, Christ Church and at St. John's, Brookfields.193 At 
Ebenezer Methodist Circuit, the Christian Conductors' Union 
held "open air" services in various centres in September and 
although work was dislocated in the circuit, (all ministers 
falling ill) influenza and the war did not constitute a 
"major injury" to the cause of Christianity in Sierra Leone 
as the literature would argue.194 On the contrary, and in
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spite of the epidemic, it was in West Africa that the 
Methodists experienced their greatest success in mission work 
in 1918, compared to Papal Europe, India, China and
if
Ceylon.195 In Sierra Leone in particular, the Synod 
established a "City Mission" for work among the Mende; the 
"Extension Fund" was increased and this provided greater 
scope for evangelical work among groups "likely to fall into 
the grip of Muhammedanism..."195 1918 itself witnessed the
flowering of the collaborative efforts between the Methodists 
and the C.M.S. in administering Fourah Bay College.197 
Whatever the scope of religious revivalism, the press was to 
argue that "prayers without proper sanitation availeth 
naught..."19S
By 1919, the spread of epidemics in wartime Sierra Leone had 
begun to take its toll on the populace and as economic 
conditions worsened, famine conditions consequent on the 
failure of the rice crop in 1918, set the stage for the 
violent onslaught against the Syrians in July 1919.
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Chapter 7: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 1
The outbreak of World War I was to have a differential impact 
on the fortunes of revenue in Colonial Sierra Leone. The 
steady pace of economic development that had characterised 
the period between 1900 and the first half of 19131 was 
significantly altered in 1914. Since the literature on the 
economic impact of World War I on African societies is very 
patchy2 this chapter examines the Sierra Leone government's 
attempt to raise revenue in order to cushion the strains of 
war, the fortunes of local producers, their responses to the 
general global depression and the factors affecting trade in 
the districts in the period under review.
THE EVE OF WAR
Judged by the levels and sources of revenue. Sierra Leone was 
enjoying a sufficiently buoyant economy on the eve of war. 
This convinced the Comptroller of Customs to recommend the 
abolition of customs duties on edibles3 in 1913. Local trade 
networks were themselves enhanced by a successful trade 
between the dependency and French Guinea, Portuguese Guinea 
and Liberia.4 In many ways, 1913 is a valuable starting 
point for assessing the nature of economic activity during 
the war for despite dwindling returns from the port of 
Sherbro following official action against the activities of 
the Human Leopard Society, revenue from customs dues 
(£328,333) that year was the highest ever collected in the 
Colony.
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Increased commercial prosperity in 1913 was the result of 
many factors. Notwithstanding restrictive legislation, 
receipts from spirit imports increased due to the large 
number of European residents and the growing demand for these 
beverages among the local population. Revenue from food 
imports soared chiefly because of the remission of taxation 
on all "articles of food." Indeed the phenomenal growth in 
revenue from the import sector was mainly a function of the 
number and tonnage of vessels which called at the various 
ports in 1913. Imports like clothing, boats, launches and 
lighters, iron and steel manufactures, building materials,
carts and carriages, cement, cottons and hardware, perfumery, 
railway material and rolling stock, telegraphic materials, 
manufactured tobacco, woollen and worsted manufactures, were 
largely designed to meet the needs of Europeans, Syrians and 
foreign firms. As many Minute Papers for the year show, 1913
was characterised by enhanced industrial activity due to the
need to promote communications in order to tap the rich 
resources of the palm belt. Importations of railway 
materials and rolling stock were for example, needed to
prosecute the massive outlay in railway works such as the 
Rokel-Makeni and Makeni-Bauya extensions.
Because of the diversion of labour to rice farming and the 
unprecedented attractions of the wage economy which the Bauya 
railway extension was making possible, palm kernel exports 
declined in volume by 1,550 tons in 1913, There was however 
a large increase in value (£793,178 for 1912 and £920,943 for 
1913) as prices on the European markets were the highest ever 
recorded (£22 per ton). For similar reasons, and in spite of
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higher prices (£31) per gallon on the European market, palm 
oil exports declined in 1913. Despite these drawbacks, 
returns show that both products had increased in volume and 
value between 1901 and 1913. The grant of concessions to 
work mechanical mills and the rapid extension in railway 
building ensured that these principal exports contributed no 
less than £997,602 to revenue in 1913.
The trade in kola nuts, thanks to the Syrians and the high 
demand in French and Portuguese Guinea, Dakar and the Gambia 
and the expansion of railway works, was making positive 
contributions to overall revenue. Returns show an increase 
of 416 tons (valued at £142,883) in 1913 over the average 
exports (1,449 tons valued at £185,120) for the period 1908- 
1912. The trade in ginger, piassava, hides and rice may have 
declined due to poor prices, the prevalence of the barter 
system in Sulima, Mano Salija and Gene and the smaller 
shipments of rice from Mahela. The decline was also 
compounded by the attractions of the overland routes to 
French Guinea. These losses notwithstanding, the aggregate 
import and export trade increased the purchasing power of the 
population in 1913.5
Perhaps the most significant element in all this was the 
extent of Britain’s participation in the overall trade of 
Sierra Leone. In 1913, she was responsible for 39.31% of the 
trade of the dependency (Germany 28.62%) But if Britain 
dominated the import trade, (taking 64% with Germany 11.70%) 
Germany had clearly established her dominance in the export 
sector between 1909 and 1913. In 1913, she took 47.49% of a
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total export trade valued at £1,731,252. In 1909, the bulk 
of Sierra Leone's palm kernels went to Hamburg and in 1913 
Germany took 43,016 tons of kernels valued at £83,038 with 
only 6,185 tons going to Britain.6 The significance of this 
summary would be seen in the subsequent dislocations caused 
to revenue following the expulsion of German trade. Because 
Germany enjoyed an advantage over Britain in possessing 
extensive mills for extracting the oil from the pericarp of 
the palm fruit, she was able to use kernel oil as animal 
fodder, in the manufacture of margarine, (and other butter 
substitutes) soap and other articles7*
Germany was also making significant strides in the import 
trade of Sierra Leone - monopolising the trade in cheaper 
varieties of cotton goods, hosiery, yarn and lace and 
flooding the market with bright and gaudy colours which 
"appealed to the native mind". A ready market was also found 
for German hats and caps in the Protectorate where towns and 
villages were opening up in the wake of railway construction. 
By 1913, German jewellery consisted of "multitudinous 
trifles" whose tinsel wore off after a short time. Hamburg 
itself was an important connecting link in the trade route 
from Scandinavia to West Africa and this helped Germany to 
capture the trade in matches.8 German commercial activity in 
Sierra Leone was prosecuted by five firms based in the Colony 
and Protectorate.9 So vigorous was the nature of German 
competition that the D.C. Northern Sherbro lamented the "lack 
of enterprise displayed" by English traders.10 By the eve of 
war, the Deutsche Kamerun Gesellschaft„ had extended its 
activities to Blama and Kenema. They were also erecting a
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factory at Pendembu and were engaged in agriculture at 
Jamaica (Bonthe) with a coffee plantation extending well over 
100 acres.”11
German rivalry was not only prosecuted in Sierra Leone. 
Their apparently hostile and near belligerent attitude 
displayed in matters of commerce in neighbouring Liberia and 
the spate of German applications flooding Monrovia for 
railway concessions in Grand Bassa and Sinoe Counties were by 
1913, proving a source of worry to the British in Freetown.12 
By early 1914, the Deutsche-Liberian bank of A. Woermann had 
succeeded in taking over the Liberian government's bank 
account and the Germans were suspected of having fuelled the 
Liberian government's attempts to demonetise British silver 
coins in West Africa.13 With repeated suspicions that 
Germany had secured Liberia and the perennial problem of 
attempts to siphon-off labourers from Sierra Leone through 
Liberia to Sao Thome, Principe, Fernando Po and South West 
Africa,14 Sierra Leone's foreign relations became entangled 
in the quest for commercial supremacy in Liberia by two great 
powers on the eve of war.
However, the geographical and strategic position of the port 
of Freetown ensured a successful shipping trade in 1913. The 
general prosperity over a five year period (1909-1913, except 
in 1910 when yellow fever threatened the dependency) was 
marked by significant increases in tonnage for vessels which 
entered and left Freetown, the sub ports of Sherbro, Mano 
Salija, Sulima, Mahela and Gene.
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Up to August 1914/ shipping activity in Sierra Leone was 
dominated by the two leading maritime nations of the world 
with Britain being responsible for 70.03% and Germany 27.57% 
of a total tonnage of 1,460,197 which entered the port by 
steam vessels. The available evidence shows that Commercial 
activity in 1913 was far more prosperous than that for 1912 
due to a satisfactory harvest, a sustained demand on the 
European markets for the exports of the Colony, the extension 
of railway and public works, the opening up of the interior 
and the demand for Western imports by the large number of 
European and Asiatic residents in the Colony and 
Protectorate.
Once war erupted, the gains made began to be checked; the 
decline in the volume of palm products was aggravated by the 
diversion of labour from palm cutting to rice farming and on 
the Makeni-Bauya railway extension, and by the lack of 
machinery to separate the shell from the kernel. Labour 
supply was rendered erratic by official attempts to curb the 
activities of the Human Leopard Society in Northern Sherbro. 
By the end of 1913 therefore, decline had begun to set in and 
the war was to make it difficult to sustain the rate of 
growth achieved in 1913, whilst hostilities lasted.15 By 
10th August therefore, the Colonial Secretary was urging all 
Heads of Departments to effect economies in the 
administration of the votes under their control16 for even 
before the outbreak, the process of mobilisation had begun to 
take its toll on revenue.
As war became imminent, it also became clear that
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government's balance (£85,000) in its current account in the 
Bank of British West Africa would be insufficient to meet 
exceptional demands. This sum was therefore to be released 
as and when necessary for military requirement;17 but because 
the depression in local commerce made it impossible to 
balance revenue and expenditure in the estimates for 1915, 
public works and trade schools had to be temporarily 
suspended.1S
Apart from restrictive legislation on sugar exports from the 
United Kingdom to West Africa in September 1914,19 the 
prohibition of trade with Germany had significant 
consequences for revenue. Britain's inability to accommodate 
the Colony's produce left merchants with large quantities of 
rice, pepper, "beni" (sesame) seed and kola which they could 
not sell.20 It was in the export sector that Sierra Leone was 
most vulnerable for the lack of crushing mills in the United 
Kingdom, and the shortage of shipping crippled the export 
trade in palm kernels.21
The initial shocks were to be felt most acutely in the 
districts. Very little trade in palm kernels was conducted 
in Sherbro due to poor prices and even when merchants 
increased the price per bushel by 50% it was to help the 
producer purchase "trade goods" and was not in response to 
the demand for kernels in Europe.22 By September 1914 trade 
had lost its usual vitality in the Port Loko sub district of 
Karene. The depredations of the men of the W.A.R., high 
prices for tobacco and salt in Freetown and the fear and 
commotion which accompanied orders to mobilise affected trade
264
considerably. As in Sherbro, producers were forced to hold 
back their produce in anticipation of better prices.
It was largely rumours associated with civil commotion that 
compelled traders to close their shops in Railway district in 
September 1914. The result was a massive shortage of salt 
and tobacco. Apart from declining prices in palm oil and 
palm kernels, Koinadugu was the least affected in the initial 
days of war23 but to the south in Northern Sherbro the 
precedents for the manipulative tactics of combines were 
being established as some foreign firms exploited producers 
by reducing prices by 120%. By September, they were paying 
4/ a bushel for kernels and 3/ per can for oil (as against 
10/ and 9/ respectively for the corresponding period in 1912) 
at a time when prices on the Liverpool market were £16.10 and 
£27.10 per ton for kernels and oil respectively.
Constrained by increased freight charges, merchants were 
forced to lock up their capital for long periods thereby 
dislocating trade and business. Thus in Ronietta, the 
C.F.A.O. at Makump, Sheard and Harrop at Mabum and Stinus and 
Depuichaffray were paying very low prices to producers.24
GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY
The pattern of economic decline which began towards the end 
of 1913, was to magnify the problems faced by the colonial 
government in its attempts to balance revenue and expenditure 
during the war. By December 1914, the estimate for the year 
was £153,146 less than the original (£448,268) due to a drop
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in railway and customs receipts. Expenditure itself had to 
be revised upwards (from £689,168 to £710,928) despite some 
savings in recurrent and extraordinary public works and 
provincial administration.
The estimated revenue for 1915 (£490,647) was £12,379 higher 
than that for 1914 but the uncertainty over the duration of 
the war made it difficult to balance revenue and expenditure. 
Expenditure thus had to be reduced by a freeze on employment 
and by suspending some public works.
The outlook for 1915 was not entirely gloomy as certain 
factors helped the government cushion the initial shocks of 
war. The estimated expenditure for 1915 (£600,759) was
£110,169 less than that for 1914 and by the outbreak of war, 
Sierra Leone had accumulated a substantial surplus on which 
the Colony could make "a further heavy call in 1915." Above 
all, savings had been made in many areas like the public debt 
(£27,956) the railway (£70,702) and on extraordinary public 
works (£19,375). Greater lengths of line had been opened for 
traffic by 1914 coupled with a heavy outlay on locomotives 
and rolling stock. This made it possible for huge savings in 
expenditure on the railway in the estimates for 1915. The 
Governor was further urged to fill only those appointments 
for African staff that were actually needed. Apart from a 
few "hiccups" therefore, the war did not materially affect 
new works for some preliminary experimental work was planned 
for roads and drains in Freetown and £12,000 was allocated 
for a new school at Kenema25 in the estimates for 1915.
The only source of worry came from the rather disappointing
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returns from trade. By the start of 1915, exports - the main 
bastion of the economy - unlike imports, were stationary. To 
avoid borrowing through the Crown Agents expenditure had to 
be drastically reduced; the Colonial Office even contemplated 
direct taxation on European officials and additional 
duties.26
The opening days of 1915 however brought fresh hopes for 
recovery when overall revenue for 1914 exceeded that of the 
revised estimates by £51,000.27 But the vitality shown by 
the palm kernel trade, increased railway receipts and the 
improvements in imports were insufficient to justify 
Merewether's expectation that the estimated revenue for 1915 
would be realised as the average monthly revenue since August 
1914 (£23,687) was not improving significantly.28 It was
therefore considered necessary to raise taxes on tobacco 
(from 5 to 8d per lb), cigars and cigarettes (from 2/to 3/ 
per lb) and beer (from 6d to 9d per lb)29 to enable Sierra 
Leone to undertake public works without troubling the Crown 
Agents.
The decline, was not solely due to the war. Throughout 1914, 
dwindling receipts from the diverse sources of revenue 
affected import duties considerably and as prices (on the 
European market) of the principal products of the dependency 
fell, coupled with a reduction in the peoples’ purchasing 
power, merchants had to reduce imports until their 
accumulated stocks were sold. The general decline in import 
duties was also due to the loss of the trade with Germany 
(especially that in spirits) and other European countries the
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value of which approximated £175,118 in 1913. By 1915, this 
deficiency had still not been adjusted for although the 
decline was mitigated by increased imports of coal and lumber 
in 1914, imports of manufactured articles like boats 
launches, cotton goods and perfumery dropped by 21.3%3°
Although Freetown was a major distributing centre on the west 
coast, 1914 was a bad year for Sierra Leone's export trade. 
There was a marked depression in food, drink, tobacco, raw 
materials, manufactured and non-manufactured articles and 
many other exports of the dependency. In addition, the ban 
on some manufactured articles led to a decline in the export 
of boats, launches, lighters and telegraphic materials so 
that by June 1915, the initial optimism shown by the Governor 
over the financial position had begun to wane. Only 
£35,089.5.0. remained at the disposal of government for 
general purposes. It was however the expenditure on harbour 
works and the Makeni-Baga railway extension in 1914, coupled 
with the various temporary advances made for war purposes 
that forced Merewether to consider effecting economies. The 
duty on spirits was therefore raised from 6/3d to 7/6d a 
gallon and a surtax of 25% imposed on all duty payable.31
By July however, the meagre balance of loan funds available 
for 1916 and the aggregate expenditure on the Cameroon and 
Togoland expeditionary forces further crippled the fortunes 
of revenue and forced the Colonial government to abandon work 
on the export wharf.3:2
Against this background, it was difficult to meet the
268
probable deficit of £40,000 for 1916. The revenue for 1915 
had fallen short of the estimates by £19,549 whilst receipts 
from the railway, licences and internal revenue and the Post 
Office Savings Bank declined considerably. In these
circumstances the Colonial Office agreed that duty on 
unmanufactured tobacco be increased from 8d to 1/ a pound and 
that the duty on foodstuffs be reimposed and increased from 
12 1/2% to 15% ad valorem. The estimated expenditure for
1916 was also made the lowest (£524,116) since 1911.
Such drastic economies may have yielded modest gains in 1915 
but £90,000 of Sierra Leone's assets were still locked up in
stores and the Colony had no liquid assets.33 Matters were
not helped by extortionate chiefs whose oppression of their 
people led many sub-chiefs to stop paying the house tax.34 
Total revenue for 1915 (£504,425) thus showed the first
recorded decline since 1911. Since August 1914 there was a
marked decline in the capital held by the Colony and loans
given by the imperial government depressed the value of gilt- 
edged securities.35
Thanks to higher customs tariffs, government secured an 
enhanced revenue in 1916 (£551,106). Through a policy of
rigorous retrenchment expenditure was further reduced by 
£13,831 and the revenue exceeded expenditure by £18,166. To 
these factors should be added the increased value of imported 
goods which were liable to ad valorem duties. Whilst the 
mercantile trade of Mano Salija and Sulima remained dormant, 
import duties continued to soar at the port of Sherbro but 
the closure of the German market continued to exercise a
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negative influence on the spirit trade.
The revenue from exports for 1916 may have dwindled slightly 
compared with 1915 but it is worth noting that of a total 
value of £1,223,544 derived from exports, the produce and 
manufactures of the Colony yielded £1,101,846. Determined to 
sustain the modest gains made, the government proceeded to 
revise import duties and the Customs Duties (Amendment) 
Ordinance of 1915. Many Orders-in-Council passed on 10th 
March and 21st July 1916 increased specific duties, imposed 
about 50% extra duty on ale, cigars and tobacco and about 25% 
on spirits and other articles. The Customs Duties (Further) 
Amendment Ordinance (No 17 of 1915) abolished the surtax of 
25%, increased the ad valorem duty from 10% to 15% and 
imposed duties on foodstuffs (except food on ice) bread and 
flour.3e
The results were not immediately realised for comparative 
figures for 1917 (£546,449) show a drop of £4,657 in revenue. 
A decline in receipts from customs, the house tax, spirit 
licences from the Protectorate and balances owed by the City 
Council for expenditure incurred by the government on water 
works extension, all accounted for this drop.
The situation was further worsened by the continued 
depreciation in the capital value of the securities held by 
the Colony so that any immediate revival was doubtful. 
Despite increases in ad valorem duties, the total dues from 
customs (£263,585) declined by £14,959. The fall in spirit 
imports, tobacco, kerosene and sugar also reduced specific
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duties and matters were little mitigated by the irregularity 
of trade at the ports of Sherbro and York. Whilst duties on 
commercial imports for 1917 (£1,288,499) exceeded those for 
1916 (£1,058,333) the closure of all public works ensured a 
decrease of £33,081 in the duties collected from government 
imports.
Only in the export sector was the story materially different 
for out of a total value of £1,497,995 contributed by the 
export trade, £1,276,434 came from the higher prices for palm 
oil, palm kernels and kola, the chief domestic exports of 
Sierra Leone.37 The problems encountered by the government 
led the Governor to revive the question of public works again 
in March 1917 in a bid to secure more revenue for the Colony. 
As progress depended on palm oil and palm kernel exports 
handled by the railway and on customs duties, Wilkinson was 
convinced that more income could be secured by opening up new 
sources of supply through railway extension and the building 
of roads and wharves.38 But the Colonial Office, preoccupied 
with the exigencies of the war in East Africa ignored the 
views of the Governor.
In October 1917, government was caught up in financial 
complications regarding the rapid rise in the price of coal. 
Because budgetary provisions for fuel for 1917 had to be 
increased by £20,000 and by £30,508 for 1918, the question of 
increasing railway rates came up again as "transportation 
costs dominated everything in the Protectorate."
Whilst Wilkinson apprehended certain dangers in increasing
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transport rates on palm products, the Executive Council 
decided that a better solution to the temporary difficulty 
created by the high price of coal was to "throw the burden" 
on all exports. Rates for kernels on the railway were 
therefore fixed at 10/ a ton, l/2d a gallon on palm oil and 
l/2d a pound on kola as export duties - all to come into 
force on 1st January 1918. Overall railway rates were also 
increased by 10% in the hope that all these measures would 
yield £40,408 in 1918 - more than enough to cover the cost of 
coal. Positive as these moves were, it was obvious that the 
burden of these rates would fall on local producers who also 
had to contend with the high costs of imported articles.39
As Wilkinson was soon to realise, increased railway rates and 
the introduction of export duties were not enough to address 
the financial problem faced by the dependency especially in 
1918 when even greater demands were made on an already 
insufficient revenue. The price allowed by the Food 
Controller in London for Sierra Leone's kernels was too low 
to stimulate production and this had an adverse effect on 
railway receipts, import and export duties. The revised 
estimate of revenue for 1917 was thus not realised while the 
demands for increased expenditure became more urgent.
Medical authorities were asking for better sanitation while 
agricultural advisers urged the importance of growing more 
foodstuffs. Forestry experts were advocating additional 
expenditure on conservancy and the approved scheme for the 
wharf at Cline Town and for "roading and draining Freetown" 
had proved too costly. Apart from overcrowding in Freetown's
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jail, the question of its enlargement was bound to entail 
more expenses. The need for a better police force could only 
be met by the provision of more pay, more men, police 
stations and barracks and that meant further expenditure.
More money was also needed to address the questions of infant 
mortality, pay war bonuses, prize court allowances and other 
personal claims. Yet in spite of extra taxation the revenue 
was only likely to cover "such bare annually recurrent votes 
as cannot possibly be avoided." Placed in a very unenviable 
position, Wilkinson deprecated the practice of referring 
problems to technical advisers who were oblivious to the 
country's limited resources or the claims of other 
departments. The Governor found it difficult "to express 
without presumption," an unfavourable opinion of a scheme 
"backed by the authority of some great name".40
Many factors therefore combined to produce a gloomy outlook 
for 1919. Expenditure was expected to rise further due to 
the need to fill vacant appointments and obtain material for 
works. Other likely sources of expenditure were the 
requirement to pay extra overtime to customs officers due to 
more shipping activity, payments for provisions in the 
medical department, payment as compensation for "Cameroons 
kit," increased allowance to troops in lieu of customs rebate 
and many more.41
These drawbacks notwithstanding, the evidence shows that 1918 
was the best year on record from the standpoint of revenue; 
government's position was considerably bolstered by increased
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receipts from ad valorem duties, customs fees and shed rents. 
In the main, it was enhanced prices for all classes of 
imported goods rather than any increases in the volume of 
imports which helped to swell ad valorem duties.
By 1918, America and South Africa were sending provisions to 
Freetown and this increased revenue, but such gains were not 
reciprocated by receipts from specific duties (which fell 
from £165,263 in 1917 to £145,510 in 1918) chiefly because of 
lesser imports of unmanufactured tobacco and lumber. The 
revenue was however boosted by gains from kerosene, salt, 
spirits and sugar imports. The government's determination to 
forestall a likely shortage had led to importations of sugar 
from South Africa and Mauritius apart from Britain and the 
U.S.A. at a time when private enterprise failed to obtain 
supplies.
As will be shown later, the aggregate duty (£31,954) from 
exports dropped significantly due to the fluctuations in the 
shipment of palm produce. Fewer vessels called at the port 
of Sherbro in 1918 and this accounted for a drop of £12,411 
comprising entirely of specific duty. By this time trade at 
the sub-ports of Mano Salija and Sulima remained dormant and 
Gene had been reduced to a smuggling preventive station. The 
fortunes of revenue were not helped by the decline in 
receipts from port, harbour and lighthouse dues due to the 
concession granted by the Admiralty to local producers to 
ship produce in vessels exempt from such duties.
By dint of fortuitous circumstances however, government was
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well placed to benefit from customs duties. 1918 was a 
particularly busy year for shipping when customs staff were 
stretched to their utmost to ensure the quick despatch of 
steamers. The "flu" epidemic was also a blessing in disguise 
for during this period, extra fees had to be paid for work 
performed at places other than customs premises. 
Furthermore, labour shortages at the King's Shed, caused a 
delay of goods which subsequently became liable to higher 
rents. As packages were numerous and their contents widely 
varied, the task of clearance and delivery was held up and 
this boosted rent receipts.42
The gains derived from customs duties were in some ways 
affected by government's obligation to pay drawbacks and 
refund duty totalling £4,703. Large supplies of stores and 
materials to H.M. forces were also furnished free of customs 
duty whilst the provision of proof of landing of goods at 
West African ports which were less favoured with steamship 
service, secured to the exporter 95% of the import duty. 
Significant refunds were also made to importers on account of 
kerosene short-landed or for damages to packages and contents 
lost by leakage.
These were clearly abnormal times and it was hoped that the 
resumption of normal shipping would keep such payments down. 
In addition to these losses, the restriction on spirit 
imports from Britain continued to contract the volume of 
imports into the Colony. Perhaps the most significant 
development in this regard was the improved spirit trade with 
America. American rum appears to have met the needs of the
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local market and by 1918, she was furnishing brandy, whisky, 
perfumed and sweetened spirits. This development
notwithstanding, £40,144 (4.27% of the entire inward trade
for 1918) was collected as duty from the imports of spirits - 
a decrease of £49,532 when compared with the figures for 1914 
(£89,676)43
TRADE AND COMMERCE IN 1918
Some analysis of trade and commerce in 1918 is instructive 
for an appreciation of the revenue situation. The picture is 
one of vacillating fortunes. The total dues collected from 
imports for the year (£1,680,336) increased by £347,584 
compared with that for 1917 (£1,332,752) and those from re­
exports (£327,600) advanced by £106,039 in value. Unlike 
these categories, the value derived from the export of the 
produce and manufacture of the Colony (£1,189,271) dropped by 
£87,163 compared with the gains made in 1917 (£1,276,434)
On the other hand, the government enjoyed buoyant receipts 
from re-exports because the port of Freetown was more 
favoured with steamships than any other on the west coast. 
Freetown thus acted as a distributing centre for merchandise 
to other West African colonies. In this way much business 
accrued to the merchants of Sierra Leone with significant 
results for local trade.
A breakdown of the various categories of imports in 1918 
would show that food, drink and tobacco yielded £412,086 
(compared with £354,488 and £320,288 for 1913 and 1917 
respectively) raw materials and articles mainly
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unmanfactured, £203,821 (as opposed to £103,680 for 1913 and 
£20,488 for 1917) and articles wholly or mainly manufactured, 
£1,064,406 (compared with £979,449 for 1913 and £807,556 for 
1917). The Comptroller of Customs argued that values had 
been so inflated in 1918 "that comparative figures of the 
import trade have largely lost their significance."44 Indeed 
such massive increases in the import of luxuries (such as 
drink and tobacco) and manufactured goods such as cutlery, 
cotton piece goods, hosiery, hats, drugs, boots, motor cars, 
matches, pipes and soap etc which catered for the material 
comforts of the population showed that "business was far from 
moribund".
In 1918, the purchasing power of the population was reported 
to be "virile" in spite of the heavy drain of excessive 
freights and high prices of imported goods. Yet much of this 
purchasing power derived from conditions not normally 
available in peace time. The establishment of a naval base 
at Freetown and the many activities pursued under the aegis 
of the navy brought more money into circulation. For the 
same reasons, the total value derived from commercial imports 
(£1,652,184) increased by £363,685 over that for 1917 
(£1,288,499) and by £360,202 over that for 1913 (£1,291,982).
Considering the poor performance of palm kernel and palm oil 
in the export sector, the shrinkage (as will be shown later) 
was therefore more than counterbalanced by the benefits 
derived from the peculiar conditions induced by the war.
Despite the very modest performances in the export sector, in
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1918, gains totalling £69,280 were made from food exports. 
Again, the government was particularly fortunate because of 
extensive shipment of kola, ginger and pepper, all of which 
yielded a revenue of £93,001. Exports of cured fish, and
sugar coupled with re-exports of rice also added to these 
increases but while the revenue derived from the exports of 
flour, cattle and "native" rice fell, the temporary 
dislocation of the ordinary system of coast trading
ironically led to increases in some categories of drink and
tobacco such as mineral waters, ales and wines and
unmanufactured tobacco.
Increases in the revenue derived from exports of coal
(£66,617) rubber (£16,353) piassava (£6,765) and lumber 
(£4,904) also helped to mitigate the loss in revenue from the 
trade in palm kernels (£159,371) hides, ivory and beeswax.45
1918 was therefore a busy one for Freetown as far as the
export trade of the dependency was concerned. Thus in terms 
of the export of manufactured articles, the extended shipment 
of cotton, boats and launches, bags and coopers stores helped 
the revenue considerably; so that the aggregate value of
commercial exports (£1,516,871) exceeded that for 1917 
(£1,497,995) by £18,876.45
On the whole, various legal instruments, ordinances and 
orders-in-council passed during the year, were to shape the 
character of the import and export trade as well as the 
revenue of the dependency. A few examples are instructive. 
From 10th July 1918, revised duties at the rate of lOd per 
100 were to be imposed on cigarettes, whilst Ordinance 24
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revised the rate for rent at 1/ monthly for each receptacle 
of palm oil and Id for each package of kernels deposited on 
the west end of government Wharf. Designed to come into 
effect on 1st February 1919, Ordinance 25 revised rates for 
the storage of imported goods in government's sheds and 
warehouses and fixed special rates for goods in transit.4-7 
In terms of value alone therefore, 1918 was statistically the 
best on record since 1914.
Perhaps the only significant drawback was the decline in 
the principal exports of the Colony which proved a serious 
set back for overall revenue. Such difficulties were 
accentuated by the high prices of basic commodities (whether 
imported or of local production) and the influenza epidemic 
which exercised a baneful influence on production, stifled 
trade and made it difficult for the Comptroller of Customs to 
forecast the trend of commerce in 1919.48
Confronted with a gloomy outlook for 1919, the Governor was
forced to address the question of dwindling revenues whilst 
fulminating against the practice of recruiting "more white 
officers," at "very high rates of pay even though there were 
equally qualified native personnel." The estimated revenue 
for 1919 (£581,442) was barely sufficient to meet the
recurrent expenditure fixed at £375,293. New ventures such 
as the need to promote forestry, improving the police force
and taking precautions against fly-borne diseases in the
prison and the need for a new hospital for the W.A.F.F. at 
Daru, were all making demands on revenue. In addition, many 
Europeans (probably missionaries influenced by the temperance
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movement) were urging the expediency of stopping the sale of 
spirits, this at an obvious revenue sacrifice of £50,000 a 
year.
Continued indirect taxation was no longer a solution for it 
fell heavily on the poor, whose average earnings was 9d a 
day. Wilkinson, (whose fondness for writing copious 
despatches on expert issues frequently infuriated the 
Colonial Office) argued that the best way of effecting 
savings was to stop recruiting more and more white officers, 
because whatever war time gains had been made in 1918, were 
siphoned-off by costly administrative expenditure.49
Desperate to effect economy, the Governor suggested the 
appointment of a trained sanitary officer for each of the 204 
chiefdoms, the construction of 700 miles of road, the 
appointment of a well trained school teacher and agricultural 
instructor for each chiefdom in order to obviate the 
supposedly wasteful methods of agriculture. Wilkinson argued 
that it was "not the poverty of Sierra Leone that stands in 
the way of progress" but lack of coordination and "a sense of 
proportion." Thus Njala Training School was to be opened in 
a few months and 300 miles of road constructed in 1919. Yet 
however well meaning the Governor was, he lamented the fact 
that he had "no real... control over the revenue."
A significant consequence of the shortfall in revenue was 
that it highlighted all the dangers associated with a mono­
crop economy. Exports were therefore to be diversified away 
from palm produce. This, Wilkinson argued could be achieved
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by cheapening communications and developing other industries 
such as rubber, cocoa, coco-nuts, piassava and oil producing 
plants other than the palm. Established patterns of 
agriculture were also to be reviewed in order to generate 
marketable quantities of produce which would attract buyers. 
The Governor was confident that his plan would entail 
expenditure initially and 1 reimbursement afterwards."50 The 
need for diversification was all the more urgent for even the 
future of the palm was threatened. The abolition of the 
spirit trade with Germany and Holland led many people in the 
Protectorate to start tapping the palm tree for palm wine to 
meet their alcoholic demands.
In the aftermath of the war, the need to continue the 
prohibition of the trade in the Colony and Protectorate, was 
still a matter for concern. Were this to happen it would 
mean a significant loss of revenue of about £130,000 
calculated on a pre-war basis apart from a further loss of 
revenue hitherto derived from spirit licences. It was also 
obvious that the high prices of British spirits made it 
unlikely that they would ever be purchased in sufficient 
quantity to counterbalance the deficiency caused by the 
cessation of the trade.51 It was in this context that 
Wilkinson was justifying his roads policy so vigorously in 
February 1919. Conscious of the decline in produce, the 
Governor argued that besides improving trade, cheaper 
transportation would release many men from the work of 
transport for that of direct production.52
Another obvious liability to be addressed was the customs
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preventive station at Gene on the Liberian frontier. 
Established on 10th April 1913 by agreement between the U.K. 
and the Liberian government, it was hoped that the navigable 
Mano river, would serve as a major trade waterway. By 1918 
however, geographical barriers, lack of proper supervision of 
the station and the abuses perpetrated by "boatmen" (guards) 
of the preventive service especially in Makpli and Sore 
Chiefdoms (Pujehun District) were all defeating the purpose 
for which the Anglo-Liberian Agreement was signed - i.e. 
raising revenue. Very few traders presented themselves at 
the various stations and at Gene to pay duty. So that in 
1916 for example, the cost of running the station amounted to 
£900 whilst the revenue collected was only £16.53
By May 1919, the financial position of the Colony was 
regarded as "very bad". Even after the peace treaty to end 
the war, heavy charges still had to be met due to war bonus 
payments which were bound to incur an excess expenditure of 
£122,916 in 1919. Further, the loss of import duty on trade 
spirits was estimated at £23,000 and the loss of revenue from 
spirit licences at £1,600. It was also assumed that by 1920, 
the revenue from spirit licences would decline by 25% and 
will cease entirely from the Protectorate. By 7th May 1919, 
the total amount of supplementary expenditure was put at 
£5,743, the chief items here being Njala Training College, 
the acquisition of land for public purposes for the railway, 
forestry and a foundry at Cline Town. The value of the 
Colony’s investment also continued to depreciate - the 
estimated excess of assets over liability being £104,453.54
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In order to raise more revenue the government (in July 1919) 
increased import duties on beer (to 1/ a gallon) gun powder 
(to 6d per lb) spirits (at 10/ a gallon) unmanufactured 
tobacco (to l/3d per lb) manufactured tobacco (to 5/ per lb) 
and on cigars and cigarettes (at 5/ per lb). Together with 
the export duties on palm oil and palm kernels, these 
increases were expected to yield about £76,000 per annum.55 
But the need to meet war bonus expenses and the heavy 
financial outlay required to suppress the riots of 1919 
complicated the financial position of the government even 
further. Proposals for more increases in railway rates for 
passengers, fees for telegrams (at 1/ per 72 words) and an 
import duty of 10/ per ton on salt were therefore made in the 
hope that all would yield approximately £20,000 annually.56
The growing list of increases in taxation which punctuated 
government's attempts to redress the imbalances between 
revenue and expenditure however did little to ameliorate the 
situation. The revenue for 1920 was estimated at £757,357 
(as against £591,442 for 1919) but the increased cost of 
materials and the need to replace worn-out rolling stock on 
the railway made it impossible to fix the expenditure at less 
than £763,289. Not even Wilkinson's proposals for
substantial increases in spirit duties and for making the 
City Council more responsible for sanitation and street 
maintenance could break the stalemate. As the Governor 
argued, "the weak point in the Colony's finance was due to 
the fact that taxation fell exclusively on the native 
producer who is voiceless" and is "the poorest member of the 
community."5V
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TRADE IN WARTIME SIERRA LEONE
As is evident from government's efforts to secure revenue the 
difficulties encountered were partly a function of the 
strains induced by the war. In Sierra Leone, internal and 
external factors conditioned trade and helped to shape local 
responses to the crisis. The story of commercial activity 
between 1914 and 1918 was essentially one of mixed fortunes. 
Conditions preceding the war helped some districts to absorb 
the initial shocks. Koinadugu for example entered the war 
with a largely increased revenue and the massive increases in 
store and hawkers' licences were clearly due to the march of 
the railway. Though groundnut cultivation was affected by a 
fungoid disease in 1914, government's timely intervention 
ensured the continuation of a small local market in the 
district.5e
For a district reputed to have the finest cattle in the 
Protectorate, 1915 was marked by a considerable lull in the 
cattle trade due to the outbreak of disease (pleuro­
pneumonia) among the herds, but these "abnormal conditions" 
did not affect overall trade in Koinadugu. So successful was 
Captain Stanley's experiment in groundnut cultivation in 
Yalunka country that one chief harvested 50 bushels that 
year.59 But the freeze on railway construction was to have 
serious consequences for trade in Koinadugu in 1916, when 
receipts from store and hawker's licences fell significantly. 
Conditions were however mitigated by the introduction of 
European commercial activities at Kabinkolo and Kamabai. It 
must be said however that Koinadugu's contribution to the
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overall trade of the Colony (apart from the produce - rice, 
palm kernels, hides, kola and locust beans- which managed to 
find its way to the railway through the Bauya extension in 
Ronietta and Karene) had not hitherto been materially 
significant,60 and traders had to await the harvest of 1917 
for trade to be revived once more.61
Commercial activity was however boosted in 1918 through the 
presence of two European traders (a lease having been granted 
to Monsieur J M Billieres) in Kamabai which developed slowly 
as a trading centre, even attracting produce from the palm 
bearing areas of Karene.62
Perhaps the Railway District provides the best example of the 
differential impact of the war on local trade. With 
headquarters at Kenema the district then spanned an area of 
about 7,000 square miles. The railway line which traversed 
it from east to west, from a point 120 miles from Freetown up 
to Pendembu, intensified local trade with significant 
consequences for revenue in 1914. But the vibrant trade to 
which the railway was opening up the district was fraught 
with serious drawbacks. Apart from widespread "petty 
larceny," the credit system (prosecuted by Syrians and Krios) 
which constituted the lynchpin of trade in the district, led 
to many summonses and "distress warrants" being taken out as 
each party tried to outdo the other.
In other ways, the spread of trade and education, Syrians and 
Krios, all tended to be disruptive of traditional authority 
for many of the local people who came to acquire "a 
smattering of English" plus a store licence began disobeying
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their chiefs' and even refused to attend the latter's courts. 
The growth of trade also undermined local industry through 
the spread of imported cotton goods, spirits, building 
materials and hardware. By 1914 only a few people were 
engaged in the manufacture of "native cloth" in the district. 
These drawbacks apart, the trade in kola nuts flourished in 
1914 and was not subject to the same disruptive influences as 
that in palm kernels.
In general, trade drew its impetus from a thriving market at 
Bauya (near the French Guinea border of Kissi) and from the 
massive improvements in communications. Three first class 
roads (Blama-Boajibu, Hanga-Lago and Bo-Tikonko) in the 
district acted as feeders to the railway and were used for 
wheeled traffic to carry produce in hand-carts.63
The general depression of 1915 however penetrated every 
interstice of economic activity in the Railway district. 
Overall revenue dropped significantly, forcing traders to cut 
down on expensive luxuries such as spirit licences "which 
swallowed nearly all their profits." Revenue derived from 
spirit and hawkers' licences also declined and as receipts 
from Railway Open Lines fell, traders were deprived of spare 
cash "which they normally took back to their villages..." 
Nonetheless, the blessings of communications in the district 
helped to revive the vigorous trade networks with the French 
Kissis in November thanks to the completion of the road from 
Pendembu to Kailahun. The depression however did not deter 
wartime abuses and many traders continued to cheat consumers 
"by the use of some measure" other than the imperial 
bushel.64
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While the depression persisted elsewhere, Railway District 
continued to show signs of prosperity in 1916. Increased 
revenue provided proof of prosperity and as petty trading 
expanded, small shopkeepers took out yearly store licences 
and abandoned the practice of store trading as a speculation. 
These factors gave an added fillip to the kola trade which in 
turn drew its impetus from improved communications 
particularly down the branch line from Rosanda and Makeni. 
At every station on the line (except Baoma) trade settlements 
(dominated by Syrians, Europeans and Krios) sprang up 
especially at Bo, Blama, Kenema, Segbwema and Pendembu which 
were also assuming the status of townships.65
The prosperity of 1916 was to characterise trade in the 
district in 1917 and further increases in revenue derived 
from store and hawkers' licences were clearly indicative of 
vibrant commercial activity. Again the triggers came from 
the high prices of kola which tempted many traders to invest 
in the commodity. An increased demand for kola, scanty 
supplies coupled with rain storms which prevented the fruit 
from setting freely all combined to force the price of kola 
up.66 The influenza epidemic of 1918 however had serious 
consequences for trade. During the year high prices of 
imported goods precluded people with limited capital from 
purchasing goods. Not even the use of motor lorries (though 
not widespread but used especially by Syrians on the Bo-Mandu 
and Bo-Tikonko road) for carrying produce could help to abate 
the decline in revenue from store and hawkers' licences.67
To the south west in Sherbro, traders were particularly well
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placed to benefit from the disruptive influences of the war 
and its ironically positive impact on the piassava trade in 
1914. Enhanced prices for this commodity on the European 
market consequent on the high demand for army brooms in 1914, 
gave the trade a new vitality. It was also hoped that the 
pulp, hitherto considered as mere waste would fetch between 
£6 and £8 per ton on the European market whilst also serving 
as a coir substitute; but the apparently languishing rubber 
industry received further shocks with the outbreak of war.68
In a district where the Jong, Bagru and Kittam river systems 
were navigable for produce carrying crafts, the ban on German 
shipping was particularly harmful to trade in Sherbro in 1915 
when some £50,000 worth of produce was left lying at the port 
awaiting shipment. During the rains, the problem became so 
acute that the revenue dropped considerably.69 The shortage 
of shipping space which persisted in 1916 was however not 
sufficient to deter traders. That year schooners and a motor 
lighter carried produce worth £40,970 to Freetown; even the 
firms continued to buy and sell produce. The indications of 
a successful trade can be gleaned from the value of exports 
sent by steamers to Europe and the value of the stock 
awaiting shipment. The depression in the spirit trade was 
accompanied by a corresponding drop in the crime rate, but 
the trade in dried fish was badly hindered by cattle disease 
in Karene which prevented the exchange of dried fish for 
cattle.70
For the first time since the outbreak of war, the port of 
Sherbro was cleared of produce in 1917. This was so because
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Sherbro was nearer to the U.K. than any other port down the 
coast and because the mercantile shipping communities were 
willing to turn "ships round with the utmost expedition." The 
only drawbacks were the low prices paid at the beginning of 
the year; this diverted to the railway a quantity of produce 
that would otherwise have been exported from the port. The 
recruitment of many able bodied men into the ranks of the 
Carrier Corps also affected the output and prices of produce. 
Less produce was gathered in Sherbro in 1917 and insufficient 
attention was paid to its preparation. But if disease 
continued to deplete the cattle herds, the trade in cocoa 
received a boost thanks to the active purchases made by the 
C.F.A.O.71
1918 was however a particularly bad year for trade in 
Sherbro; that year, fewer steamers called at the port and the 
loss of specific duty due to the decreased importation of 
tobacco and spirits had serious repercussions for overall 
revenue (£29,904) which dropped by £6,776/19/7 compared with 
that for 1917. Palm oil, palm kernel and piassava exports 
also suffered badly and produce that would otherwise have 
been shipped from the port was sent to Freetown.72
War time trade in Northern Sherbro exhibited the mixed 
fortunes observed elsewhere. The very high rates exacted for 
spirit and hawkers' licences taken out in 1914 helped the 
revenue situation immensely but the suspension of the 
Woermann Line service which had hitherto catered for kernel 
exports and the demands made on the merchant fleet in the 
North Atlantic denied the district the normal facilities for
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shipment. Customs revenue from the four ports of entry - 
Bonthe, Sulima, Mano Salija and Gene - therefore fell.
Merchants faced grave risks and could not offer attractive
prices to producers nor could they supply consumers' demands 
after 4th August 1914.73
The same factors governed trade in 1915 and much of the 
produce hitherto sent to Mano Salija and Sulima were diverted 
to Liberia with serious consequences for revenue.74 The
depression caused by the war was however to generate local 
initiatives in 1916. That year thousands of fishermen - a 
hardy, prosperous and independent community - began fishing 
in the hitherto uncharted creeks in the district. The vast 
quantity of salt and fresh water fish caught in cast nets 
found a ready market all over the Protectorate.
Another factor which helped to revive trade was the
development of the road system. An excellent third class 
road with good bridges, embankments and culverts, constructed 
along the Mano-Pujehun Telegraph line helped to transport 
produce; so did the remarkable system of waterways (south of 
the district) which induced many Europeans to open factories 
there. The chiefs also planned to clear the small channel of 
the Small Bum or Bey river which was formerly a short route 
to Sumbuya, a trade centre in the Railway district. The 
result was an added fillip to the trade in kola and palm 
kernels in 1916.75
The prosperity enjoyed in Northern Sherbro in 1916 set the 
stage for a vigorous trade the following year when very high
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prices revived the piassava industry. At £20 a ton, piassava 
paid the producer quite as much as kernels and apart from 
kola nut and the cocoa market, the energies of many people 
were diverted to the lucrative industry in dried fish. The 
only threat to the cocoa industry was the low prices offered 
for the beans and the reluctance of many firms to buy though 
the C.F.A.O. came to the rescue at Mopalma and Pujehun.
By 1917 many people in Northern Sherbro had come to regard 
cattle as a good investment; increased demands for beef at 
Bonthe, along the railway line and at various trading centres 
in the district (and because the cattle trade had been 
prohibited in French Guinea) generated higher prices for 
c a t t l e . T h e  tale of relative prosperity was however 
halted in 1918 when influenza allied with trade depression to 
cause a decline in receipts from store and hawkers' licences. 
In 1913, there was more than ten times the number of spirit 
shops than in 1918. Worse still the fall in the spirit trade 
was not balanced by any improvements in the sale of other 
goods and as many traders resorted to increased hawking 
activity, the low prices paid for produce magnified the 
difficulties of middlemen.
A much more significant factor was the pull of the railway 
and the movement of the coast trade to Bonthe. Many chiefs 
in Gallinas country lost their wealth and source of power and 
this complicated affairs in Northern Sherbro. In the Bulom 
chiefdoms of the district however, cheap river transport, a 
wealth of fruit bearing trees, the effective husbandry of the 
crop coupled with land (local laws) and "Poro" regulations
291
all helped to ensure a lively trade. So did the presence of 
European firms established from Mano to Bonjema which became 
an important outlet for Gallinas produce.
Many indigenous industries in Northern Sherbro also witnessed 
a renaissance, due partly to the high cost of imported 
textiles. As dyers multiplied, great quantities of indigo 
were brought to the district. The blue "saful" cloth sold 
expensively and the chief exponents of this art (from 
Senegal) received handsome fees from their pupils. Weavers 
were active in Gallinas country and the scarcity of the 
imported Nigerian cloth led to desperate attempts to imitate 
it. In fact some weavers began working in silk with the help 
of spinning wheels, and embroidery as another art developed 
simultaneously. Originating in a rather "jejune European 
tradition" it expanded rapidly and soon acquired a local 
peculiarity in design "which far surpasses its origins."7'7
To the north west in Karene the chief factors influencing 
trade between 1913 and 1916 were the presence of the railway 
and cheap river transport on the Searcies, European 
enterprise at Rosanda, the smallpox epidemic of 1916 and the 
poor prices paid for commodities like kola.78 Trade was 
generally successful in the district in 1917, but European 
firms were showing very little enterprise on the coast due to 
the failure to open up factories on the Searcies during the 
year. Paradoxically however the difficulties and high prices 
introduced by the war stimulated African industry. Due to 
the high price of salt the people of Samu chiefdom began 
extracting salt, (whose samples consisted of coarse white
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crystalline sodium chloride in a moist condition) which sold 
at 3/ per bushel.79 Of all the districts in the Protectorate, 
Ronietta was the most affected and between 1914 and 1918 the 
story was one of marked depression caused mainly by the call 
of many to the colours, the fluctuations of world market 
prices for palm kernels and kola and the escalating prices 
for imported goods.80
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Generally, the depression of 1915, the decline in prices for 
Sierra Leone's products on the world market, the accumulation 
of imported merchandise, the restriction of fresh business 
and the loss of the German market determined the flow of 
trade throughout the war years.8X Despite declining prices 
prospects for the kola trade were still encouraging in 1915. 
The hope was predicated on the buoyant groundnut trade in 
Senegal which it was hoped would increase the purchasing 
power of the Senegalese and induce them to buy more of Sierra 
Leone's kola. On the other hand, low prices for ginger 
failed to stimulate production and whilst attractive prices 
and a high demand for anilyne dye substitutes boosted Sierra 
Leone's camwood trade with Britain, the price dropped 
dramatically in June 1915 from £25 to £8 per ton.82
If the kola trade yielded a total revenue of £302,720 in 
1916, the credit must go directly to the Syrians who 
conducted the trade almost entirely with other West African 
colonies.83 Syrian enterprise helped to mitigate the hazards 
which affected the kola industry in 1917 when only 1,702 tons 
were exported; this notwithstanding the total value for kola
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exports was higher compared with the figures for 1916, 
chiefly because the price rose in October 1917 to an 
unprecedented £30 per annum.84 The same trend was to govern 
the ginger trade in 1918 when high prices stimulated 
harvesting and sustained the demand for the crop until the 
onset of the rains.
Declining prices and the ban placed on the importation of 
hides into the U.K. however combined to dislocate this 
industry. The price of hides advanced between 1914 and 1916, 
but it dropped steadily in 1918 in spite of a plentiful 
supply. As buyers evinced little enthusiasm for the 
commodity, many of the hides stored became subject to the 
ravages of insects and the cattle plague in French Guinea in 
1918 further hindered the future of the market. By dint of 
fortuitous circumstances many kola trees reached the age of 
fruit bearing in 1918 so that the trade with neighbouring 
colonies (2,302 tons) yielded a total revenue of £397,726, - 
£76,599 higher than that for 1917.
On the whole comparative figures show that the import and 
export trade for 1918 surpassed in value those for any year 
since August 1914. The aggregate increase of trade over 1917 
was £366,460 or 11.45% and as the Comptroller of Customs 
argued, the probable reason was the high prices paid for most 
commodities85 but the oil palm industry was to receive 
severe shocks caused by a combination of internal and 
external factors.
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Chapter 8: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT II
Just as World War 1 complicated the problems faced by the 
colonial government in raising revenue, the closure of the 
German market dealt a severe blow to the oil palm industry. 
As Sierra Leone's major export commodity, kernels far 
exceeded in value the contributions made by other products in 
the export trade of the dependency. From at least 1901, the 
output of kernels increased till it reached an all time high 
in 1913 when a total tonnage of 49,201 yielded £920,943 (or 
68% out of £1,376,603 derived from the produce and 
manufacture of the country) Once the first sod for railway 
building was cut in 1896, commercial expansion in colonial 
Sierra Leone became a function of developments in 
communications. The railway itself reached the palm belt in 
1904 with significant consequences for overall revenue. 
Whereas between 1901 and 1903, the average value of kernel 
exports was £186,000, between 1905 and 1908, it was £344,000; 
in the same period, the total value of exports rose from 
£375,000 to £711,000.1
Regarded as a "sovereign tree" by Alldridge2 the oil palm 
(elaeis quineensis) in Sierra Leone was found in five 
varieties (locally known as kawei, henoi, iiakeve, kpolei and 
toqboi) with "togboi" yielding the highest oil content in the 
pericarp and the fruit. The tree which prospered on the rich 
soil of the mangrove accumulations, abounded in Mahela, up 
the Searcies river and in the lower part of Limba district.
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It required "neither planting nor watering" and served 
diverse purposes - providing food and drink, oil for locally 
manufactured lamps and above all, employment.4 It was partly 
the cessation of German trade, the lack of adequate machinery 
in Britain and the failure by British farmers to use the 
kernel cake as fodder that arrested progress in this industry 
in 1914.
In November when all enemy firms had been closed in the Gold 
Coast and Nigeria the German firm Deutsche Kamerun 
Gesselleschaft in Sierra Leone was refused permission to ship 
500 bags of kernels to London.5 In many ways, wartime 
conditions in Britain impinged significantly on developments 
in the oil palm industry. Desperate to eradicate competition 
and secure the gains derived from acting as intermediaries 
between British manufacturers and West African producers, the 
London and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce were making 
strident calls after August 1914 for the closure of German 
trading establishments in Sierra Leone.6 The only drawback 
was the dearth of machinery in Britain to take full advantage 
of the opportunity created; and although France was to 
receive some of West Africa's surplus kernels in return for 
removing the surtax d 1entrepot,7 Britain could only deal with
7,000 tons out of the 30,000 tons she was expected to receive 
in August 1914. In addition, a market still had to be found 
for the kernel cake® to prevent Sierra Leone's and Nigeria's 
kernels reaching Germany via Holland.9
The feverish efforts exerted by British merchants in their 
bid to secure the trade for Britain culminated in a meeting
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held at the Colonial Office in August 1914. The object was 
to find a means of alleviating "the serious loss likely to be 
incurred by the colonies concerned" whose annual production 
of palm kernels was valued at £7,500,000. Some 10,000 tons 
of kernels were taken up in Britain by the African Oil Mills 
Company (Liverpool) by smaller mills and margarine makers, 
but they could not absorb the 26,000 tons available monthly.
Various Chambers of Commerce and companies operating oil 
mills were therefore to be urged to extend the oil crushing 
industry in Britain.10 Thereafter, the London Chamber of 
Commerce circularised all heads of Agricultural Training 
Colleges and Experimental stations in Britain and the Royal 
Agricultural Society of England with an appeal to bring the 
palm nut cake to the notice of farmers in order to establish 
a regular demand there.11 Sir Owen Philipps even promised to 
reciprocate the efforts of millers in Hull or any port 
prepared to take up the matter by ensuring that the shipping 
companies provide the necessary service to meet their 
requirements. The desire was to use the war to secure the 
profits hitherto enjoyed by the Germans.
The commercial possibilities to be reaped from using the 
kernel cake were enormous. Apart from utilising palm kernel 
oil in the manufacture of soap and candles and in the 
preparation of various edible fats - cooking fats, vegetable 
butter - the meal or cake was valuable as cattle feed. Above 
all in Germany, palm kernel cake produced through the solvent 
process was found to be more digestible than meals from 
hydraulic presses.12 Against this background, the press came
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to constitute a powerful lobby for West African kernels, 
urging British farmers to shed their conservatism and take up 
the feed-stuff.13 But whilst British merchants attempted to 
come to terms with the loss of the German market, the impact 
on the oil palm industry in Sierra Leone was slight in 1914. 
The dependency could clearly not escape the consequences of 
the loss of German trade and the war merely aggravated the 
decline that had begun in late 1913. The major variable 
governing trade in the Railway District was the depression in 
prices paid for palm kernels.
As producers held back their kernels in anticipation of high 
prices, production dropped between May and September.14 If 
there was a contraction in both the value and tonnage of palm 
kernel exports between January and December 1914, the war was 
not the only cause for by December, many steamers were still 
plying the route between Freetown and Liverpool. Favourable 
prices governed the palm oil market in 1914 yet, ironically, 
there was a drop of 95,077 gallons in exports from January to 
July compared with the same period for 1913. The partial 
failure of the first rice crop, the inducement to work on 
road construction and falling prices after August restricted 
expansion in the oil palm industry.
In Sherbro in particular only a quarter of the usual supply 
was produced between August and December. The industry was 
further affected by chiefs who diverted labour towards town 
building16 and due to low prices coupled with the 
disturbances resulting from the Leopard murder cases, 
producers became "indifferent and careless in the manufacture
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of the oil".1'7 The decline in the palm kernel trade was 
reflected in the import sector, and in low railway and 
customs receipts. With the Liverpool market offering only 
£15 or £16 a ton a few purchases were being made at £11 
leaving the trader with a very small margin of profit after 
paying increased charges for freight and insurance.18 By 
December however, there was little need for pessimism; the 
decision to erect crushing mills in Britain was to alleviate 
the problems in the oil palm industry the only drawback being 
the shortage of ships to carry further cargo.
In January 1915, the London Oil and Tallows Trade Association 
passed a resolution in support of active steps to secure West 
Africa’s palm kernel trade for Britain. These efforts began 
to yield positive results by March. Eight firms in Britain 
took up the challenge whilst others ordered machinery needed 
to adapt their existing plant to handling kernels. 14 
institutions also began elaborate experiments with the kernel 
cake with encouraging results at Cambridge, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Aberdeen and North Wales University Colleges. This 
was accompanied by a corresponding increase in the price of 
the cake (£6/10 per ton compared with £5/5 from 1907-14) What 
was now needed was government’s cooperation to render the 
market in Britain "less dependent upon foreign countries than 
hitherto."19
By September, the British Incorporated Chamber of Commerce 
was also evincing an interest in the trade and needed an 
assurance that they would not lose their trade at the end of 
the war.20 Even the Board of Trade now came to devote
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careful attention to the merits of palm nut and coco-nut cake 
and meals, disseminating their findings in two pamphlets.21
In spite of these positive developments in Britain local 
factors were to prove a hindrance to the palm kernel and palm 
oil trade in Sierra Leone later in the year. Initially in 
the Railway District, the palm kernel trade showed a 
depressed but reviving market, but 1915 was a record one for 
the palm oil trade as exports shot up to the highest levels 
(218,400 tons) since 1908. The sharp rise in prices at the 
beginning of the oil season jolted producers on to increased 
production,22 but elsewhere in Sherbro, the export trade in 
kernels remained risky because of the lack of shipping and 
storage facilities.23 The problems which plagued the
industry are best appreciated by an examination of 
developments in Ronietta. 1915 was essentially a year of 
mixed fortunes and unfulfilled promise for the industry. 
That year when the fruit was ripe, prices for kernels fell 
from 8/ to 2/6d per imperial bushel and the lack of a market 
for the commodity posed serious problems.
Even though the Makump-Makeni line was formally opened to 
traffic facilitating the tapping of new palm bearing areas, 
only 2,219 tons of kernels were carried on the branch line 
from Makeni to Bauya (as against 2,702 tons for 1914) The 
same quantity (64 tons) of palm oil was carried on the 
extension as in 1914 but the result showed that the 
proportion of palm oil to palm kernels sold, exceeded that 
for previous years though local demand for palm oil for home 
consumption and for the manufacture of "native soap"
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increased due to the high cost of imported goods.
Opportunities for the production of plantation palm oil were 
lost in 1915 as local factors continued to insinuate
themselves into the industry, culminating in the closure of
Messrs Lever Brothers experiment at Yonibana. In spite of 
their huge capital investment, (£30,000) the company gave 12 
months notice that they would surrender their lease of land 
on 1st March. This development was largely connected with
the dearth of labour for expressing the oil. The bulk of the 
labour for cracking the nuts devolved on to the women whilst 
the men collected the fruit, transported it for sale, built 
houses and cleared roads.24
Although the company's mills were situated on the branch line 
of the railway in an area blessed with fine palm belts, its 
very short history in Yonibana since 1912, began in less 
auspicious circumstances. The revenue of Sierra Leone was 
not destined to benefit from attempts at erecting
depericarping machinery in the Protectorate designed to 
generate increased oil yields from the country's most 
important resource. Ten years after the failure of Lever 
Brothers, scientific cultivation of the oil palm had still 
not begun in Sierra Leone. Lever's problems initially began 
over the price to be paid for the fruit. The Company offered 
30/ per ton whilst the chiefs requested 60/. Though the 
ultimate price accepted was 30/, insufficient fruit was 
forthcoming. In 1915, the company (with the approval of 
government) employed labourers to cut and collect the fruit, 
paying l/6d per 15 heads delivered on the mono-rail (laid
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down to Small Magbassa) and 3d per 15 heads to the owners of 
the palms through the headmen. This worked out at 
approximately 1 per head. But the almost insurmountable
problems of labour forced the company to abandon its 
concession in December 1915.
The available evidence shows that failure was due to the low 
price paid for the fruit, the disinclination of producers to 
carry palm heads over long distances, the inadequacy of 
transport facilities from the palm belts to the factory, the 
antagonistic attitude of small traders who persuaded 
producers against supplying the company and as M.T. Dawe 
(Commissioner for Lands and Forest) argued, "the inability of 
the native to appreciate the advantages" of selling his palm 
fruit - losing the pericarp oil which he required for 
domestic use and the palm nut which provided employment for 
wives and children in their spare hours.25
Phillips has argued that the company failed because it did 
not understand that existing methods of oil production were 
deeply embedded in a specific sexual division of labour,26 
yet perhaps of greater importance was the fact that the 
company lacked any rights over the palm trees in Sierra 
Leone. They had no rights to collect the fruits themselves 
neither could they force the people to do so.27 Therefore 
export of kernels whilst increasing in volume (39,624 tons as 
against 35,915 tons for 1914) depreciated in value (£504,033 
as against £559,313 for 1914) At one time, prices on the 
European market for palm kernels fell as low as £12/10 a ton 
whereas the price for 1914 never dropped below £17. Because
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prices were well maintained throughout the year the aggregate 
trade for palm oil exports increased in both volume (1,935 
tons) and value (£45,671) The establishment of crushing 
mills in Britain by the end of December 1915 enabled her to 
take 384,006 gallons out of a total volume of 481,157 gallons 
whilst France received 89,869 gallons.28
By April 1916, millers and crushers, margarine manufacturers 
and agriculturalists were responding to the more vigorous 
campaigns to secure West Africa's palm kernel trade for 
Britain. Crushers in the neighbourhood of Hull began 
importing kernels and crushing them for the first time; in 
return shippers agreed to deliver kernels at Hull at the same 
rate for freight as to Liverpool. During 1915, 18 steamers 
from West Africa had delivered 51,248 tons of palm kernels 
valued at £827,653 to Hull and 178,060 tons to Liverpool. 
The results showed a great increase in the tonnage of palm 
kernels taken up by Britain between 1913 and 1915. The 
margarine industry expanded and as high prices for butter 
increased so did the demand for margarine; new factories were 
erected to absorb an increasing quantity of edible oil. The 
attention of farmers in Britain was now drawn to a new 
material and the industry was materially assisted by the high 
cost of other food stuffs commonly used by farmers.29
By August 1918, the Committee on Edible Nuts and Oils had met 
to consider the position of West Africa's trade in palm 
kernels and other edible and oil producing nuts and seeds. 
In order to secure these commodities for crushing industries 
in Britain, the committee suggested imposing an export duty
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of £2 per ton on kernels which was to be remitted if the 
kernels were crushed in Britain. In Sierra Leone however, 
many variables were affecting production. Producers received 
low prices, suffered from the activities of a group of 
foreign firms which had constituted themselves into a Combine 
to preserve their interests, lack of shipping space and 
delays which caused the kernels to deteriorate in quality.
Willing to reciprocate the efforts of British industrialists, 
Wilkinson argued that what was needed was increased 
production to be secured through extending the railway into 
Kono and Limba country, improving wharf facilities and making 
transportation cheaper in order to secure better prices for 
producers. Above all, the destruction of the oil palm for 
its "cabbage" and for palm wine had to be guarded against. 
The Sierra Leone section of the London Chamber of Commerce 
however rejected proposals to hold shippers to their bonds 
until they provided documents to show that their kernels had 
been delivered to a seed crusher in Britain.30
The Committee argued that for many years, German traders in 
British West Africa had enjoyed and even abused British 
hospitality and because Australia had successfully eliminated 
German influence in the base metal industry, it was suggested 
that the same could be done for the palm kernel trade. What 
was now needed was an effective demand in Britain to match 
the supply. It was obvious therefore that the aim was not 
merely to confine the trade to the U.K. but to retain it in 
British hands long after the war.31 The impact of these 
measures was felt in the dependency where local factors now
310
aided production.
The Railway District came to occupy the premier place in the 
palm kernel trade, sending 19,539 tons down the railway. The 
trading station at Sumbuya also contributed immensely to the 
total produce shipped from Bonthe. 293,489 gallons of oil 
were also shipped from the district showing an increase of
75,000 gallons over that for for 1915. With yearly prices on 
the European market averaging £36 and £22 for palm oil and 
palm kernels respectively, it was mainly increased prices and 
the willingness of producers to respond to increased demands 
which determined the export trade in oil and kernels in 
1916.32
The trade in palm kernels managed to recapture its usual 
vitality recording an increase in tonnage in both volume and 
value. 45,316 tons valued £680,705 were exported to the U.K. 
whilst higher prices for palm oil on the European market 
ensured that 406,516 gallons were sent to Britain and 129,025 
gallons to France which had successfully replaced Germany in 
the produce trade.33 The only problem facing the industry in 
1916 was the shortage of shipping space. The proposal that 
Elder Dempster be given additional tonnage to ship more palm 
kernels to Britain for the manufacture of glycerine was 
rejected and even when Lever Brothers bought six more ships 
for the purpose, three were taken over by the Admiralty.
By February 1917, the Sierra Leone government was opposing 
the proposed price of £12 as too low for a ton of kernel. 
This was predicated on the fact that it was bound to affect
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production. The reaction was in response to Lord Devenport's 
attempts to reduce the price of kernels without providing 
enough freight for merchants or offering a price at Liverpool 
which made for a reasonable profit. As the activities of the 
Combine in Freetown were regarded as "bad enough," the 
Secretary of State ordered that the Ministry of Food purchase 
all kernels at a fixed price. This was essential as merchants 
and producers had little influence over the differences in 
prices between Liverpool and the west coast of Africa, which 
were in turn determined by increased freights, war insurance, 
delays in shipments and interest charges for stocks in hand.
Under pressure from the Sierra Leone and Nigerian governments 
Walter Long ordered that prices at Liverpool be fixed at £12 
a ton. On 20th March Mr. Bigland was appointed to control 
the supply of vegetable oil, fats and oil seeds and the 
disposal of the manufactured products such as oil, cake, 
meal, soap and margarine, and to prohibit the import of 
oleaginous material except under licence.35 Then on 4th
August the Colonial Office ordered all West African colonies 
except the Gambia to prohibit the export of all fats, animal 
and vegetable oils except to the U.K.36 Through such laws
the government hoped to secure the trade firmly in the hands
of British manufacturers. But at a time when Wilkinson was 
frowning on an offer of £12 a ton for kernels, H.M. 
government was proposing to fix the price at £10.
The news which leaked out before the governor declared it
jolted the Combine into action and in an attempt to preempt 
any move to raise the price, they declared £10 a fair
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bargain. The serious opposition which this elicited from 
smaller European firms, Syrian merchants and others operating 
through Messrs Pickering and Berthoud and the Cooperative 
Wholesale Society, ultimately ensured that fairer prices were 
paid. Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils also 
saw in the proposals of 20th March the potential for 
enhancing the activities of the Combine and for the "pooling 
of profits" that might not "serve any imperial purpose." 
Rather they favoured competition provided the price paid 
allowed a reasonable profit for the producer.37
In 1917 the average monthly price for kernels on the European 
market was (£25 per ton) the highest since 1914. The same was 
true for oil (£44 per ton) The effects were immediately felt 
in Railway District, Ronietta38 and Northern Sherbro where 
collection of the palm fruit was well maintained with price 
levels touching 8/ per bushel.39 Increased demands for the 
oleaginous products of West Africa ensured that the volume 
(58,020 tons) and value (£842,508) of Sierra Leone's palm 
kernels peaked to record levels - the highest since 1914. 
However shipping difficulties and other expenses were to 
force producers to accept greatly reduced prices. The fact 
also that they had to contend with increases of between 200% 
and 300% for imported goods had an adverse effect on 
production. Though fewer gallons (543,183 valued at £62,385) 
were exported in 1917, (unlike 557,751 gallons valued at 
£53,622 for 1916) attractive prices on the European market 
ensured higher values than those for 1916. Of the aggregate 
trade in palm oil, 526,043 gallons went to France. The 
decline in the quantity exported was mainly due to the local
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demand for palm oil for home consumption and for the 
manufacture of "native soap."
By 1918 discussions had come to centre on the methods to be 
employed to control "essential raw materials" including 
oleaginous products for the British empire after the war. It 
was envisaged that 889,000 tons of oils and fats would be 
needed alone for the U.K. to meet the requirements of the 
margarine, soap and candle industries. The probable 
requirements of Allied countries also needed to be 
ascertained. It was feared that linseed oil from Russia and 
Argentina, soya beans from China and copra from the Dutch 
East Indies would not suffice for Germany's needs after the 
war, and since she would thus have to look to British West 
Africa for palm kernels, there was an even greater need for 
firmer control by Britain and France.41 Thus on 4th November 
a differential import duty first imposed on tin ore in the 
Straits and Nigeria was also extended to West Africa's palm 
kernels - to be in force for five years after the war.42
It was obvious that the objective was clearly part of an 
economic offensive designed to exploit the fears of German 
business men regarding the future of German trade after the 
war and "to force them to seek peace in order to save 
themselves from economic ruin." More importantly, it was a 
"trade war" calculated to establish a basis for bargaining in 
the peace negotiations, create material injury to Germany and 
by so doing, weaken her capacity to wage war. In short, it 
was to be a "policy of war after the war."43
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These developments on the international scene were not 
matched by developments in the oil palm industry in Sierra 
Leone. Even though 1918 was statistically the best on record 
from the standpoint of revenue, the country's domestic 
exports shrank considerably in both volume and value - 
yielding an aggregate tonnage of 41,858 valued at £716,885. 
This contrasted sharply with figures for 1917 (60,192 tons
for both palm kernels and palm oil valued at £904,893) Such 
paradoxes owed their origins to the low prices paid to 
producers, acute labour shortages caused by the recruitment 
of carriers and the increased prices of kerosene which forced 
many people in Sherbro to turn to palm oil for fuel. Low 
prices were in turn a function of the speculative nature of 
the trade, the extraordinary fluctuations in freight and 
shipping difficulties in Sherbro.44
Generally, the "flu" epidemic, the early rains of 1918 and 
the high cost of imported goods combined to paralyse progress 
within the industry. Influenza, felt most acutely in August 
and September - usually the best months for kernel shipping - 
accounted for a deficit of 13,015 tons. The early rains 
which hampered rice cultivation, diverted the energies of 
men, women and children from nut cracking to food production 
and because low prices were paid in a period of high prices 
for imported goods, the result was widespread apathy among 
producers.
The same factors affected the palm oil market in 1918. In 
fact not a single gallon of oil left the country in 
September. It should be observed however that palm oil
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production was always an occasional rather than a regular
industry;45 local methods of oil production often involved a 
long and laborious process and producers were "routiniers 
dans leurs habitudes et en general assez peu disposes a leurs 
modifiers."46 More importantly for our purposes, producers 
throughout the war found themselves subjected to the 
manipulative tactics of a Combine of firms operating in the 
dependency. By 1913 foreign firms like the C.F.A.O. and 
Lever Brothers were clearly striking deep roots in commercial 
activities in the Colony. They were also desperately seeking 
concessions to install machinery and light railway rolling
stock to express the oil from the pericarp of the palm fruit 
and to transport it to the main railway stations.47
The beginnings of the activities of the Combine in Freetown 
could be traced to 1915 when Messrs Paterson Zochonis and the
C.F.A.O. with their stores at Sawpit, barricaded the
embankment at the wharf thereby preventing local traders from 
using the customs shed which normally attended to crafts from 
Sherbro, Kambia, the Searcies and Port Loko. Local traders 
saw in this an attempt to establish control over the trade by 
ensuring that their "coaxers" or "runners" took trade from 
the crafts to them only. Government ignored initial protests 
from Krio traders like John Benjamin and William Cole and by 
the time the activities of the Combine came to light in 1916, 
it found it had left it too late to protect the interest of 
African traders.48
By December 1916 Wilkinson was forced to acknowledge the fact 
that the fate of local producers was in the hands of the
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Combine at the centre of which stood the Freetown Chamber of 
Commerce. Whilst producers prepared the oil and kernels for 
the market, they received very low prices though they had to 
pay high prices for imported goods. The effects were 
particularly felt in the kernel trade in which producers had 
to contend with reduced prices, high rates for freights by 
Elder Dempster, payments for war risks to ships and insurance 
on the kernels. The Combine also exploited the shortage of 
shipping by allocating space only among its members. This 
they justified on the grounds that they incurred losses due 
to the special rates paid on available steamers. To defray 
such losses they reduced producer prices but Wilkinson 
doubted the authenticity of their claims. Evidence that the 
Combine was making huge profits was adduced from the 
commission paid on profits by the parent firms (in London) to 
local agents "who are notoriously prosperous..." and from the 
discrepancy in the rates paid for kernels in Freetown and 
Bonthe. In December 1913, the price paid at Bonthe was 
£17.10 as against £23 per ton in England; in 1916 the Bonthe 
price was £12 as against £25 per ton in England.
As few steamers called at Bonthe the profits which hitherto 
accrued from cheap rates of freight were now rarely made. The 
Combine thus tried to secure this by a further reduction in 
the price paid to producers. African traders responded by 
combining with Syrians at Bonthe to buy small vessels to send 
produce to Freetown. But the Combine moved vigorously to 
secure lighterage to check competition. The prevalent belief 
among Africans therefore was that only the return of the 
Germans would revive competition but Wilkinson was convinced
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that "the Germans would join the Combine."49
Though the clout of the Combine was not as great as that in 
Nigeria the Colonial Office was forced to admit its existence 
in Freetown in 1917.50 By this time also the press and 
various Traders’ Associations in Freetown and Bonthe were 
petitioning the administration to "do its duty and suppress 
this illegal form of business."51 Members of the group were 
loath to be referred to as a Combine and adopted the 
euphemistic title of "Produce Committee.” Their principal 
objective was to regulate the price of kernels. They aimed 
to secure "fair shares" of the kernel, oil and ginger trade 
for their members on a scale of percentages determined by the 
average shipment made by each member firm before the 
formation of the Committee, eliminate the "coaxers" or 
"runners" who acted as middlemen from the produce trade and 
secure tonnage space for its members. By these methods local 
producers and traders were left stranded; so were four 
smaller firms excluded from the group because they could not 
provide evidence of shipment before the war to qualify them 
for membership. However the vigorous opposition posed by 
this group helped to prevent the Combine "adopting the 
methods of an unscrupulous trust."52
Whilst the activities of the Combine served to undermine the 
enthusiasm of producers in the oil palm industry shipping 
difficulties throughout the war compounded the crisis with 
significant consequences for revenue. Sierra Leone's export 
trade in oil and kernels depended extensively on a successful 
shipping trade with the port of Freetown and Sherbro. The
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withdrawal of the Woermann Linie shipping service which had 
hitherto carried the bulk of palm oil and palm kernel exports 
made Sierra Leone's shipping very erratic. From 11th August 
1914 rates for freights and passages were increased by 50%53 
on Elder Dempster Lines which now enjoyed a virtual monopoly 
of the shipping trade. Though these rates were later reduced 
to 20%, shipping was grinding to a halt by September when 
Elder Dempster complained that their steamers had been 
suspended.54
The hope that the steamer service between the U.S.A. and 
West Africa would be doubled with the withdrawal of German 
shipping55 did not materialise so that in Ronietta recourse 
was had to the mail boat service which plied the route 
between Moyamba, Sembehun and the Bagru river.56 The decline 
in customs receipts in 1914 was therefore partly the result 
of the dislocation of sea-borne commerce. From August 1914 
German steamers stopped calling at Mano Salija, Sulima, Gene, 
Mahela Kikonkeh and Provo Point in the Searcies. One 
significant consequence of this was the dominance Britain 
came to enjoy in the overall import and export trade of the 
dependency. Though there was a decrease of 4 1/2 per cent in 
shipping tonnage in 1914, British tonnage by this time had 
increased by 59,601.
The contraction in shipping which was later to affect the 
palm oil and palm kernel industries should be attributed to 
the withdrawal of German ships, the lack of a market for palm 
produce in the earlier months of the war, the uncertainty 
regarding the safety of transit and the extremely high rates
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of insurance.57 If the shortage of freight and the
consequent difficulty of obtaining materials from England 
forced the government to abandon a large number of new works 
provided for in the estimates for 1915,58 the crisis was 
exacerbated by the requirements of the army and navy, by 
abnormal shipping casualties and by the internment of ships 
in enemy ports since August 1914. In 1915, 1,146 vessels
with an aggregate tonnage of 1,635,119 entered and cleared 
from the port (compared with 1,788 ships with 2,780,18 tons 
in 1914) and although Britain was responsible for 94% of the 
shipping trade,5® this development was hardly enough to fill 
the vacuum created by the withdrawal of German ships.
By August 1915 the lack of shipping services was causing 
feverish competition among shippers for space on Elder 
Dempster ships and because the Combine was influencing the 
allocation of available space, smaller firms, small traders 
and shippers were particularly vulnerable. By this time 
Admiralty requirements had taken up 25% of Elder Dempster's 
total tonnage while regular steamers were being diverted to 
meet army and naval needs. Further congestion at home ports 
such as Liverpool and the difficulties of re-exporting 
impeded the prompt discharge of steamers. Not even the large 
firms could agree to Elder Dempster's suggestion that 
available steamer space be divided "pro rata", on the basis 
of pre-war average shipments. Smaller firms and African 
producers were therefore at a disadvantage since Elder 
Dempster decided to deal with "the regular rather than the 
casual and new shipper."60
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The result was a flood of complaints to the Colonial Office 
and threats by some British firms to refuse orders from West 
Africa for "the name of Elder Dempster stinks in the nostrils 
of the Railway Companies here..."61 The export trade of 
Sierra Leone must have suffered from this bickering in 
commercial circles as smaller firms were "quietly" being
"frozen out."62 The uncertainty governing the shipping trade 
was partly responsible for the decline in the palm kernel
industry where shipments fell from 559,313 tons in 1914 to 
504,033 tons in 1915.
The same factors persisted in 1916 when only 796 ships with a 
tonnage of 1,553,312 entered and cleared from the port 
(compared with 1,146 ships with an aggregate of 1,635,119 
tons in 1915) Britain continued to dominate the shipping 
trade with the dependency but despite increased revenues in 
1916, the disruption in maritime commerce placed severe 
restrictions on both the inward and outward trade of the 
country.63 Conditions had not altered by 1917 and the
decrease in tonnage (1,526,640) was mainly due to the 
"intensified campaign of frightfulness on the sea..."65
Paradoxically in 1918 when the export trade in palm oil and 
palm kernels declined, mercantile activity with the Colony 
experienced a great revival. Returns show a total of 821 
ships with a tonnage of 1,736,247. This was lower when
compared with the immediate pre-war period, yet from a 
commercial standpoint the results were in many ways
satisfactory. "The successful keeping of the seas" and "the 
efficiency of the convoy system" attracted many ships to
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Freetown and Mahela even at a time when the submarine menace 
was most threatening. Generally shipping in 1918 did not 
adhere to the normal routes of peace time. Many vessels were 
chartered out of their own countries and though French and 
Belgian steamers no longer called regularly at the port, the 
establishment of a naval base at Freetown and its role as the 
connecting link in the great convoy system conferred many 
more blessings on the port in 1918 than in any other year 
since August 1914. Some of the principal steamers which 
called at the port included the British and Africa Steamship 
Navigation Company, Elder Dempster Lines, the African 
Steamship Company and the Union Castle Line.66
On the whole, the vicissitudes and shifts in the palm kernel 
and palm oil trade imposed severe constraints on the fortunes 
of revenue throughout the war. Foreign (merchant) capital 
represented by Lever Brothers failed to stimulate development 
or growth within the oil palm industry and the strict 
adherence to traditional modes of production by local 
producers did little to alleviate the difficulties introduced 
by shortage of shipping space. Only in 1925 did the 
Secretary of State begin to address the question of improving 
the quality and increasing the quantity of palm oil and 
kernels through scientific methods of production. This was 
due to the dangers confronting West Africa's palm oil trade 
caused by competition from the Dutch West Indies and Malaya, 
where scientific cultivation was producing superior oil and 
kernels on a far more prolific scale than the "wild and 
uncultivated oil palm of West Africa."67
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Chapter 9: WAR, RICE AND FOOD SHORTAGES.
Around 8 p.m. on the night of 18th July 1919, there was 
nothing beyond the usual liveliness that characterised the 
torch light processions held in connection with the Peace 
Celebrations - a victory parade designed to mark the end of 
the war. Around 8.15 p.m. also there was nothing beyond a 
number of parties parading the streets, singing patriotic 
airs. By 8.30 however, an attempt was made to break into a 
Syrian's shop at Westmoreland Street in the West end of 
Freetown. Egged on by police inability to curb the first 
excesses, the crowds swelled and the looting of Syrian shops 
became common place.1
The Anti-Syrian Riots of 1919, the subject of great 
controversy among scholars,2 do not directly concern us here. 
Rather, the aim is to show to what extent the war contributed 
to the outbreak of violence in post-war Sierra Leone. Far 
from attributing sole blame to the Syrians, it is argued that 
the riots were, inter alia, a function of socio-economic 
forces unleashed partly by the Great War; in all this, the 
main trigger for urban and rural radicalism was widespread 
famine caused by rice and food shortages.
This is not to deny the fact that the displacement of the 
Krio by the Syrian entrepreneurs from their position of pre­
eminence in local commerce and Syrian sexual contacts with 
Krio girls had soured the relationship between both groups.
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But World War I had left behind a legacy of distress and 
privation in both the Colony and Protectorate. The economy 
itself was in dire straits when compared with the immediate 
pre-war period. The outbreak of smallpox (1916) and 
influenza (1918) had exerted a severe strain on the morale of 
the population. Perhaps more importantly, the failure by 
government to devise a work scheme for the demobilised 
soldiers and carriers helped to increase the ranks of the 
unemployed in Freetown. To this was added the many migrants 
from the Protectorate who fled to escape the onerous burden 
of taxation imposed on them by extortionate chiefs. The 
potential which all this had for the making of an "urban mob" 
was clearly not lost on the press which by June was 
commenting on the wave of "vandalism," "burglary and night 
thefts" that had come to dominate life in Freetown.3
The factors which jolted that mob into a rebellious spirit 
included the early rains and poor harvests of 1918 which led 
to the famine of 1919; the frequent incidence of food 
shortages and high prices of basic commodities, a common 
feature throughout the war; the hoarding of basic foodstuffs; 
the inordinate attempts at profiteering by local, European 
and Syrian traders and above all, the bungling attempts by 
government to address the food problem. Only by examining 
these variables can the historian begin to understand the 
nature and timing of the events of July 1919.
What happened then was essentially a desperate attempt by the 
masses to find food and stave off the "pinch of hunger,"4 for 
Syrian competition and seduction of Krio girls did not
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suddenly become unbearable in July 1919. In a sense 
therefore the debacle of 1919 centred around rice, the 
nation's staple. As the Attorney-General rightly argued, 
"rice" and the failure by government to extend war bonus to 
all classes "were the pegs on which the riot depended..."5 In 
order to explain the cataclysm of 1919, this chapter examines 
the nature of rice and food shortages between 1910 and the 
eve of war, official policy towards rice and food and the 
general fortunes of the rice crop between August 1914 and 
1918.
The acute shortage of rice and other foodstuffs in 1910, was 
poor augury for the shape of things to come. In many ways, 
the famine reflected the inability of the local population to 
adjust to abnormal circumstances and more significantly to 
effect diversification in agricultural methods and diet. As 
the nation's chief staple, rice was cultivated extensively in 
nearly all districts in Sierra Leone - from Moyamba, 
Kangahun, Mano, Tabe and the inland towns, the growth was 
reportedly "luxuriant," though from Songo to Rotifunk in 
Ronietta the excessive heat of the sun scorched the young 
plants and retarded the litoma and other varieties.6
Although maize was grown in both the Colony and Protectorate, 
producers and consumers had very limited use for it as food 
apart from boiling, roasting and preparing it as "agidi" (a 
powdered form). Above all, maize was easily susceptible to 
weevils and the experiment with seed supplies from the Gold 
Coast did not in any way alleviate the famine of 1910. Apart 
from the positive results yielded by Alimamy Tosana, Chief
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Caulker of Rotifunk and Pa Bana, (all in the Railway 
District) the casks of seeds sent to Karene, Northern 
Sherbro, Ronietta and parts of Railway District, were either 
in a state of semi-fermentation or were rendered sterile by 
weevils.7
Cassava, a root tuber always supplemented the rice crop. 
"Foo-foo" (fermented cassava) also generated a lucrative 
business and sometimes dominated railway freight between 
Freetown, Bo and beyond. But the shift to "foofoo" 
production in 1910 exhausted the cassava crop, led to high 
prices and raised the demand for rice and other crops. "Dr" 
Abayomi Cole, whilst attributing these problems to poor 
agricultural methods recommended that cassava be planted 
separately rather than being 1 scattered in rice farms." He 
had tried this successfully by planting 50 acres of cassava 
at Mabang in the S B Thomas estate and by September 1910, was 
experimenting with another 20 acres at Kangahun.8 But the 
Mabang experiment was clearly a lone effort designed to 
mitigate the food problem of 1910.
The abnormally high prices of food made it impossible for 
some government contractors to fulfil their food contracts. 
At Bonthe for example, the usual ball of "foofoo," normally 
sold for l/2d, was reduced to a quarter of its size for the 
same price.9 The prospects for agricultural diversification 
were therefore bleak and it was chiefly the desire to achieve 
variety in diet that led Governor Probyn to commence cooking 
classes for Krios, the Kroo community and for Protectorate 
women then resident in Freetown, under the direction of
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Abayomi Cole. The overall objective was to make corn into a 
"palatable foodstuff."10
Government was however slow to develop a much more consistent 
policy toward the problem of food shortage. By November 1910 
when the crisis had not yet abated, the Comptroller of 
Customs suggested that the import duty on rice should not be 
reimposed.11 The shortage itself had been due in part to 
the insufficiency of seed rice and the early rains of 1909
which interfered with the proper burning of the bush and
forced farmers to abandon their farms.12 So grave was the
crisis that many people were forced to either harvest the 
rice before it was due or cut down young palm trees for 
food.13 Urgent steps were therefore needed to alleviate 
hunger and prevent the population from committing "very rash 
acts."14
In order to prepare for the planting season of 1911, Governor 
Probyn suggested obtaining "seed yams" and seed corn from the 
Gold Coast, and groundnuts from the Gambia. These were to be 
given to chiefs in return for providing labour on the Rowalla 
railway extension.15 Only then were sustained efforts begun 
to improve the agricultural resources of the country.
Propaganda work was also started aimed at fostering new 
products and improved methods of agriculture,16 but the 
results of such efforts were yet to be enjoyed nationwide for 
there were clearly problems well beyond the control of 
government.
The food scarcity of 1911 on Banana Island was mainly a
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function of the unusually high tides and heavy rains which 
prevented boats from leaving for Freetown.17 Apart from 
these problems, government was particularly culpable for 
failing to encourage individual enterprise. By 1910 for 
example, many Krios had embraced the philosophy of "back to 
the land..." as their best hope for prosperity and had 
therefore started many plantations. Z E Johnson of Hill 
Farm, Wilberforce, having just returned from the Botanic 
Gardens at Kew, was exploring different branches of 
agriculture and only needed enough land to carry out his 
experiment. His appeal for help however met with a firm 
rebuff from the Governor.18
By 1912 other factors were combining with natural hazards to 
cripple the fortunes of the rice crop. The wave of arrests 
in connection with the activities of the Human Leopard 
Society in Bonthe engendered fear and mistrust among many 
farmers who consequently fled the district leaving the rice 
to the mercy of birds.19 In fact conditions approximating 
those of 1910 had become a regular feature of the 
agricultural systems of the country. The spasmodic and 
erratic rainfall ensured severe shortages in many parts of 
the Protectorate.
As no rice was cultivated in Sherbro District, cassava (a 
crop low in vitamins and proteins, with a high carbohydrate 
content and little affected by the vicissitudes of rainfall) 
formed the main dietary supplement. But the first seedlings 
failed to germinate in the Railway District. No rains fell 
till the first week in June in Northern Sherbro and because
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the drought encouraged the development of insect pests, 50% 
of the young rice succumbed to maggots. Similar conditions 
prevailed in the Limba chiefdoms of Biriwa and Saffroko (to 
the south east of Koinadugu District) so that by 1912, the 
"rumour of rice shortage" had become an "annual 
institution..."20 Government's response then was to start an 
experimental farm at Njala21 designed to introduce some form 
of crop rotation and alter the allegedly wasteful methods of 
farming which then involved cutting and burning fresh bush 
each year. Favourable conditions in 1913 however produced a 
better crop and reduced the demand for imported rice.22
As war became imminent in Europe there were grave 
apprehensions in colonial circles regarding the policy to be 
pursued in the event of food shortages during an emergency. 
But the extent to which the issue of rice shortage was to 
become so politically volatile in 1919 was partly a function 
of the ad hoc policies pursued by government. According to 
the Defence Scheme (revised to May 1911) the garrison was to 
receive supplies of preserved meat, biscuits, groceries and 
dried vegetables from Britain in the event of war, but the 
Overseas Defence Committee which considered the question on 
24th February 1914, argued that the resources of Britain 
would be taxed to their utmost in war time.
The Committee also assumed that those dependencies which were 
not self-supporting were not, by dint of their geographical 
positions, likely to be cut off from allowances in the event 
of war and that to maintain large reserves of food supplies 
in peace time would be very expensive. Therefore, the
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provision of granaries in colonies like Sierra Leone had 
never been contemplated and the 0 D C was unwilling to 
recommend it. Rather, they suggested the collection of all 
food supplies and the purchase of additional supplies from 
neighbouring territories should the need arise.23 Governor 
Merewether was however afraid of the likely consequences of 
any suspension of mercantile activity should war erupt in 
Europe. Though the local defence scheme empowered him to 
seize grain and food in any emergency, the garrison was bound 
to have first claim on local supplies. Merewether feared 
that the amount of food in shops, stores and on board ships 
would not last very long; worse still, even if the export of 
rice to French Guinea were stopped, the quantity thus 
obtained would not last the civil population for even one 
month.24
The 0 D C even doubted whether in the event of an outbreak of 
hostilities, the local population would desert the Peninsula 
for the Protectorate or leave their comparatively isolated 
homes in the interior for Freetown. In framing their 
estimates for food supplies, the 0 D C therefore relied 
heavily on the census of 1911. With a population of about 
67,039 in the Peninsula, the Committee calculated that the 
monthly quota required for the African population would be 
837 tons of rice. To ensure a four month supply therefore, 
3,348 tons would be needed. Allowing a pound of flour and 
l/21b of rice a day for each European (307 in all) a total of 
3,357 tons for rice, 196 barrels of flour and 500 bags of 
salt were considered necessary for four months. But there
were other problems requiring urgent attention.
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It was doubtful whether the necessary supplies would be 
obtained locally in January when rice was usually harvested; 
the only feasible alternative it seemed would be to import 
foreign rice but this would have to be disposed of after six 
months when locally grown rice would have flooded the market. 
Another question concerned the preservation of the stock for 
the only known local method then was to treat the rice with 
pepper to prevent weevils.
Although the Committee was little apprehensive about the 
possibility of securing other food supplements such as fish, 
maize, cassava, palm oil and sweet potatoes, their optimism 
was to be proved short-lived by the harsh realities of war 
time and the vagaries of the weather. Not even the 
alternative of commandeering rice brought down the mouth of 
the Searcies held out any promise for such exports merely 
amounted to about a fifth of the quantity required for one 
month1s supply.
Setting up a government granary was bound to be very 
expensive. This would have entailed capital expenditure on 
stores and for purchasing reserve supplies, charges for 
supervision and the possible loss to be incurred through the 
need for turning over the stock periodically. The Committee 
therefore supported the Governor's suggestion that in the 
event of war, merchants were to maintain a stock of rice and 
flour for the use of government. Leading firms (such as the 
Sierra Leone Old Company, G B Ollivant, Paterson Zochonis) 
were also to pledge a willingness to maintain a standard 
minimum stock of rice and flour.25 Because of the acute
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differences between Sierra Leone and a self-supporting colony 
like Jamaica, a scheme to provide for the garrison for four 
months -based partly on available local reserves in 
government stores, partly on the completion of contracts 
signed before the commencement of hostilities and partly on 
what supplies Britain would be able to offer - was 
prepared.26
The outbreak of war in August 1914 was however to generate 
fears (albeit unfounded) in official and local circles that 
the rice crop in most places would be poor. District 
Commissioners were therefore instructed to purchase surplus 
rice and to form depots for storing the crop in their 
districts.27 146,1701bs of rice had been received in 
Freetown by 2nd September but this feverish accumulation of 
the nation's staple did not initially fulfill the purposes 
for which it was collected and merely plunged the government 
into serious losses. Merewether found it difficult to 
dispose of the rice even though it was offered at less than 
cost price to local merchants, French Guinea and the Gold 
Coast.2e Further problems confronted the government. Were 
the rice to be sold, it was doubtful whether there would be 
enough for the next three months; because the accumulated 
rice belonged to the 1913 crop, and because of the continued 
supplies from the Protectorate and the reduced demand for 
rice in Freetown, deterioration had also begun to set in by 
September.
Apart from the problem of storage, government also wished to 
avoid competition with the merchants whilst selling its own
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rice. By December therefore though government still had some 
40,0001bs in store, much of the rice, was either damaged and 
unfit for human consumption, or had to be sold at highly 
reduced rates (6/6d for a bushel of 801bs). The demands of 
the military authorities for 100,0001bs could therefore not 
be met.29
The problems faced by the colonial government in its attempts 
to address the question of food are best illustrated by an 
examination of the conditions in the Protectorate in the 
early months of war. In Ronietta for example, the late rains 
of 1914 put the first rice planted at the mercy of ants, rats 
and birds. The erratic rainfall which fell after a second 
crop had been planted caused the young crop to be scorched by 
the sun. But by 19 th August when orders came to halt 
purchases, the D C Moyamba was saddled with over 1,000 
bushels.
Between October and November new rice flooded the market and 
not even the very low price of 7/6d a bushel could attract 
buyers to the government's stocks. The price was thus scaled 
down to 3/6d at considerable loss to government.30 At Bonthe 
where the process of accumulation went further, the D C had 
to dispose of 2,500 bags, scaling the price down from 14/ to 
10/ per bushel. Yet it was impossible to sell the rice to 
the firms from whom the crop had been purchased. Though rice 
still sold for 13/6d a bushel in the Kittam (Northern 
Sherbro) the French Company there would not buy as it had 
considerable stocks in hand. It was also the absence of a 
uniform selling price which compounded the problems of the
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District Commissioner.
By the time the Comptroller of Customs stepped in to provide 
storage facilities, the price had fallen to 6/3d and the 
inevitable loss to government revenue was accentuated by 
increased freight to Freetown and the hazards of temperature 
which rendered the rice mouldy.31 In Northern Sherbro, the 
problem of transportation was to arouse fears of a possible 
shortage for May and June 1915. Though the price per bushel 
was 13/6d by mid August 1914, the Sumbuya rivers were not yet 
navigable and the D C could not even stock more than 400 
bushels.32
Prospects were no more promising in the Railway District 
where in Kono country, the late and light rains ensured a 
late harvest after delayed sowing.33 Though the late rains 
had delayed planting in the northern and central parts of 
Koinadugu District, heavy down pours in July allayed all 
fears of a shortage but so urgent were government1s demands 
for rice in Freetown that the D C suggested that the house 
tax be paid in rice. The objective was also to deter
planters from parting too readily with their surpluses to 
traders waiting to stockpile rice and prevent chiefs from 
selling the crop over the frontier. By the time orders came 
to stop buying rice, the chiefs in Kabala had collected over 
1,000 bushels and the D C was soon caught up in the 
consequences of feverish accumulation experienced elsewhere.
By October, D C Stanley had about 150 bushels after
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despatching the rest to Freetown. At a time when new rice 
had flooded the market, he could only sell it at reduced 
rates to the labourers engaged in railway extension.34 The 
conclusion to be drawn from this massive accumulation of 
rice, was the unconditional willingness of chiefs to collect 
the nation's staple at the request of government. Rice 
collection at the outset of war thus became a yardstick for 
measuring chiefly loyalty to officialdom. Its plentiful 
supply united government and people but when severe shortages 
occurred in 1919, that unity was shattered with disastrous 
consequences.
THE FORTUNES OF RICE AND FOOD, 1914-1918
Once war erupted, the inevitable restrictions imposed on 
shipping coupled with the loss of the German market meant 
that lesser imports of rice, bread, butter, confectionery, 
provisions and salt entered the country. In fact, the total 
value of food and drink imports (including tobacco) shrank 
from £354,488 in 1913 to £268,827 in 1914. When government 
gave orders for rice collection in August 1914, they had 
given little thought to the vagaries of the weather and its 
possible impact on the rice crop. Perhaps the most striking 
feature of 1914 was the irregular rainfall which resulted in 
a moderate rice harvest, decreased exports and a considerable 
rise in the price of the commodity.
Generally Sierra Leone rice was preferred to imported 
varieties as it was believed to have greater nutritional 
properties and so commanded higher prices.35 Though Indian 
varieties were adapted to irrigation in Sierra Leone, the
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majority only grew on non-irrigated or swamp areas and the 
grains were smaller in comparison to Sierra Leone rice. 
Their flavour was appreciated but farmers showed less 
interest in their cultivation.36 Among the first victims of 
the resultant food shortages and high prices of foodstuffs 
were government contractors like Mr E A Davies who could not 
meet his obligations to the Colonial Hospital and Prison 
Department.37
Government’s attempts to mitigate the problem involved an 
experiment with various swamp rice varieties from Sierra 
Leone, British Guiana, India and Ceylon at Mambolo on the 
Searcies river. The Public Works Department also set up a 
seed store to preserve harvested rice and groundnuts. The 
Mambolo experiment was however doomed to failure from the 
outset. The chiefs and people showed no interest in it, 
allowing birds to destroy the rice when in ear and making 
public foot paths through the plots to reach their farms. 
The generally bad fortunes of groundnuts were to compound the 
food problem in 1914. The crop failed due to bad germination 
and a fungoid disease (cercospora personata) which killed off 
the leaves.38
In August 1915, government prohibited the export of rice from 
Sierra Leone but in spite of the restriction 21,600 bushels 
(as against 18,705 bushels in 1914) found their way to 
Conakry and Liberia.39 Official intervention in the question 
of food shortages in 1916 was chiefly a function of newer 
factors which were insinuating themselves into the crisis. 
The heavy rains which precluded the successful burning of the 
bush, led the Director of Agriculture to conclude that 1916
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was "a year of partial famine when rice reached the 
extraordinary price of 25/ for a colonial bushel of 841bs." 
The scarcity itself was aggravated by the demands of troops 
and carriers from the Cameroons during April and May, this at 
a time when many people had set aside what rice they required 
for seed purposes and their own consumption.
Troop movements such as that by a company of the W A R  from 
Freetown via Mabanta to Wongkufu where there was already "a 
great shortage," impinged significantly on the already 
depleted supplies. Major Heilborn tried unsuccessfully to 
purchase between 10 and 20 tons from the principal dealers 
chiefly because speculators were also holding back their 
stocks in order to make excessive profits.40 As returnees 
converged on the capital receiving their "food supplies on 
the broad charitable basis of native brotherhood..." the 
urban mob that would start the riots of 1919, began to make 
its presence felt. Observers therefore pointed to the 
potential for crimes to be committed and advocated the 
application of the Vagrancy Act.41
Totally unaware of the stormy clouds that would erupt in July 
1919, government once more turned to experimentation on the 
farm at Njala where specially selected swamp rices produced 
"large and plump" crops. Even the Indian variety
"talatidanna" and British types such as "demerara creole," 
were found to be worth encouraging. In addition plot 24, 
mulched with dead leaves and grass, yielded 7041bs of maize 
and 9871bs of groundnuts in one year. Official efforts at 
improving the food situation also included the opening of a 
cocoa station in Northern Sherbro where producers to the east
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of Pujehun were already beginning to evince great interest in 
its cultivation.
Commendable as these efforts were, the farm at Njala was in 
its infancy and the results achieved never effected a 
transformation of agricultural practices nationwide. 
Government's endeavours were further crippled by local 
peculiarities of the soil and by other factors such as 
diseases.42 As a non-rice producing area. Headquarter 
District was particularly hit by the shortages and abnormally 
high prices during the "hungry season." The "slight famine" 
was also aggravated by the fact that "the cassava crop that 
year produced a good deal of dry rot in some farms."43
By 1917, the perennial problem of food shortages which 
government had to address had convinced Governor Wilkinson of 
the need for agricultural education. In a lengthy and 
weighty despatch, the Governor argued that the prosperity of 
Sierra Leone depended on palm products and kola. Sierra 
Leone itself lacked any great industry beyond the cultivation 
of food crops for local consumption. The demand for kola was 
limited and although the output of palm products was likely 
to be improved by increased transport facilities, there was a 
limit to the available supply. Agriculture therefore had to 
be developed first by avoiding shifting cultivation which 
led to soil exhaustion and deforestation. In fact by 1917, 
large areas were either desolate or under lalang or elephant 
grass.
Experiments in deep-hoeing and crop rotation had yielded few
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positive results and the reserves set aside by government 
were either encroached upon or became "the subject of 
grievances" among farmers. Wilkinson therefore urged the 
cultivation of more permanent crops such as rubber, coconut, 
lime, coffee, kola and above all, swamp rice -through natural 
or artificial irrigation. The only way to achieve this, he 
argued, was through agricultural instruction whilst 
relegating literary instruction to second place. He 
suggested setting up a training college for elementary 
teachers at Njala to teach the theory of plant life. The 
pupils who were to be paid 6d a day, were afterwards to be 
employed as teachers at the rate of 1/ daily. At a time when 
the same questions were being considered in Lagos, some
officials in the Colonial Office, always apt to find fault 
with the governor, found his proposals "impractical" and 
ambitious without proposing another.44
The prolongation of the war, the curtailment of imports from
the United Kingdom and restricted supplies from the United
States, forced the authorities in Freetown to continue 
contemplating other sources of food supply. Because some 
ships sometimes called at Freetown from Cape Town en route to 
the U K with shipping space, the chairman of the Food
Committee suggested using this space to secure supplies from 
South Africa.45
The situation by 1917 had clearly become urgent. The cost of 
imported foodstuffs had risen considerably and the demands of 
large numbers of ships in the harbour intensified the rising 
cost of local products such as bread, meat, fish, fowls, eggs
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and fruits. But while all classes including the European 
community were affected, it was the indigenous population 
that suffered most from increased prices of rice, flour and 
imported necessaries of life..." As the Governor argued, 
"...a rise of a penny or two in the price of a loaf of 
bread...is a more serious matter to a Creole clerk on a tenth 
of" a salary of £350 a year.46
By this time African members of the Sierra Leone Civil 
Service were petitioning the government for a war bonus in 
order to meet "the abnormally increased cost of living..." 
which had either been doubled or trebled in spite of 
governments efforts to regulate the prices of foodstuffs. It 
was obvious that commercial causes had led to these 
conditions. Forced to purchase his requirements at high 
prices, the producer had to increase the price of his 
articles to enable him to do so. What aggravated the 
situation was the fact that the purchasing power of the 
sovereign was hardly more than half of its value compared 
with pre-war days and the shortage of machets for agriculture 
worsened matters.4-7
The Canary Islands which hitherto supplied onions had since 
ceased to do so and cargo space was considerably limited on 
the steamers of the Standard Oil Company which sailed between 
the U S and West Africa.48 In such depressed conditions, 
West Indian fitters in the Railway Department who found they 
had to maintain two establishments (one in Freetown and 
another in the West Indies) also joined the plea for a war 
bonus.49
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The available evidence shows that by 1917, official policy 
towards the question of food shortages had become more 
interventionist. Even though the rice crop was good in 
Headquarter District, attempts were made everywhere to 
diversify the sources of food by planting other crops. The 
Director of Agriculture selected a site in the district for a 
Government Model Farm just outside Waterloo.50 On the whole, 
rice farmers in 1917 seemed to have been goaded on to greater 
activity (due to the problems encountered) planting actively 
for example, in Karene and Koinadugu districts where food 
prospects for the 1918 hungry season appeared favourable. 
Unfortunately those in Railway District were unable to 
control the weeds consequently neglecting their farms and 
unharvested rice. Once more, government moved in to control 
the price of rice, prohibiting its export except on 
licence.51
Official attempts to control the situation were however stop­
gap measures designed to halt a potentially escalating 
crisis. Despite the partially favourable conditions of 1917, 
farmers benefited very little from the experiments carried 
out on the farm at Njala, where varieties of rices like 
"demerara creole" produced good results, the soil being fed 
with dressings of ammonia sulphate. Furthermore by 1917, the 
original rain forests of Sierra Leone had been considerably 
reduced through traditional farming methods and apart from 
Northern Sherbro, rice farmers were responsible for most of 
the damage. It was even doubtful whether there was more 
than 1,000 square miles of high forest remaining in Sierra 
Leone and the situation was approximating the savannah
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conditions of Northern Ashanti.52
In 1918, government was forced to contend with natural 
disasters well beyond its control. The conditions leading to 
the famine of 1919, were preceded by early rains in 1918 
which prevented farmers from burning the bush off the land. 
None of the large trees had been felled when the rains began; 
that year the average rainfall for most areas between March 
and April stood between 7.75 and 9.93 inches. Rice farmers 
therefore had to turn all available labour on their farm to 
hand clearing the area for planting. The operation was slow 
and the land required constant weeding.
The influenza epidemic further worsened the fortunes of 
farmers and with only between 50 to 60% of a normal crop 
produced, a severe shortage was anticipated for 1919. D C 
Addison (Sherbro) therefore suggested that a law be passed 
making it compulsory for every town, village and "fakai" to 
reserve a quantity of rice for the annual hungry season. 
Such rice was not to be "touched, 1 sold or pledged without 
the permission of the D C or traditional authority. Though 
swamp rice grown in the estuaries produced good crops, the 
areas under cultivation were small and this necessitated 
increased cultivation of cassava and sweet potatoes.53
So grave was the problem that by late October, members of the 
Sierra Leone Clerical Service drawing about £100 a year were 
also requesting a war bonus as a relief from hard times; so 
were members of the technical and industrial staff - medical 
dispensers, nurses, foremen of works, surveyors, draughtsmen, 
printers and storekeepers.
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The prices of some food items by 1918 are instructive in 
order to show the rising cost of living. Bread had increased 
from 3 to 6d a pound, sugar from 3 to lOd a pound, butter
from l/9d to 4/ a pound, milk from 6d to l/3d a tin, rice
from 8/ to 12/6d a bushel of 841bs, meat from 7d - l/6d a 
pound, yam from between 3/4d and 4/6d to between 12/ and 15/ 
a dozen and palm oil from 5/ to 15/ a tin of four gallons.54
THE YEAR OF RICE RIOTS - 1919
By February 1919 the desperation caused by rising food
prices, unemployment55 and government's apparent 
discriminatory approaches over the grant of the war bonus 
were precipitating conditions of rowdyism, "robbery" and 
general insecurity. According to the Governor many Africans 
had "formed themselves into armed bands by whom wholesale 
robberies are done from one end of the town to another." Many 
people were therefore apprehensive over "what may happen
before the present quarter of the year is out."55
With the failure of the rice crop in 1918, a great shortage
was anticipated from March 1919 onwards. Government's
response to the crisis was to suggest the importation of
£1,000 worth of foreign rice which was to be given to chiefs
in return for labour, and to forestall attempts by combines 
to corner rice. The only problem then was where to obtain 
the rice from. Madagascar's exportable surplus was intended 
for Mauritius and South Africa's price - £47 a ton - was
highly prohibitive, whilst that from the Persian Gulf was 
dismissed as useless. The only alternatives were Egypt and 
Siam.57
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At a time when Germany was coming to peace terms with the 
Allies, Britain was about to witness the worst riots in post­
war Sierra Leone. Among other things, the main trigger for 
rural and urban radicalism was a general dearth of rice and 
food shortages. By July 1919, rice was sold for about 5d and 
6d a cigarette tin full and £2 a bushel. The situation 
itself was aggravated by the profiteering and hoarding 
tactics of local traders, chiefs and Syrians. So widespread 
was the famine that reports of emaciated people flooded the 
capital. It was obvious by this time that a general economic 
decline and the almost universal slump in the export trade 
were beginning to have an impact in the body politic.
The problems associated with cultivation in the Sierra Leone, 
government's requisitioning of rice throughout the war 
period, and the serious administrative lapses which 
punctuated government's efforts to solve the crisis of 1919 
had done little to halt the drift towards near anarchy in the 
post-war dependency. For example the daily-wage employees of 
the Mechanical and Locomotive branches of the Railway 
Department ordered a strike on 15th July58 over war bonus and 
hungry rioters moved in to exploit the situation. These 
variables show that the Syrians were not entirely responsible 
for the crisis of July 1919 and therefore merit attention.
In searching for answers to the almost perennial problem of 
rice shortage, an examination of the system of cultivation 
then, is instructive. Farmers sowed their farms too thinly, 
brushed and burned too large an acreage and made no attempts 
to restore the fertility of the soil by digging in organic
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matter, green manuring and fallowing. Original farms were 
therefore allowed to revert to bush for about seven years.59 
By 1915, the absence of mechanical transport on the 
Kailahun-Pendembu, Lago-Panguma and Bo-Pujehun roads meant 
employing large numbers of men for transporting materials - 
men whose energies could otherwise have been deployed in 
agriculture and rice production.60
If the general dislocation in trade caused by war conditions 
led to abnormal prices for consumer products, agriculture 
during the war was hampered by erratic rainfall such as that 
in 1915.61 Experiments carried out on the farm at Njala had 
shown that better results were obtainable by deep hoeing than 
by orchard cultivation62 but by December 1916, the 
availability of rice and prospects for further cultivation 
were clearly dependent on the availability of machets which 
were then "practically exhausted." Much of this was due to 
the closure of the German market.
As the importation of foreign rice became difficult there was 
great panic in the Protectorate,63 and in January 1917, the D 
C's office at Ronietta was flooded with applications for 
machets. D C Fairtlough therefore requested some 2,000 from 
the P W D or Railway Construction Stores failing which, he 
suggested the provision of half a ton of iron bars or some 
hoop iron which the smiths could convert to implements for 
use on the farms. Only in February did the Secretary of 
State order that 100,000 machets be sent to Freetown.64 These 
began arriving by August 1918 when influenza was also 
threatening agriculture.65
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The system of requisitioning rice for the troops was also to 
have an impact on food supplies. In response to fears of a 
possible shortage in 1914, the military was asking that 
500,0001bs be reserved for their requirements. Chiefly 
support in the acquisition of surplus rice was turned to good 
account when in October, 1,008 bags were sent to the 
Cameroons.66 Between August and December 1914, more than 
1,000 bushels had been supplied by Koinadugu and Karene (400 
bags from Port Loko) to form part of the Defence Scheme 
stores and to service the troops in the Cameroons.67 
Throughout 1915, the chiefs in Ronietta supplied 54 tons to 
the military authorities and when in February 98 1/4 tons 
were shipped to Duala this included 65 tons from Karene.es
By June 1915, Dobell was requesting 50 tons a month, but 
uncertainty regarding the duration of the war made it 
difficult for D CTs to meet this demand. Supplies had been 
dissipated in the Railway District and the prospects of a bad 
rice crop in Ronietta aggravated the situation. In Bonthe, 
the handsome contributions of Paramount Chief Samuel Margai 
led to fears of a shortage. On the whole, the process 
exerted severe pressures on chiefs like Papu Powi and the 
carriers of P C Margai who had to travel long distances to 
transport the rice to the railway.69 The massive shipment to 
the Cameroons and the lack of any price control merely 
exacerbated the famine conditions of 1916 for between January 
1915 and March 1916, 25,636 bushels were shipped to the
troops.70
351
Once the W A F F  returned from the Cameroons the pressure on 
the districts to provide rice for them in 1917 increased. 
With the Railway District being requested to supply 4,000 
bushels in October, D C Bowden urged that more equitable 
demands be made on each district, for apart from feeding the 
company at Bandajuma, he had to provide for the Bo School, 
traders and settlers. Ronietta could not help due to the 
late harvest. In fact D C Stanley (Northern Sherbro) was to 
warn against discouraging cultivation through requisitioning 
chiefs for rice below its market value. At Karene, 
requisitioning coupled with high prices charged by the
S.C.O.A. was already imposing severe hardships on the chiefs 
and people.7x
The same conditions prevailed in the Railway District where 
the cultivator found his foodstuffs requisitioned at anytime 
"... without payment" or "below the market price." The 
results were disastrous for both producers and chiefs and in 
places like Kabala and Northern Sherbro, the exactions of 
government officials led to widespread rural-urban migration 
to join the ranks of the Carrier Corps, to take up work in 
Freetown or even migrate to Fernando Po through Liberia. By 
1917, therefore, several large towns hitherto shown on 
Captain Bond's map (1907) had virtually disappeared.72
Rice and Food in the Protectorate
In order to appreciate the ferocity of mob action, one must 
also examine the fortunes of the rice crop in the districts 
albeit briefly. In spite of its agricultural potential - 
endowed as it was with miles and miles of deep soil, -
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Ronietta was yet to become "one of the richest and most 
productive of the districts."73 By 1915, the quest for money 
had become tied more than ever before to rice production. As 
rice fetched good prices, the low rates paid for palm kernels 
led many to sell their surplus for cash and this marked the 
prelude to the famine of 1916.74
The phenomenal shortages which characterised the rice crop 
between 1914 and 1916 were considerably worsened by natural 
hazards and the influenza epidemic in 1918 when the early 
rains hampered shifting cultivation. Seeding was therefore 
delayed and the cultivated rice below average.75 Perhaps 
more than anywhere else, the Railway District was most 
illustrative of the threat posed to food supplies by 
artificial and natural causes. Though the rainfall for 1916 
was good in the district, by June, the return of carriers was 
to make significant inroads into the surplus crop. As more 
rice was needed for the returnees, borrowing became general 
and scarcity very widespread. More importantly, the new 
class of wealthy men who were assuming prominence, (based on 
the perquisites which they enjoyed) due to the extortionate 
practices of chiefs and sub-chiefs, added to the problem 
through the need to supply their retainers with rice and 
food.76
Indeed as the successful and roving life of the peddler 
diverted many people away from the farms, it became obvious 
that wealth was the bane of agricultural production in the 
Railway District.77 By 1917, rice had become an article of 
commerce and as producers parted with their surplus, this led
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to speculation and an attempt to corner foodstuffs.78 As 
influenza precluded the successful harvesting of rice in 1918 
both swamp and upland rice were left to the mercy of the 
birds and the D C had to warn against the practice of 
speculating in rice.79
Noted for its very vibrant export trade in rice, Karene was 
yet to turn to good account the miles and miles of country in 
the coastal regions so eminently suited for the cultivation 
of coconuts. In 1915 upland rice suffered from the heavy 
rains whilst a good deal of the rice crop was smuggled over 
the border to French Guinea in 1916 in spite of the 
prohibition on exports.80 Not even the Experimental Farm at 
Batkanu (Karene) could alleviate the situation and the food 
scarcity was the worst since 1910.81 If sweet potatoes, 
cassava and yams yielded good crops in 1917,62 up-land rice 
and subsidiary crops like fundi, guinea corn, millet and 
groundnuts succumbed to the ravages of the early rains and 
influenza in 191883 and the D C feared a recurrence of 1910 
conditions.84
The partial famine conditions of 1916 and the scarcity of 
ripe palm nuts meant that there was little available cash in 
Northern Sherbro "and most of the larger towns were suffering 
from hunger."85 The district was endowed with alluvial soil 
capable of producing excellent rice; climatically, it had a 
higher percentage of rainy and cloudy days than anywhere in 
the Protectorate. But these agricultural advantages by 1916 
remained undeveloped and though marsh land abounded suitable 
for cattle grazing, the lack of any knowledge of cattle
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management meant that this was yet to complement the viable 
fishing industry in the coastal chiefdoms.86
It was however the debilitating effects of the war, acute 
food shortages, the failure of the rice crop and influenza 
which worsened the plight of the populace in Northern Sherbro 
in 1918. According to the D C, influenza struck when the 
hill crops were ripening and "children driving birds...died 
in the shanties which they built;" and though rice was 
planted in the water meadows, the water levels were 
inconsistent and the capital needed to prosecute the industry 
was limited.8"7 So great was the scarcity in Krim and Bui lorn 
chiefdoms that D C Shuffrey reported great "suffering" in 
April 1919.88
To the north in Koinadugu, upland and swamp rice produced 
good albeit modest yields in 1918 but the district did not 
escape the hazards of the early rains and the consequent rice 
shortage produced hunger among the people. To these
conditions should be added the ravages of wild animals which, 
because of the absence of gun powder, did much damage to rice 
farms. "I myself saw rice farms eaten almost bare by 
buffalo" wrote the D C. Food supplies in Koinadugu were also 
depleted by cattle diseases in Yalunka country and among the 
Mandinka settlements of the Mabole valley.
On the eve of the riots the blessings of the cattle herds 
were yet to be turned into good account. With the exception 
of the Fulas, the people of Koinadugu failed to use cattle 
for consumption purposes for "there was no reason why
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the... population of Freetown should not be supplied" with 
butter and milk from the herds. The efforts of the Mandingo 
Development Corporation in Kamadugu chiefdom had not really 
begun to yield positive results by early 1919.89 A hungry 
season was therefore rightly predicted.90
THE SYRIANS AND RICE SHORTAGES
Although the literature on Syrian trade in Colonial Sierra 
Leone in very thin, recent archival research shows that 
between the late 1880's and 1914, the Syrians were a steadily 
increasing community in Freetown and the Protectorate.91 By 
1916, they had become the principal shippers of kola92 
(supplanting their Krio, Temne and Susu rivals) and by 1917 
were acting as agents for Spanish steamers bringing cargo to 
Sierra Leone93 and as intermediaries in the nascent cocoa 
industry.94 Syrian success in trade was predicated on 
loyalty to each other, cooperation in business and access to 
capital.95 But if the Syrians were regarded by officialdom 
as a group which gave "little trouble... are universally 
respectful and ready to listen to reason, 1,96 to what extent 
were they responsible for the rice shortages of 1919? The 
evidence adduced so far based on the agricultural history of 
Sierra Leone, and official policy towards the problem of rice 
shortages, should help persuade the historian to eschew 
monofocal approaches in explaining the riots of July 1919.
By 1916 however when it was still difficult to obtain country 
rice, European firms like Paterson Zochonis were complaining 
that the Syrians had been firmly established in "practically 
every nook and corner of the Protectorate..." and were
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"successfully trying to corner the market for rice." Those 
on the line at Taiama and Mano were offering high prices for 
"native rice," preventing European firms from securing a 
normal supply. As a result, high prices ruled in Freetown - 
between 14 and 15/ a bushel - at a time when no rice was 
being sent to the Cameroons and when the normal price offered 
was between 8/6d and 10/ a bushel.97 So severe was the 
distress felt by the men of the W A R  that many sold their 
official and personal clothing and deserted in large 
numbers.98 By this time European firms had also joined in 
the game of cornering rice. The S C 0 A was particularly 
guilty of this in the Banta and Bagru chiefdoms in Ronietta. 
Not even the tenders of the French Coy and Moses Allen at 
Pendembu could meet the W A F F's requirement of 7,000 
bushels at Daru.99
The complex variations in prices per bushel in many parts of 
the Protectorate100 provided many opportunities for flagrant 
breaches of the Weights and Measures Ordinance by Syrians at 
Bo, Mano and Gerihun (using illegal measures) in spite of 
many convictions. Though some European firms eschewed the 
use of force, the inevitable cut-throat competition which 
evolved, forced them to fall back on "coaxers" to amass 
produce and with Syrian traders strewn all along the line, 
the firms had to keep pace with the "illegal methods" then in 
vogue.101
By July 1919, the Syrians had "monopolised the rice trade" 
and bought the new crop in some districts "so as to keep the 
price up..." The Commissioner of Police then had to
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prosecute two Syrians for selling rice - between 45 and 50/ - 
well above proclamation prices. Syrians also compounded the 
food problem by making significant inroads into the local 
"foo-foo" trade102 so that officialdom itself was forced to 
confirm the "underhand nature of these creatures..."103 The 
difficulty therefore of retrieving Syrian goods from many 
houses (where the looters had hoarded them) in the aftermath 
of the riots against them, and the lack of any proof against 
individuals supposedly involved in the raids in Makeni, 
provide enough evidence of the intensity of local feeling 
against the Syrians.104
What the local population (many of whom were to take to 
rioting in July) resented most were the methods employed by 
the Syrians to corner rice, and the "insolent and 
overbearing" manner with which they greeted appeals from 
those seeking rice. One man alleged he was told- "We will 
make you Creoles eat grass." 105 Through the formation of 
Syrian rings and combines, prices of produce were 
artificially forced up and "Krio girls," "unmarried females" 
and "old widows" squeezed out of the petty trading business 
in "foo-foo," "parched groundnuts" and "kanyah" (i.e. ground 
and sweetened rice). The Syrian tactic was to employ their 
"native wives" and provide them with the necessary capital to 
trade in these foodstuffs.
For many years, the Syrians had perfected the so-called "sama 
practice," whereby a trader would take advantage of the 
hungry season to extort a promise of huge amounts of produce 
when harvested, in return for an advance of money and meat.
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In fact by February 1919, many rice farmers were mortgaging 
their farms to Syrians in places like Port Loko and 
Koinadugu.106 Though outlawed in 1918, many factors
encouraged "sama contracts." The practice was made possible 
by the "improvident habits of the average native," who 
devoured or sold all his produce (even seed rice) during the 
harvest which he had to buy again at exorbitant prices. 
Syrians were thus able to inflate the price of rice in spite 
of a plentiful harvest.
By Saturday 1st August 1919 for example, one Madam Sassin was 
collecting rice debts in Temne country - in return for 
credits advanced in 1918 - and advancing loans at 4/ a bushel 
against the next season's rice crop in Mambolo Loko Masama 
chiefdom. Other Syrians were doing the same at Port Loko. 
The fact that there was a glut in the rice market - rice 
being sold for as low as 2d a cup - after the raids, that 600 
bushels were retrieved from a Syrian tenant of one Mrs Brown, 
further served to buttress the charges against the Syrians.
In order to evade the law and take advantage of high prices, 
Syrians and other profiteers sent their rice up country in 
exchange for palm kernels. Thus at Mafwe in the Railway 
District, 500 bushels of rice were found in the house of a 
Syrian who had previously been sentenced for aggravated 
assaults in Bumpe chiefdom. In these and many other ways 
were the Syrians culpable. Finding the evidence against them 
irrefutable, the Colonial Office concluded that "the holding 
up of rice was a considerable part of the cause"10"7 of the 
riots of 1919.
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By July 1919 therefore, the impact of rice shortages had 
become universal. Work on the Kessewe Hills was retarded due 
to widespread starvation and resort was had to the oil palm 
for its "cabbage" and to diverse "bush fruits." This, and 
the feverish efforts by government to send rice up country in 
August should partly explain the ferocity of mob action 
throughout the Protectorate.108 Sufficient evidence abounds 
to support the thesis of rice shortages. At Ronietta, the D 
C attributed the riots to "food shortages" which put the 
"native riff raff...in a ripe state for mischief..." at 
Bauya, Moyamba, Mano, Makump, Kangahun and Tabe.109 At 
Bonthe, D C Page found that the "lawless movement" was the 
direct result of hunger.110 According to D C Hollins 
(Ronietta) the only remedy was the prompt despatch of a 
supply of rice,111 because at Kambia (Karene) where Krios and 
Syrians were regarded as intruders, rice shortages made the 
people restless and only the strong influence of the Kumrabai 
(chief) held them in check.112
Despite the emphasis by nearly all D C's on rice shortage, 
Colonial Office thinking was chiefly informed by white 
perceptions of Freetown's Krio since 1898. By arguing that 
the Krios "inspired" and "controlled" the riots113 of 1919 
the Colonial Office either underestimated or chose to ignore 
the authentic economic distress, grievances, and privations 
which had been partly introduced into the dependency by World 
War 1. Only after the mob had committed the worst excesses 
did it begin to dawn on C.O. officials that the disturbances 
at Liverpool had made it impossible for ships to take rice 
from that port to Freetown.
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However related the Liverpool disturbances114 (based on the 
sexual relations between Black men and White women) were to 
the Syrians' association with Krio girls in Freetown115 as a 
factor in the riots, it could hardly be denied that the most 
immediate cause was rice shortage and in this, the Colonial 
Government was particularly culpable for a series of
administrative lapses which characterised its efforts to
address the question of shortage. Coming as they did in the 
wake of the controversy over the war bonus, the riots soon 
ensured that acting Governor Evelyn had "a pack of troubles
to make him remember peace day."116 Mr Ellis found him
particularly reprehensible for not enforcing the maximum 
price of rice and for not bringing down prices by selling the 
rice which the government then had in store.11-7
In the main, Evelyn had failed to act quickly at precisely 
that point where action was badly needed. Wilkinson found 
his subordinate "unequal to the position of Acting Governor. 
He was dilatory in the matter of war bonus, inert in the 
famine..." and "timid in the face of the strikers."110 Indeed 
the catalogue of administrative mistakes which punctuated the 
rice crisis of 1918 and 1919 to some extent made the riots 
inevitable. For example, no steps were taken to distribute 
by sale or otherwise the 32 tons of government rice which had 
arrived in the Colony on 30th June 1919; no steps were taken 
to import the £5,000 worth of rice on government account as 
was authorised by the Executive Council on 14th April 1919, 
nothing was done regarding the resolution of the council to 
reduce the railway freight for rice sent to the Protectorate 
or to meet the deficiency of rice in the Protectorate as
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reported by Captain Benham on 20th June and by Mr Hollins on 
28th June 1919. Therefore, with a weakened police force and 
a rather "nebulous" governmental control over the imperial 
forces of the West African Regiment, the rioters were bound 
to have a field day against the Syrians.119
By February 1919, knowledge of an imminent rice famine -first 
mooted by the Director of Agriculture in January120 and made 
concrete by the "subterfuge" adopted by traders to annul 
proclamation prices fixed by the Food Committee121 - was 
confirmed by all D.C.s who agreed that government should
secure shipments of cereals. On 26th February 1919, the 
Acting Colonial Secretary assured leading firms that the 
selling price of rice would be fixed to allow them a
reasonable profit if they imported rice. By 25th March the 
Executive Council was seeking permission from the Secretary 
of State to import rice for relief purposes. When Wilkinson 
visited the Protectorate in early April he found that 
adequate action had not been taken to mitigate the rice
problem. Local supplies held out until his departure for
leave and this prevented him from using the authority granted 
by the Secretary of State.
By late April however, the rice question had driven a wedge 
between government and the Chamber of Commerce, the latter 
determined to prove that the Syrians were the real culprits. 
They refused to furnish information on the stocks held by 
leading firms, disagreed with government's assessment of the 
shortage and refused to import more rice unless assured that 
the government would not import any. Whilst refusing to
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honour the wishes of the Chamber, the Executive Council on 
12th May also agreed to reduce railway freight by half for 
any rice sent to the Protectorate, at a time when foreign 
rice was being sold for 27/ in places like Moyamba.
Between 27th May and 27th June a series of miscalculations 
and the ineptitude displayed by some government officials 
over the rice issue, led to starvation in many parts of the 
Protectorate.122 Indeed, Mr Maude the Colonial Secretary "did 
not show himself" a "useful adviser to Mr Evelyn...but for Mr 
Maude, there would have been...no hostility because of the 
famine."123 On 27th May and 16th June, Mr Maude refused 
pleas for rice from the Director of Agriculture and the D C 
Railway. This amounted to a cancellation of the Executive 
Council's decision of 12th May. In fact, by arguing that the 
rice requested was "government owned" he was wrongly 
referring to the 32 tons imported through the Crown Agents 
and not the rice in Council's circular.
By June therefore, the bureaucratic hurdles which stood in 
the way of rice distribution ensured starvation and deaths at 
Moyamba and Railway District. Mr Maude complicated the 
situation by arguing that government's response to the 
problem would be "general...not special." Yet, when on 1st 
July Mr Hollins reported great "distress" in Railway 
District, no reply was received. By 3rd July when as much as 
50/ was being paid per bushel, Mr Maude refused to advance 
money to the conservator of Forests to buy rice for his men. 
Transferred to Moyamba (Ronietta) on 24th July, Mr Hollins 
was appealing to government for urgent supplies of rice and
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food to relieve the distress.
Freetown had its own share of problems and the matter was not 
lost on the press which continued to appeal to government for 
help. In the interim, the rice ordered remained in the 
customs shed until 15th August. When the riots erupted on 
18th July there were 32 tons of rice at the shed and 148 tons 
consigned to Freetown on a steamer in the harbour. By 
failing to use its rice therefore, government added to an 
already worsening crisis. As Wilkinson rightly argued, had 
government used its rice to check profiteering or even 
gratuitously for road work in the Protectorate," its position 
would have been strengthened enormously."124 The result was 
massive starvation and death and the Railway District was 
clearly illustrative of these results. Extreme "emaciation 
and deterioration due to underfeeding" were observed in Bo, 
Daru, Segbwema, Baima and Pendembu among the boys and 
children were "palpably thinner than in normal times..."125 
The same was true for Karene126 and Pujehun12'7 where the 
triggers for revolt came from widespread hunger.
Major Farrar best summed up the likely consequences of 
starvation when he argued in June that "in its civil aspect 
the suffering might not improbably lead to riots and 
looting..."128 Such fears were amply vindicated on the night 
of 18th July 1919, when the first riots erupted in Freetown. 
Once "the ordinary country people" began "eating the young 
cassava which in the ordinary way would not have been 
eaten,"129 not even the prompt despatch of troops to the 
scenes of riotous conduct could halt the drift towards
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anarchy in post-war Sierra Leone.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND THE RIOTS OF 1919
A look at the riots albeit briefly would help explain the 
thesis of food shortages and throw light on the political 
consequences which the war had for Sierra Leone. The war had 
brought untold hardships to many in the Colony and the 
Protectorate and those who bore the brunt of a dwindling 
revenue were not surprisingly the peasant producers. Far 
from setting in motion a series of actions designed to 
ameliorate the situation, officialdom was preoccupied with 
raising taxation and export duties. Whatever advances had 
been made in revenue in 1918 were at best deceptive so that 
by 1919, the administration was forced to contend with an 
excess of expenditure caused principally by the payment of 
war bonuses and a depreciation in the value of the 
investments of the Colony.
In the circumstances food prices rose to unprecedented levels 
whilst rice, the nation's staple was subjected to natural 
hazards. It is against this background of a general economic 
decline and an apparent apathy shown by the administration 
that we must understand the drift towards anarchy in the 
post-war dependency instead of shifting blame to the Krio as 
the administration did.130 Admittedly there was already bad 
blood between the Krios and the Syrians based on trade 
rivalry but when the rioters struck in July they did not do 
so in response to the Krio plea to expel the Syrians neither 
were they pawns in the hands of the Krio intelligentsia. 
Instead rioting was more a response to economic grievances 
and privation.
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As has been amply demonstrated, many District Commissioners 
imputed the riots to food shortages and high prices. Yet far 
from assessing the impact of the war on the dependency, 
officialdom was content to find scapegoats among the elites 
in the community. Thus attempts by Krio settlers in Bo to 
warn the administration of an impending attack were greeted 
with the usual contempt and levity as in 1898. By adopting 
this stance, the administration was indirectly denying the 
authentic economic grievances of the population.
The outbreak was sudden and commenced in Freetown on the
night of 18th July. First intimations about the riots 
reached the Governor through the Commissioner of Police, 
Major Heslip when a crowd besieged a Syrian shop at
Westmoreland Street. Police inadequacy to curb the initial
excesses forced the Governor to call out the military in aid 
of the civil power. Although the troops had been held in 
readiness when the Great Railway Strike131 erupted on 15th 
July 1919, there was some delay in despatching them to the 
scenes of looting. The first phase of the rioting only
petered out around 5.00 am. when the troops returned to
barracks.
By Saturday (19th July) rioting and looting of Syrian shops 
commenced once more and taxed the energies of three companies 
of the West African Regiment to the full. When calm
returned to Freetown security was provided by both "the
police and a number of Creole gentlemen who have offered
their services as constables."
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In their usual predilection to find scapegoats for the 
outbreak, the government noted that "in no single instance 
were the business premises of the European and Creole 
merchants interfered with. The shop of a Creole trader who 
was believed to be profiteering in rice was threatened but no 
attack was actually made on it." The economic element in the 
riots was underlined by the fact that in the earliest 
skirmishes as well as in later encounters, attacks were 
directed more against property than against persons, though 
the riots claimed 3 victims in Freetown. One Syrian was shot 
accidentally by an apparently jittery compatriot; another 
died from the effects of the beating he received; so did a 
woman who gave birth prematurely.132
Because of the impossibility of providing adequate protection 
for the Syrians in their own homes, about 213 were 
temporarily quartered in the Wilberforce Memorial Hall 
("which has been generously placed at my disposal by the City 
Council") and in two houses at Garrison Street and East 
Street. By the 20th intelligence reports intimated that the 
disturbances would spread to the Protectorate. Telegraphic 
communication with the Protectorate had been suspended 
because of the railway strike, but the "devotion and loyalty" 
of the Krio Telegraph Superintendent, Mr Jones, made it 
possible for the government to despatch telegrams to the 
District Commissioners of Ronietta and Railway districts, to 
the Officer Commanding the Troops, Daru, and the Officer 
Commanding the detachment at Bandajuma.133
Urban violence abated for some four days and in the interim,
367
the ground swell of discontent against the Syrians gathered 
momentum in the Protectorate. The first centre of attack was 
Moyamba where on Friday 25th July, predatory raids were 
organised against Syrian storekeepers at Bauya and those on 
the branch railway threatened at Mano. As in the initial 
riot in Freetown lack of adequate protection gave the rioters 
a field day at Moyamba. Of particular significance is the 
fact that the D.C. attributed the occurrence at Moyamba to 
"scarcity of food and high prices."134
By 26th July, the gravity of the situation forced the 
government to arrange a meeting of the Executive Council and 
to circularise the D.C.s all over the Protectorate regarding 
the impending threat to the Syrians. The train service to 
Kamabai for the 26th was ordered to return to Makeni in order 
to facilitate the transport of troops and for relieving the 
detachment at Mano from Daru.135 In addition to the use of 
force, chiefs were urged to assist in preventing and 
suppressing rioting within their chiefdoms.135 For prevention 
at Bonthe, the government recommended that special constables 
be enlisted.137
In spite of the formidable security apparatus which was set 
in motion, the raiders made good their threats at Moyamba and 
Mano on the night of Friday 25 th July138 and launched 
predatory raids on the Syrians at Makump.139 Kangahun on the 
branch railway was attacked on the 26th.140 Though there 
were no casualties in all these areas in Ronietta District, 
the D.C. was forced to request Captain Benham for a 
redeployment of half of his force originally detailed to
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Yonibana and to send the other half to Moyamba.141 In all 34 
soldiers (albeit inadequate) were despatched from Makeni.142
The railway line seemed to have been the chief instrument for 
coordinating centres of attacks and parties of rioters 
travelled rapidly up the line from Freetown throughout the 
Protectorate. On the 25th therefore when Moyamba came under 
attack, a restless situation prevailed at Bo. The alarm was 
caused by soldiers who it seems were intent "on inciting riot 
among peaceful people." By this time however, officialdom 
was convinced that the main instigators of the riots were 
Krios. When the latter, stationed at Bo, requested help from 
Lt. Strachan, he "threatened something worse and stated that 
he cannot speak with niggers - please oblige protection."143 
The D.C. however defended the Krio settlers by attributing 
the "very trivial occurrences" to other "persons from down 
line by first up train".144
The next day 200 rioters arrived at Bo by train from Mano. 
Because precaution had been taken the object of the raiders 
was frustrated. By night however a Syrian's store at the 
edge of the town was looted.145 Sumbuya also came under 
attack though futile, on the 27th and troops had to be 
ordered from Bandajuma.146 By the 31st, when peace returned 
to the Railway District 40 rioters had been arrested.147
The pattern of events in Karene was rather intriguing and the 
rioters seemed to have resorted to a propaganda campaign 
intended to invest their actions with legitimacy. News 
travelled fast from Freetown to the district and by Sunday
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20th July panic-stricken Syrians rushed to the Officer 
Commanding the detachment of the West African Regiment at 
Port Loko. Since the Loko people had started laying siege to 
the Syrian houses and shops the O.C. organised a strong 
piquet in the town. What stirred up the local people was 
rather curious; they had received reports "that the 
"government was telling people in Freetown that they could 
help themselves to Syrian goods." Convinced therefore of 
official complicity in the riots, they were to interpret the
O.C.'s mission to the town to examine the situation, as an 
attempt to start raiding on his own. As he reported later, 
"...people came rushing up and pointing out different Syrians 
as possessing large properties. There was quite an air of 
surprised disappointment when it was found out that this was 
not part of the programme."
Due to the cessation of the ordinary river trade between 
Freetown and Port Loko, many of the inhabitants of Port Loko 
were temporarily unemployed and they were to find in rioting 
and looting, a safe outlet for their energies. As in Moyamba 
the triggers for rebellion were provided by the desperate 
food situation and the acute shortage of rice. Supplies 
ordered en route during the Freetown riots had still not 
arrived by the 23rd and Sheka, the Alikali's brother, 
complained to the O.C. that "the food situation is very 
bad." Just four hours away from Port Loko the situation was 
far from peaceful. Trouble was also brewing at Mange ("a 
fairly big place with a lot of Syrians.") where the 
inhabitants were threatening to plunder the Syrians.148
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Unlike Freetown and Moyamba, the disturbances at Karene were 
minor ones.149 The drift towards anarchy seemed to have 
abated at Mange after the O.C. had remonstrated with Bai 
Inga, the Paramount Chief but as at Port Loko, the prevailing 
idea was that "the government no agree for the Syrians to be 
here." At Mange also, the food position was worsened by the 
riots and the "Country people are now eating the young 
cassava which in the ordinary way would not have been eaten 
for another two or three months, and rice is practically 
impossible to get."150
Apart from these districts mentioned, all was apparently 
quiet elsewhere except for Waterloo in Headquarter District 
in the Colony where two Syrian shops were looted on the night 
of the 26th July.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that unlike Southern and 
Northern Nigeria where revolts in World War 1 were directed 
against the policies of the colonial government,151 in Sierra 
Leone, the riots were not aimed at the nerve-centre of the 
colonial apparatus. The food riots of 1919 could also not be 
seen part of the nationalist movement designed to secure 
independence.
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CONCLUSION
Seven years after the cessation of international hostilities. 
Hector Duff, in assessing the impact of World War 1 on "Black 
men's countries" argued that "...in such a war, the natives 
over whose heads it is fought...will always be the greatest 
sufferers..."1 Duff, may probably have been influenced by 
Buchan's comment that Africans were drawn into "...a quarrel 
in which they had not been consulted...in which their losses 
were certain and their gains speculative..."2 Though educated 
elites in some African dependencies were apprehensive of 
these consequences,3 "the response of the empire was instant, 
unequivocal and complete..."4 Like many other British
colonies. Sierra Leone played a significant part in World War
1. Apart from sending recruits to help fight the Germans in 
Togoland, the Cameroons, East Africa and Mesopotamia, the 
colonial administration in Freetown provided funds, 
ammunition and foodstuff to help equip and maintain the 
troops in the various theatres of war.
Committed as it was to supporting the Allies against the 
Central Powers, the war had significant consequences for 
Sierra Leone. Drawing on a wide range of hitherto untapped 
archival sources, this thesis examines the impact of the 
Great War on "ancient and loyal Sierra Leone" between 1914 
and 1919. By so doing it contributes to the growing 
literature on Africa and World War 1. The thesis eschews 
what Edmund Dane refers to as the "dry technical manner"5 in 
which the many campaigns of the period have hitherto been 
presented; instead it examines the military, social, economic
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and political impacts of the war on Sierra Leone. As war 
clouds gathered over Europe, many in Sierra Leone became 
convinced that the crisis was not just a "White Man's 
palaver" and despite the bitter acrimony that characterised 
Anglo-Krio relations by 1913, Sierra Leone provided human and 
material resources for the Allies. Support for Britain came 
from all sections of the community but although Merewether 
found these expressions of loyalty "spontaneous," officialdom 
at the end of the war did not reciprocate these efforts as 
the community had hoped. The obligations which the war 
imposed on Sierra Leone coupled with the temporary 
redeployment of officers impinged significantly on the smooth 
flow of the administration and drained the already depleted 
resources of the Colony.
The first part of the thesis examines the impact of military 
recruitment on the dependency. Deeply apprehensive of German 
attacks on Sierra Leone Governor Merewether advised against 
denuding the Protectorate of troops but the emergency was in 
the opinion of the Colonial Office, more pressing than the 
security of the Colony. Though mobilisation and recruitment 
were to generate much tension and apprehension in the 
dependency, by August 1917, thanks to chiefly loyalty and the 
efforts of District Commissioners, Sierra Leone had supplied 
1,641 combatants and 13,023 non-combatants to the war effort. 
Of the non-combatants, 978 went to the Inland Water 
Transport; 11,890 were carriers whilst 220 served as gun 
carriers.6 At a time when the notion of the martial races 
was being given greater prominence, officialdom's refusal to 
allow the Krio to enlist merely generated a mood of
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bitterness, unease and despondency in Krio circles. If 
recruitment helped to reduce the crime rate in Freetown it 
took away many able-bodied men from agriculture and depleted 
labour needed for public works. Returnees from the Cameroons 
and Mesopotamia aggravated the problems of unemployment and 
sanitation. In many ways the experience of World War 1 
exposed the organisational drawbacks of the Sierra Leone 
Battalion and pointed to the need for reforms.
To a large extent, the war exposed the vulnerability of 
Sierra Leone to the spread of disease. The second part 
examines the problems of health, sanitation and disease in 
wartime. Deeply encumbered by an ad hoc approach to health 
and sanitation, officialdom was caught up in a desperate 
struggle to combat two epidemics - smallpox and influenza in 
1916 and 1918 respectively. Problems of congestion in 
wartime, increased trade contacts with foreign countries like 
French Guinea and the lack of fumigation facilities for ships 
calling at the Freetown harbour facilitated the spread of 
smallpox, chickenpox and influenza. Financial constraints 
coupled with the perennial bickering among respective 
Sanitary and Health authorities in the Colony, the racial 
ethos that had come to dominate the medical service and the 
conflict between imperial and colonial interests, merely 
worsened the situation.
The available evidence shows that smallpox was endemic in 
Sierra Leone at least between 1898 and 1915. Originating in 
neighbouring French Guinea in 1915, smallpox was brought to 
Karene by traders passing through the trade route in Dixing
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chiefdom. From here the disease spread to all parts of the 
Protectorate and was carried to Freetown in December. 
Smallpox struck with devastating rapidity, threatened whole 
villages, dislocated farming activity and bred famine 
conditions in many parts of the Protectorate. The epidemic 
was assisted in its course by a simultaneous outbreak of 
chickenpox. Apart from widespread vaccination, inoculation 
was resorted to in many parts of the Protectorate and the 
Colony but African hostility to Western medicine and 
vaccination compounded the efforts of the authorities to 
contain the disease. In the aftermath of the outbreak the 
government introduced many reforms including a new and rapid 
means for disinfecting huts and houses but the measures taken 
were largely administrative in nature and did little to 
combat the spread of disease or to cushion the dependency 
against diseases introduced by sea-borne traffic.
When the Spanish "flu" reached Freetown in August 1918, the 
fortunes of mercantile shipping in the dependency had been 
radically altered. The evidence shows that 1918 was a good 
year for shipping activity in terms of the number of vessels 
and tonnage which entered and left the port of Freetown. By 
the time of the outbreak, wartime privation, widespread food 
shortages, emaciation, suffering and distinct physical 
deterioration among the population were already beginning to 
attract the attention of officialdom. It was in these 
circumstances that the Mantua arrived in the harbour with 
cases of "flu" on board. The failure by government to take 
prophylactic action and the consequent coaling of the ship by 
local labourers soon ensured the spread of the disease with
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disastrous consequences. Whilst the administration supplied 
throat gargle and disinfectant to contain the spread, the 
community experimented with a wide range of local remedies 
and socio-cultural practices that in some instances 
represented a cross between traditional and western medicine.
Influenza was accompanied by an alarming death toll almost 
unparalleled in the recorded history of the country. The 
disease dislocated business in both the mercantile and 
official sectors so that by October 1918, the Governor put 
the death toll at 1,000. The difficulties encountered by the 
authorities in determining even approximately the numbers 
affected by the "flu" were compounded by the migration of 
many victims to the Protectorate where, as in the Colony, 
many corpses were buried without the usual certificates of 
registration. Throughout the country the labour force 
generally employed in agriculture was immobilised as 
influenza combined with climatic hazards to deplete the rice 
crop and arrest progress in the oil palm industry.
In many ways the outbreak was a blessing in disguise for the 
almost acrimonious debates surrounding the origins of the 
disease led to many reforms beings introduced by the 
administration. As in the case of smallpox, most of the 
quarantine rules introduced were largely of an administrative 
nature and the additional powers granted to health officers 
mainly empowered them to detain suspected persons for 
observation.
The final part looks at the nature of the economy in wartime,
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the attempts by the administration to raise revenue, the 
fortunes of local producers and the nature of wartime trade 
in the districts. Apart from the elimination of German trade 
the lack of shipping space compounded the efforts of the 
administration to cushion the strains of war. By 1915, 
dwindling revenue returns pointed to the need for financial 
stringency. The problems of economic decline and the 
manipulative tactics of foreign firms were felt mainly by 
indigenous producers who consequently held back their produce 
in anticipation of higher prices. In Sierra Leone, the chief 
variables governing economic activity were unfavourable 
climatic conditions, the high tariff rates on spirits, the 
recruitment of potential labour for military service 
overseas, tax evasion in the Protectorate, and the closure of 
the German market. So that the phenomenal growth in revenue 
in 1918 was not indicative of any widespread accumulation of 
wealth. When the rains failed in 1918, indiscriminate 
profiteering by foreign firms and exploitative chiefs added 
to the crisis to produce a volatile situation in 1919. The 
result was the Anti-Syrian riots.
Wartime privation and economic backwardness were to impinge 
significantly on the already depleted supply of rice and 
food. Rice smuggling over the frontier to French Guinea, the 
requisitioning of rice by the military authorities, a general 
lack of protection for the African producer, the hoarding of 
rice by traders, serious lapses in administrative circles 
over the distribution of available rice and the general 
famine of 1919, intensified the problem of food shortages and 
provided the triggers for urban and rural radicalism.
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